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ABSTRACT 
SEAPORTS AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF 
The practical and theoretical relationship between transport and development is 
examined in relation to the evolution and operation of maritime transport systems which focus 
on the major seaports of the Persian Gul f . Concentrating on the ports of Kuwait, Bahrain and 
Dubai, and using a 'systems' methodology, the negative, as well as positive issues which have 
emanated from the post-war era of unparalleled economic development and expansion are 
extracted for analysis. 
Confirmation of the hypothesis that since the late nineteenth century the intrusion of 
modern systems of transport Into Gulf society has dismembered, but not destroyed, a former 
pattern of life based on trading in dhows, leads to the conclusion that a spatial 'dualism' 
exists in the Gul f , differentiated by the extent to which modern technology has percolated 
traditional social and economic life. 
In practical terms, the research focuses on three areas: it measures the spatial extent 
of the existing dhow trading network; it comments on the inter-relationship between port 
expansion projects and the general pattern of economic development within the Gulf ; and 
it highlights problems relating to the overtonnaging of shipping services and port congestion 
in the Gulf . 
Theoretically, the relationship between seaports and development is assessed in the 
context of the significance of behavioural aspects of decision-making in port development 
and operation. Secondly, the social impact of the modernisation of transport services, measured 
in terms of the concentration of Investment at the major points of linkage with the world 
economy - the port cities - is perceived as exacerbating spatially unbalanced growth to the 
detriment of groups living in peripheral towns and villages. 
"In 1498 Vasco da Gama was at Malindi in East Africa 
looking for a pilot to take him to India. There he found 
none other than Ahmed ibn-Majid, and persuaded him to 
conduct the Portuguese squadron across to Calicut. Thus, 
by one of the ironies of history, a great Arab seaman helped 
bring about the undoing of Arab navigation, for the Arabs 
could neitfier drive out nor compete with the Portuguese and 
other European nations which followed them." 
(Hourani, 1963, p83-84). 
PERSIAN GULF/ARABIAN GULF 
Throughout this thesis the term 'Persian G u l f is generally used 
to denote the study region. It is appreciated that the term 'Arabian G u l f is 
in common usage in the contemporary Gulf . However, rather than use the 
clumsy term 'Arab-Persian G u l f the label 'Persian G u l f has been adopted far 
convenience within the text as ft appears to be the most commonly used 
alternative throughout the world. Ik use implies no disrespect to the Arab 
community. 
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CHAPTER 1 . 
THE NATURE OF PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF SEAPORTS I N THE PERSIAN G U L F 
1 
The f i rs t chapter represents an a t tempt to c l a r i f y the nature of problems w h i c h 
re la te to the rap id bu i l d up o f f o re ign t rade and levels of na t iona l income in the G u l f 
dur ing the I960's and I970*s in so far as they imp inge on ports and s h i p p i n g . The a i m 
is to iso late the major concep tua l themes w h i c h de r i ve from an era of rap id change in 
w h i c h t r ad i t i ona l as w e l l as modern modes of mar i t ime transport have adapted , or have 
had to a d a p t , to chang ing economic c i rcumstances. 
Throughout the thesis the genera l c u t - o f f po in t for the analysis is the beg inn ing o f 
1980. D e t a i l e d analys is is cu r t a i l ed a t the end of 1978 for the "modern* sector o f ports 
and s h i p p i n g , w h i l e the close analys is o f the ' t r a d i t i o n a l * dhow sector re lates to f i e l d 
work car r ied out up to the end of 1973. 
I . I . SEAPORTS, TRADE A N D DEVELOPMENT 
In an era o f rap id c h a n g e , both the adequacy of the Gulfs ' seaports and the e f f i c i e n c y 
of the sea transport systems serv ing the reg ion are o f c r i t i c a l impor tance I f the deve lopment 
process occur r ing in the w a k e of accumu la t i ng o i l revenues Is not to be undermined by 
congested harbours and choked warehouses. Seaports are p a r t i c u l a r l y c ruc ia l to the 
reg ion 's economic heal th because the G u l f states are h e a v i l y dependent on imports to sustain 
the i r deve lopment o b j e c t i v e s , over n i ne t y percent (by we igh t ) of w h i c h a r r i ve by sea . The 
ma jo r i t y o f consumer goods and items of cap i t a l equ ipment a r r i v e through the ports: these 
i nc lude basic foodstu f fs , cons t ruc t ion equipment to b u i l d roads and other Items of 
i n f ras t ruc tu re , cement to erec t houses, pipes for sewers, cab le for e l e c t r i c a l systems, 
equ ipment to t rea t w a t e r , and mach inery to establ ish the indust r ia l base of the G u l f s ta tes. 
As a w h o l e , the G u l f states impor ted close to 40 m i l l i o n tons of such items by sea a t the 
end of the I970's (see S m i t h , 1978, p65), most o f w h i c h a r r i ved through port f a c i l i t i e s 
o r i g i n a l l y designed to hand le no more than a ten percen t annual g rowth in t rade (El Z e i n , 1977, 
3 0 - 3 1 ) . 
2 
The r e a l i t y of the 1970's has been tha t the t rade levels at the end of Hie decade 
bear no resemblance to those exper ienced at its b e g i n n i n g , or in previous decades. The 
root cause of this sharp upturn in the absolu te and r e l a t i v e levels o f t rade l ies in the 
steep r ise in the p r i ce of o i l in 1973, 1974 and subsequent years w h i c h led to a sudden 
jump in na t iona l expend i tu re levels in the G u l f a f te r 1974. A t the beg inn ing o f the 
decade imports from the U . K . t o the G u l f states rose 14% by v a l u e f rom 1970 to 1971 
( M i d d l e East Economic D iges t , 1972, 1 6 / 6 , p . 167). F o l l o w i n g the large o i l p r i ce rises o f 
1973, 1974, O . E . C D . stat is t ics show tha t the va l ue of sales f rom Western Europe, J a p a n , 
the Un i ted States and Canada to A rab M i d d l e Eastern states rose by 5 7 % in 1974, 6 5 % 
in 1975 and 2 2 % in the f i rst ha l f o f 1976 ( c a l c u l a t e d in f . o . b . te rms) . These t rade levels 
represent f igures app rox ima te l y four t imes greater than the wo r l d average a t the t i m e . In 
1977, exports from the U . K . t o M i d d l e Eastern states rose by 2 8 % from the previous yea r . 
I n e v i t a b l y , these rap id annua l increases in rhe l eve l of t r a d e , p a r t i c u l a r l y t o the G u l f , 
a l t hough reced ing in the la te 1970's from the ' boom ' levels of the midd le d e c a d e , 
t rans la ted themselves i n to rap id increases in the leve l of cargo tonnages hand led i n the 
por ts . Duba i is an example o f this t r e n d , expe r i enc ing a rise In imports (dwt) hand led 
from 514761 tons in 1971 to 3351081 tons in 1978. 
A number o f iheres emerge as a resul t of the i n te rp lay be tween trade l eve l s , deve lopment 
ob jec t i ves and seaport c a p a c i t i e s . F i rs t , the genera l r ise in the leve l o f imports in the G u l f 
through the I950 's , 1960's, and p a r t i c u l a r l y post 1973-74 has led a t var ious times to ser ious, 
sometimes severe , por t conges t ion , lead ing to the de lay o f u rgen t l y needed cargoes whose 
costs were increased by the a d d i t i o n o f surcharges l ev i ed by sh ipp ing con fe rences . A 
rea l i sa t i on o f the nega t i ve imp l i ca t i ons o f congested ports has led the governments o f the 
G u l f states in to ce r ta in courses o f a c t i o n to a l l e v i a t e na t i ona l c i rcumstances. A common 
response has been to deve lop or expand harbour f a c i l i t i e s so tha t the number o f wharves 
matches the demand for ber th ing space in the immedia te and longer terms. Hence the G u l f 
3 
has witnessed in the I950's and 1960's, and d r a m a t i c a l l y in the second ha l f of the 1970's, 
a spate o f deve lopment p r o j e c t s . A l l i e d to th is response has been a pa ra l l e l e f f o r t to improve 
vessel ru rn -a round- t? me e i ther by invest ing in new techno logy to speed d ischarge times 
( e . g . con ta iner cranes, Ro-Ro berths or L . A . S . H . Systems), or by i n t roduc ing new port 
management schemes ( sometimes run by overseas compan ies) , or b o t h . 
Many of the G u l f states have In the same t ime per iod sought to d i ve rs i f y the i r n a t i o n a l 
economies away from a narrow r e l i a n c e on o i l and o i l p roduc t expor ts . A number o f 
c a p i t a l - i n t e n s i v e indus t r ia l i za t ion schemes have formed the backbone o f this d r i v e to 
d i v e r s i f y , and because many o f these pro jec ts are based on impor ted raw mater ia ls together 
w i t h an a im o f marke t ing the major p ropor t i on o f manufac tured output overseas, several 
G u l f states have sought to base some of the i r indus t r ia l p l an t on sites ad jacen t to port 
f a c i l i t i e s . Whereas , the resul t of concer ted ef for ts a t por t deve lopment has been the 
d i m i n u a t i o n s ince 1977 of widespread por t congest ion w i t h i n the G u l f , the scale o f these 
pro jects has i n e v i t a b l y led to a number o f imp l i ca t i ons w h i c h f o l l o w f rom such investments. 
F i r s t l y , the cost o f the p le thora o f por t deve lopment schemes e i ther r e c e n t l y comple ted 
or present ly under const ruc t ion is very h igh in f i n a n c i a l terms. The pub l ished costs of such 
port deve lopment pro jec ts w i t h i n the G u l f ( I nc l ud ing Oman) add up to a p p r o x i m a t e l y 
£ 4 , 0 0 0 M i l l i o n a t 1978 pr ices and invo lves the use of considerable quan t i t i es o f fo re ign 
labour and cons t ruc t ion equ ipmen t . Assuming a l l these pro jects are comple ted they w i l l 
raise the to ta l be r th ing c a p a c i t y of the G u l f from 121 ex is t ing berths in A p r i l , 1978 ( C i v i l 
E n g i n e e r i n g , A p r i l 1978, p . 2 0 ) , to a to ta l o f 370 In the ea r l y 1980's. Such an increase has 
led to specu la t ion tha t the G u l f w i l l move from u n d e r - c a p a c i t y o f berths in the mid 1970's 
to o v e r - c a p a c i t y by the ea r l y 1980's, represent ing a consequent waste o f resources espec ia l l y as 
so many o f the berths present ly under const ruc t ion are o f the t r ad i t i ona l t y p e , whereas the 
t rend in wo r l d sh ipp ing and port deve lopment has moved towards a r e l a t i v e Increase in the 
use of conta iner ized cargo hand l i ng methods. 
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Second l y , as a resul t of the po l i c i es o f a l l the G u l f s ta tes , to indust r ia l ize and 
broaden the base of the i r na t iona l economies , a number o f them have sought e i ther 
i n d i v i d u a l l y , or in c o - o p e r a t i o n , to deve lop indigenous sh ipp ing companies , the m a j o r i t y 
o f w h i c h l i nk the G u l f to overseas markets in d i r ec t compe t i t i on w i t h long-es tab l i shed 
overseas car r ie rs . These investments i n v o l v e f i n a n c i a l risks not least because they have 
been t a k i n g p lace in the atmosphere o f a d o w n - t u r n in the w o r l d economy w h i c h i n i t i a l l y 
h i t the tanker and bulk sh ipp ing trades and subsequent ly a f f e c t e d l iner operat ions in the 
second h a l f o f the 1970's ( O ' B y r n e , 1978, p .20) 
In contrast to the modern ports and sh ipp ing sectors o f the G u l f economy the in fo rmal 
mar i t ime transport systems w h i c h u t i l i se s o - c a l l e d ' i n te rmed ia te * t echno logy have suf fered 
from both neg lec t and c o m p e t i t i o n from other transport modes. Those trades w h i c h u t i l i ze 
the t r a d i t i o n a l dhow transport have not on l y been depr i ved o f the investment i n sh ipp ing 
services and port f a c i l i t i e s acco rded to l iner t rades, but have also had to adapt the i r 
markers in the face o f c o m p e t i t i o n f rom new techno logy in sh ipp ing ( i . e . un i t i zed methods) 
and from deve lop ing road and a i r trades a long the G u l f l i t t o r a l and b e y o n d . There are 
excep t i ons , for example the buoyant dhow-based t rade routes w h i c h focus on D u b a i , but in 
genera l the t r ad i t i ona l soc io-economic pa t te rn of l i f e a long the shores o f the G u l f is 
th rea tened w i t h a sharp con t rac t i on in both the in tens i t y and spat ia l reach of its ope ra t i ons . 
The spat ia l imp l i ca t i ons o f the pat te rn o f port deve lopment have become more pronounced 
dur ing the I 9 7 0 , s , opera t ing on t w o l e v e l s . F i r s t l y , the ear ly I980*s revea l a d i s t i nc t change 
in the h i e ra r ch ia l pa t te rn o f ports in the G u l f compared w i t h the beg inn ing of the previous 
d e c a d e . Second l y , the rush to b u i l d and expand harbours i n e v i t a b l y impl ies that por t 
h in te r lands and forelands w i l l i n some cases over lap to a degree not p rev ious ly e x p e r i e n c e d . 
The phenominon of port compe t i t i on appears a t the beg inn ing o f the 1980's to be most acu te 
in the Uni ted A rab Emirates. 
5 
Before p roceed ing fu r ther , the rema in ing sections o f f h i s chapter w ' l l discuss in 
greater depth each of the major ihe-res that have emerged in this s e c t i o n . These themes 
w i l i In turn const i tu te the backdrop againsi w h i c h the subsequent analysis presented in 
this thesis w i l l be set . 
1 .2. PORT C O N G E S T I O N 
Dur ing the mid I970's a number o f the Governments of the G u l f states r e c e i v e d a 
shock . In each case the diagnosis was c h r o n i c , import i n d i g e s t i o n . The years 1975, 
1976 and 1977 were a sharp, pa in fu l reminder that the capac i t y of the i r respect ive seaports 
must bear a d i r e c t re la t ionsh ip to ac tua l levels o f t r ade . Dur ing these years a t i da l f l ood o f 
imports caused serious problems associated w i t h acu te port conges t ion . 
The inadequacy o f port f a c i l i t i e s is not s imply a problem thor arose in the I970's. 
se lec t i ve port congest ion has b e d e / I l e d ce r ta in ports dur ing the previous t w o decades 
w i t h a character is t ic symptom of ships l y i n g a* anchor o f f shore e i ther w a i t i n g for o be r t h , 
or d ischarg ing cargoes s low ly in to barges where deep-wate r harbours were l a c k i n g . As 
levels o f t rade b u i l t up s tead i l y In the 1950's and !960's some Governments found ••hat 
the i r ports suf fered from port congest ion because o f the absense of deep -wa te r ber ths, 
aggravated In some cases by slow methods of cargo hand l ing on shore. The I ran ian ports 
of Khorramshahr and Bandar Shahpour, the I raq i port of Basra, the Saudi port of Dan-imam 
and the port o f K u w a i t had a l l found d i f f i c u l t y In coping w i t h an increas ing annua l leve l 
of imports associated w i t h ambi t ions programmes o f economic and soc ia l d e v e l o p m e n t TSie 
port o f Bahrain operated close to capac i ty i n response to its hea l thy t ransi t and re -expor* 
trades to ma in land por ts , hampered by the perpetua l use o f one of its six berths by m i l i t a r y 
c r a f t , in the la te 1960's and ear ly 1970's the ports o f the Truc ia l States (Un i ted A rab 
Emirates a f te r 1971), in pa r t i cu la r Abu Dhab i and D u b a i , jand the O m a n ' port o f M u s c a i , 
found tha t they could not sustain the i r respect ive deve lopment programmes w i t hou t recourse 
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ro the const ruct ion o f deep-wa te r harbours. Port deve lopment and expansion schemes 
were therefore part o f a cont inuous process of response to pe rce ived levels of port 
i nadequacy . The d i f f e rence in the mid !970's was that the cond i t i on of port congest ion 
became s imul taneously widespread throughout the G u l f . 
T h e o r e t i c a l l y , the c r i t i c a l re la t ionsh ip between seaports and development programmes 
in the LDC's (Less Deve loped Countr ies) has been establ ished in a number o f s tud ies. In 
g e n e r a l , i t appears that mar i t ime connect ions and ports have a far greater impact on the 
economies o f LDC's than is the case in the ma jo r i t y of more a d v a n c e d , indust r ia l states 
(Nagorsk i 1968, p . 3 6 ) . Hoy le and H i l l i n g (1970) emphasise tha t seaports in LDC's are nodes 
through w h i c h almost a l l ex te rna l trades passes a n d , as such, are w e l l p laced to a c t os 
e i ther o growth po in t , or as a res t r i c t i ve in f luence upon deve lopment H i l l i n g ' s (1970) 
study of the ports of Ghana (and other studies of Trop ica l A f r i c a n ports - W h i t e , K h o g c l i , 
Hance and Schul tz - a l l 1970) concludes that a seapor f Is a major determinant o f both the 
ra te o f g r o w t h , and the stage o f economic development a t t a i ned In Its h i n t e r l a n d . U l t i m a t e l y 
this growth is re la ted to the capac i t y and degree of soph is t ica t ion o f port f ac i l i t i e s (p.126) . 
Op t imum port capac i t y in this contex t is de f ined as the po in t at w h i c h a port increases its 
t r a f f i c on l y at the expense of conges t ion , delays to shipping and a genera! increase in 
costs. Whereas a number o f G u ' f ports had reached opt imum capac i t y at var ious points 
dur ing the previous twen ty years , i t seems that in the mid I970's v i r t u a l l y a l l the G u l f por+s 
reached opt imum capac i t y s imu l taneous ly . 
The causes of port congest ion in the G u l f in the mid 1970's have beer, a t t r i b u t e d 
la rge ly to the spending boom f o l l o w i n g the quadrup l ing of the p r i ce o f a barre l of o i l In 
the wake of the M i d d l e East War of 1973 ( M i d d l e East Econ imic D iges t , 25 March 1977). 
The resu l t ing torrent o f cargoes a r r i v i n g at G u l f ports proved far in excess of the tonnage 
that the t r ad i t i ona l ( i . e . n o n - c o n t a i n e r e e d ) hand l ing systems cou ld cope w i t h . Fur ther , 
hSis vo lume o f tonnage was aggrava ted by the fac t that i n i t i a l l y the ports con t inued to be 
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serv iced mostly by conven t iona l b reak -bu l k ships wh i ch used r e l a t i v e l y slow and l abou r -
in tens ive hand l ing methods. However , this essent ia l ly s e l f - i n f l i c t e d cause of congest ion 
was not the sole factor though i t d i d serve to in f l a te other unde r l y i ng pressures. 
The 1973 War cu r ta i l ed the v i t a l o v e r - l a n d transit t rade routes l i n k i n g Europe and the 
Levant w i t h the G u l f states w i t h the result that parts such as Shuwaikh in Kuwa i t became 
o v e r - l o a d e d as ships unable to d ischarge at the congested porH of Dammam, Jeddah and 
Aqaba ( i n Jordan) began o f f - l o a d i n g cargoes dest ined for Saudi A rab ia (Smith 1978, p . 4 5 ) . 
The la ter outbreak of f i g h t i n g in Beruit resu l ted in the closure o f its por t and fur ther 
aggrava ted the transi t t rade s i t u a t i o n . In the eastern M e d i t e r r a n e a n , Tartous and La tak ia 
became congested due to Berui t 's c losu re , f o l l owed by moves by the Syr ian Government to 
reduce transi t t r a f f i c and reserve ber th ing space for its own g row ing l eve l of Imports. In 
bann ing I raq i o v e r - l a n d cargoes from t rans i t ing its t e r r i t o ry u n t i l re la t ions were eased in 
1978, t h e , S y i a n Government added to the leve l of port congest ion in the G u l f . The Syrian; 
a c t i o n not on ly h i t the I raq i port o f Basra where ships were ob l i ged to w a i t up to 90 days 
for a ber th dur ing 1977, but also the ports o f K u w a i t , Jordan and Eastern Turkey where 
arrangements had been made to he lp w i t h t ransi t problems. 
W i t h i n the G u l f , congest ion was he lped a long by two further fac to rs . First ly vessel 
t u rn -a round times were lengthened in some cases by slowness in un load ing cargoes. O n c e 
ashore cargoes were aga in sometimes slow to be c leared from warehouses and open storage 
areas, lead ing u l t i m a t e l y to some je t t ies becoming choked w i t h unc la imed cargoes. The 
prob lem o f a c c u m u l a t i n g , unc la imed cargoes was p a r t i c u l a r l y acute in Bahrain and D u b a i . 
In the case o f Bahrain a survey by the Bahrain Soc ie ty of Engineers (Shipping Wor ld and 
Sh ipbu i l de r , January 1976) suggested that the i nd i sc ip l i ne o f l oca l consignees, who t rea ted 
t ransi t sheds as cheap warehouses and who refused to take d e l i v e r / o f th eir goo<is un t i l a 
long per iod of t ime had e lapsed , hod been the main cajse of congest ion in the port o f M i n a 
Sul rnan. 
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Secondly, the sheer volume of imports shipped to the Gulf was accompanied 
by a rush of both large and small shipping companies to open new services to the 
region. This process led to a situation where many of the Gulf trade routes with the 
rest of the world were clearly over tonnaged (O'Byrne, 1978, p.20) as represented 
by a situation in which more ships were servicing the Gulf ports than was justified in 
terms of the gross volume of cargoes that required to be carried. 
The severity of port congestion measured in terms of the average waiting time for 
vessels requesting a berth at each of the Gulf's major ports is illustrated in Table 1.1. It 
is less easy to obtain data concerning congestion on-shore. In most cases there was a 
dramatic rise in average vessel waiting times through 1974 and 1975, rising to a peak 
in 1976 and early 1977. Equally sharply, waiting time fell away steeply in 1978. In 
the upper Gulf, the Iranian ports of Khorramshahr and Bandar Shahpour experienced the 
worst levels of congestion in the region rising to a peak waiting time of approximately 
200 and 100 days respectively in mid 1976. In general, the total capacity of the Iranian 
ports which, in 1973, stood at 3.8 million tons per annum, could not cope with the four 
fold increase in the level of imports in the two year period 1974-1975, which led to a 
situation where, in 1975, Iran's ports handled 9.8 million tons, three times their capacity 
(Barnard, 1976). However, by the beginning of 1978 delay times had dropped precipitously 
to 3 - 6 days in the case of Khorramshahr, and 5-10 at Bandar Shahpour. Bulk (non-
conference) cargoes tended to experience longer delays at Bandar Shahpour (7-35 days), 
as well as at Bandar Abbas, Bushire, Kuwait and Basra. In the Iraqi port of Basra waiting 
times were consistently high (around 60 days) throughout 1974-76, rising to a peak of 90 
days in 1977 and falling back to 7-8 days by early 1978. Kuwait reported no delays in 
early 1978, but the port had experienced delays of around 50 days throughout 1976 and 
1977. Unfortunately, at the time of writing (1980) the ports of Basra and Khorramshahr are 
now closed in the wake of the military conflict between Iraq and Iran, once again aggravating 
the situation in other ports in the region. 
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In the mid-Gulf, the port of Dammam was the most congested Gulf port prior 
to the Middle East War of 1973. Delays of between 20 and 30 days during 1973 and 
1974 were reduced for a time fn 1975 when new berths came into operation but 
ultimately the spectacular rise in imports (Saudi Arabia imported 27,594,000 tons in 1977, 
a 65% increase on 1976) forced up delay times to 90 days in 1976, before they were 
cut again to nil by the beginning of 1978. Bahrain's delay rates, though not as high as 
some rose to a peak of 30 days in 1976 and 1977. The smaller, Qatar! port of Doha 
(four deep water berths) was seriously overloaded by transit cargoes en route to Saudi 
Arabia which pushed up its delay times to a peak of 130 days in 1976. 
Across the Gulf, the low level of trade passing through the port of Bushire meant 
that congestion was not a serious problem. However , lower down the Gulf the enhanced 
role of Bandar Abbas in the development of South West Iran, together with conditions in 
Khorramshahr and Bandar Shahpour, forced up delay times to 120 days in 1976, before 
they dropped again in 1977 and 1978. Dubai was the least congested and largest port 
in the Gulf in the early I970's but even it experienced very long delay times of 70-80 
days in 1977, twice the level of neighbouring Abu Dhabi. In the Gulf of Oman, the 
port of Matrah in general escaped the serious congestion experienced in the Persian Gulf. 
The financial costs of this mid-decade congestion were high, both for shippers and 
for Governments. Faced with the escalating operating costs for vessels lying idle in Gulf 
waters (which increased from $5000 to $8000 a day between 1976 and 1977), shipping 
conferences elected to post high congestion surcharges on congested ports. In general 
surcharges averaged 10-25% in 1975 (with the exception of Basra at 100%), rose to 
levels of 50-100% in 1976, and fell back to 0-30% in 1977 (Middle East Economic Digest, 
March, 1977; Smith, 1978; Arab Economist, July 1975). A second form of action taken by 
shippers was to increase the number of container and roll •n-roll off (Ro - Ro) services 
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The response by Governments to port congestion was to retaliate against shippers, 
as well as setting about curing their own problems of port congestion. A severe example 
of the types of problem involved is the case of Iron which at the beginning of 1976 hod the 
dubious distinction of possessing the most congested ports in the Gulf. Demurrage charges 
alone were costing the state more than $ 1 billion a year (Smith 1978, p.49). Waiting 
times at Khorramshahr reached five months with queues sometimes in excess of 200 vessels. 
The result was that the rate of inflation in Iran was sent even higher, motor vehicles became 
a black market commodity, cement fetched five or ten times the official price, and the 
pace of industrial development was threatened. A shipper cites the case of a vessel carrying 
31,000 tons of Australian wheat which waited outside Bandar Shahpour for 104 days in 
1976. The contract allowed for only 8 days for off-loading and the Iranian Government had 
to pay for 96 days delay at a daily penalty rate of $7,250 - which led to a final bill of 
$696,000 (Barnard, 1976 p.41). 
In some cases action was taken against shippers. For example, Qatar banned ships which 
were more than 15 years old, and Kuwait barred ships with under 400 tons of cargo to 
discharge (Barnard, 1976, p.42), but the main thrust of Government responses was to put 
their own house in order by improving rates of discharge and increasing the number of 
conventional, container and Ro-Ro berths. A number of Governments responded by re-
organizing their port administration and port services, sometimes with the use of expatriate 
labour. One example was the employment of Gulf Port Management Services (a joint venture 
by Scruttons, U.K. , and the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board) at Dammam which was 
responsible for cutting the waiting time for vessels from 96 days to nil in the period 1976-
1977. Throughout the Gulf docksides and warehouses were gradually cleared with the use 
of various measures including the use of shift systems, the employment of foreign hired 
labourers, the simplification of paper work, and the installation of new port technology 
(e.g. container cranes.) For some ports matters were improved considerably by tightening 
up on conditions for part storage. In Kuwait, a years grace was allowed before uncleared 
goods were auctioned, in Dubai it was six months, in Saudi Arabia, fifteen days (Whelan, 1977) 
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However, although many of the Governments of tfie Gulf states differed precisely 
in the options adopted to clear docksides of cluttered cargoes, one option was embraced 
almost universally as the panacea towards the prevention of a future recurrence of the 
problem. This was the costly decision to develop or expand harbour facilities, and as 
such deserves more detailed attention. 
1.3 INVESTMENT IN PORT FACILITIES 
Port construction projects presently underway in the Persian Gulf constitute one of 
the largest regional programmes of port development ever seen in the so-called less 
developed world. The rush to develop harbours is so earnest that the Gulf faces the real 
possibility of moving from a position of netunder-provision of berths to net over-provision 
in the decade 1973-1982. The Gulf states now recognise that if their national economies 
are to develop into anything like their projected scenarios there has to be an efficient, 
unimpeded flow of cargoes into the region. However, it now seems that although some 
schemes are realistic ?n terms of the likely future demand for port capacity, others may be 
over-ombitions. 
The scale and speed of the port development process is indicative of the strength of 
reaction to port congestion. Table 1.2 lists the current and projected number of berths 
in the Gulf up to 1982. The increase in the total number of berths is almost exponential 
rising from 30 conventional berths in 1970, to 75 in 1973, 157 (of which 12 were container 
or Ro - Ro berths) in 1977 to 292 in 1979 (of which 41 were container or Ro - Ro berths), 
with a projected level of 465 (55 container or Ro- Ro) by T983 (Owens, 1978; Gomer 1977). 
Nearly all the major deep-water parts, with the exception of Bushire, Basra and Matrah, 
have significant port expansion projects under construction in the period 1978 - 1982. Some 
are modest, for example expansion at Bahrain and Doha, but others are major ventures such 
as the projects based on Bandar Abbas, Bandar Shahpour, Dammam, Dubai and Jebel Ali 
(U .A.E . ) . The overall trend seems to be for the contained dominance of conventional berths, 
TABLE 1.2 PERSIAN GULF PORT DEVELOPMENT 13 
(General Cargo Facilities) 
Existing Facilities, 1977 Future Expa nsion 1978 - 1982 
rate / Port Berths Cranes Berths Cranes 
C R L C * C * R L P C * 
AHRAIN - Sulman 11 2 2 1 2 
?AN - Abaddn 3 3 1 
- Bandar Abbas 6 6 14 4 2 1 4 
- Bandar Shahpour 6 3 1 2 24 1 2 
- Bush ire 2 1 
- Khorramshahr 9 2 4 
RAQ - Basra 15 68 1 1 
- Umm Qasr 4 11 1 2 14 
- Zubair 5 
CUWAIT - Shuaiba 3 5 6 4 1 
- Shuwaikh 18 69 2 24 2 
DMAN - Matrah 8 4 1 
2ATAR - Doha 4 2 3 
- Umm Said 4 
- Jazirat Alyah 50 
5AUDI - Dammam 15 3 1 2 19 2 2 
ARABIA - Jubail 2 12 2 7 
- RasAlGhar 7 
- Ras Al Mishab 1 2 
U.A.E. - Abu Dhabi 12 1 3 1 8 
- Jebel Ali 14 5 40 
- Dubai 20 1 2 16 2 
• Fujairah 10 
- Sharjah S 2 1 2 7 
- Khor Fakkan 2 2 ) 
- Ras Al Khaimah 1 3 2 1 
- Umm Al Qaiwan 1 
T 1 
i 
Key C = Conventional; * = Container; R = Ro-Ro; L = LASH; P = Planned ! 
after P . G . O w e n , Dock and Harbour Authority, October, 1978, P. 167. i 
i 
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but with an increasing proportion of specialized quays for container, Ro-Ro, and LASH craft 
at selected ports. 
Three different, though related processes, seem to present themselves as justification 
for port development schemes. First, the level of trade in the mid-1970's exceeded the 
capacity of many Gulf ports. Whereas investigations have shown that a well-equiped, 
efficiently operated general cargo berth can comfortably achieve a throughput of 120,000 
tons per annum under normal circumstances (Owens, 1978, p. 164), levels as high as 
400,000 tons a berth were achieved in some ports at the height of the congestion period in 
1976, levelling out to an average throughput of around 250,000 in 1977 with the arrival 
of frequent containerized and Ro-Ro shipping services. Secondly, the handling advantages 
offered by container, Ro-Ro and LASH shipping systems in terms of faster turn-around time 
seemed to justify investment in new, specialized berths and container gantries, at least in 
the short term battle against congestion. Third, an increase in the demand for berths was 
clearly part and parcel of the efforts of all the Gulf states to diversify their unbalanced, 
petroleum-dominated economies in the direction of major industrialization projects many of 
which are located in coastal locations adjacent to specialised port facilities. 
Considerable skeptism has, however, been levelled at some of the projects in hand, 
particularly by commentators outside the states concerned. Uppermost are doubts as to 
whether the levels of trade in the Gulf in the 1980's will grow as fast as they did in the 
1970's. Owens (1978) expressed the view that the future prospects for ports are likely to 
be influenced by an atmosphere of moderated traffic growth and excessive shipping 
capacity (p.164). It seems likely that the period 1978-1983 will witness a process of 
progressive port over-capacity as traffic growth falls behind that rate at which new berths 
are opened. Set against this process is the possibility that another sharp rise in oil prices 
may again set off an import boom, or that continued political instability in the Middle 
East will precipitate the closure of some trade routes (e.g. the Iraq-Iran War which 
15 
began in 1980). It is however apparent that the pattern of imports into the Gulf is 
unbalanced in favour of large quantities of construction materials, and that as such the 
level of imports is closely associated with the number, type and intensity of development 
projects under way. Hughes(1979) has noted that construction materials, particularly 
bagged cement, make up a high proportion of the tonnage imported into the Gulf, and 
that decline in the construction boom, together with efforts to manufacture some of the 
products locally, would seriously threaten the levels of trade in some ports, notably Doha, 
Dubai and Bahrain. 
Changes in the use of transport technology in the Gulf have also given rise to doubts 
about the wisdom of building so many new berths. It seems likely that penetration in the use 
of container, Ro-Ro and other modern handling equipment will continue in the short term, 
eroding the dominance of conventional handling methods. If this trend continues it is 
possible that the considerable expansion in conventional facilities will lead to a situation 
where the vast investment required will be waisted in an atmosphere of unwanted berths 
(Smith, 1978, p.45). The evidence in Table 1.2 suggests that over-capacity is likely to be most 
apparent in the United Arab Emirates. Balanced against this possibility is the fact that 
given the mainly one-way nature of seaborne traffic in the Gulf it is difficult to justify 
long-term investment in container and Ro-Ro terminals, specialized container vessels, and 
the range of required back-up services. Containerization certainly played a major role in 
clearing the back-log of cargoes in the mid-1970's. However, this was essentially a short 
term problem: in the longer term many of the cargoes required for the 1980's, especially 
heavy construction equipment, may not be so easily containerized. A specialized, versatile 
type of vessel which can carry Ro-Ro or heavy lift cargoes may therefore be developed for use 
on Persian Gulf trades (0*Byrne 1978). 
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The position is further complicated by the increasing of the rood network along 
the eastern Arabian coast, linking Europe with Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the 
United Emirates and Oman, together with the causeway between Bahrain and the Saudi 
mainland. These projects will affect ports such as Bahrain which have traditionally 
conducted sizeable transit and re-export trades. 
Overseas companies fighting to secure lucrative development contracts naturally 
see no advantage in slowing the regions rapid expansion of port facilities, since shipments 
associated with these projects and their supplementary cargoes have not only kept 
International construction companies operating profitably, but also promise to provide 
ship owners and ship operators with business for some time to come (Middle East Economic 
Digest, April 1978). However, within the Gulf states the implications of port over-
capacity are sometimes viewed differently. The Gulf-based consultant engineers. Sir 
William Halcrow and Partners have had the opinion that too many berths are being built 
in the Gulf for some years, and have responded by turning their energies to what they 
consider to be the next stage in the development of the Gulf, namely the installation of 
more desalinization and irrigation plants, and power stations. A conference on Arab Ports, 
held in London in July 1978, expressed fears that the level of port expansion in the Gulf 
was not justified by the (then) present rate of growth in demand for such services, or by 
rational justification despite the possibility of future fluctuations (Arab Economist, Oct, 
1978). 
As a group, the governments of the Gulf tfates are, in general, aware of the significance 
of seaports to the regional economy, and some of them have gone some way towards co-
ordinating their development proposals. The Arab Gulf Union of Ports was set up in 1977, 
based in Dammam (Gower, 1977) and in 1978 the Arab Union of Parts was set up under the 
auspices of the Arab League in an effort to coordinate all Arab ports under one umbrella by 
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functioning as a central information point for the collection of statistics such as those relating 
to cargo turnover and port expansion plans. However, at a meeting in Basra to elect a 
general manager for AUP, only 9 out of 22 Arab League Members attended, two of which -
Kuwait and Iraq - represented the Gulf (The Middle East, August 1978). 
Hitherto however, cooperation in concrete terms has been limited, with serious 
implications for the Gulf. Whereas on the one hand fears have been voiced that individual 
states will find it difficult to cover the capital and operating costs of their new berths in a 
situation of low utilization without recourse to the subsidization of tariffs, on the other there 
Is the basic underlying problem of the location of the Gulf ports. As in other parts of the 
world, government projections of national economic development and trade growth are some 
times over-optimistic, reflected at another level by individual port authorities who have formed 
over-optimistic views on the competitiveness and traffic prospects for individual ports 
(Owens, 1978). Such competitiveness is crucial in the Gulf where a number of micro-states 
and federated shaikhdoms compete with each other as well as with the larger states. It is 
therefore the spatial implications of port development in the Gulf that are the basis for 
concern as to the nature and extent of new construction projects. 
1.4 SPATIAL AND LOCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF PORT DEVELOPMENT 
The spatial implications of the extensive development of ports in the Gulf centre on 
the fact that the competitive hinterlands of nearly all the major seaports of the region overlap 
to a greater or lesser extent on either landward or seaward margins, or both. Although some 
ports are 'national ports' in the sense that their primary role is to serve the inland urban and 
rural communities of the state (for example, Dammam, Basra, Khorromshahr, Bandar Shahpour, 
Bushire, Bandar Abbas and Matrah), others have a dual function in which a significant 
proportion of imported cargoes are ultimately re-exported or shipped in transit to ports and 
port hinterlands elsewhere in the Gulf. This latter group includes the parts of Kuwait, 
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Bahrain, Doha, Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah. In practice this means that parts of the 
territorial space of a number of Gulf states are served regularly by parts other than their 
national ports. 
Given the configuration of the Gulf as a maritime cul-de-sac it is reasonable to 
consider the ports to be members of an inter-related group in which they exhibit certain 
levels of functional association and inter dependence between each other. Ogundana (1970) has 
defined such a regional group of ports as a 'port complex' which, "based on his Nigerian 
case study, may be viewed as being a set of ports which individually may be in a 
complimentary or competitive relationship to each other. Broadly, two particular ports may 
be considered to be in a complimentary relationship if they each develop separate, 
specialist trading functions which together serve a common hinterland; while a competitive 
relationship will develop when two ports compete against each other to serve a common 
hinterland with the same functions. 
Viewed in time, the process of changing competitive or complimentary associations 
between ports in a 'port complex' leads to the development of a hierarchy of major and 
minor ports, and coastal villages, measured variously according to different indices of 
traffic flow (R immer 1966 A and B, 1967 A; Carter 1962; Nai-Chung Sun and Bunamo 1974; 
ShaefFer 1965; Kenyon 1970). In the context of the Gulf the instability of the port hierarchy 
is typified by the demise of the ports of Siraf, Hormuz, Lingeh and Muscat to contemporary 
positions of relative insignificance. 
The key, therefore, to the success of a port at any period of time lies in its ability to 
command sufficient trade from its surrounding hinterland (Boerman , 1951). Theoretically, 
the notions of a 'port complex', 'port hierarchy' and 'port hinterland' were put together 
in a 'third world' context by Taaffe, Morrill and Gould (1963) in their study of the development 
of transport networks in ©hana and Nigeria. The explanatory model derived from this study 
depicts a so-called 'ideaI-typical' sequence of processes whereby the success of one port at 
the expense of others in a 'port complex' is derived from the gradual hinterland penetration of 
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a port in concert with the development of inland transport networks. If such a model is 
to be applied to the Gulf one would expect a regular spacing out of major and minor ports 
servingthe inland urban and rural communities of Arabia, Iraq and Iran. The theory explains 
that in reality two major, competitive ports serving the same hinterland would be unlikely 
to develop simultaneously, adjacent to each other. Ultimately one would dominate the 
other. 
A direct application of this model to the Gulf is complicated by its shape and the 
fact that for the entrepot group of ports a significant proportion of their respective 
hinterlands includes ports and villages across the waters of the Gulf in a form of 'seaward 
hinterland', or foreland. Rimmer's (1967) study of Australian seaports which in part 
attempted to adaptTaaffe, Morrill and Gould's model, also found difficulty in its direct 
application because the original model laid emphasis on land communication (I.e. the 
hinterland) and neglected the organization of maritime space (ie the foreland). In reality 
the maritime space of the Gulf is criss-crossed by o network of dhow, barge, Ro-Ro and 
LASH routes which link the ports and villages of the Gulf together in a manner less rigid 
and confined than the inland penetration of road and rail routes. Nevertheless, one would 
expect that in general terms the model would fit the Gulf context in the sense that over 
time an ordered hierarchy of ports would emerge based on competition for hinterlands and 
forelands. 
Blending this theory with the reality of port development in the Gulf brings one up 
against the observation that most states appear to have taken little account of port 
development plans in neighbouring countries (Owens, 1978, p. 164), and in one case, the 
United Arab Emirates, little cognisance seems to have been paid to development schemes 
in member Emirates. Some projects seem well planned to compliment one another in terms 
of overall national development programmes, namely the construction of separate commercial 
and industrial harbours as in the case of Kuwait (Shuwaikh and Shuaiba), Qatar (Doha and 
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Umm Said), Saudi Arabia (Dammam and Jubail) and Dubai (Port Rashid and Jebel Ali) , 
and in the case of SharjaHs development of two linked container ports at Port Khalid and 
Khor Fakkan. Some schemes, however, seem destined to intensify competition for trade in 
broadly overlapping hinterlands. In this context the development of the port of Dammam 
in Saudi Arabia would appear to threaten transit trade from Bahrain and Doha, while in 
the United Arab Emirates the scale of port development at the ports of Sharjah, Ras Al Khaimah, 
Fujaraih and Abu Dhabi seem questionable in the face of Dubai's dominance as the state's 
leading entrepot. On the Iranian coast it seems less likely that the expansion of Iranian 
harbours will seriously affect trade levels in Arabian entrepots whose main function is to 
supply the smaller Iranian coastal towns and villages. 
The locational implications seem more favourable than some of the spatial manifestations. 
The development of commercial and particularly industrial harbours ere providing the region 
with a number of 'growth poles* for industrial development in furtherance of the common aim 
of the Gulf states to d Tversify their economies. The development of heavy and light 
industrial enterprises such as those located at Bandar Shahpour, Shuaiba, Dammam, Sitra 
(Bahrain), Umm Said, Jebel Ali and Bandar Abbas are providing the states concerned with 
opportunities for down-stream industrialization through the investment in such export-
earning projects as the manufacture of fertilisers and the dry docking of oil tankers. Further, 
the general policy of industrialization, linked to the development of seaports, inevitably 
open up the question as to whether the Gulf states should invest in their own shipping 
fleets as a general adjunct to the drive towards diversification. 
1.5 INVESTMENT IN SHIPPING 
The events of the mid-1970's have confirmed the Gulf as one of the busiest shipping 
markets in the world, both for dry cargo and tanker trades. By 1980, an average of one 
ship passed through the straits of Hormuz in every twelve hours of each day (Hughes, 1979). 
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GROWTH OF TANKER AND DRY CARGO FLEETS IN THE GULF STATES 
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Source: Seatrade Publications (1979, p.33) 
* Figures for Iran relate to 1977, obtained from Lloyds Registry of Shipping. 
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However, this density of shipping conceals a number of inter-related problems facing 
the industry at the end of the last decade. Firstly, international shipping has been 
hit badly by a slackening in world economic activity (O'Byrne, 1977). In this 
depressed atmosphere the anti-cyclical character of merchant shipping resulted in 
an over-capacity of vessels as ships ordered earlier came into service at a time when there 
was no real need for them. Consequently, world wide freight rates dropped and forced 
'tramp' operators to transfer ships to liner-type 'ad hoc' ventures to explore the few 
remaining profitable trades, which in the late 1970's included the Gulf cargoes. The 
net result of the attractiveness of Gulf markets in an era of world economic slump was 
to channel an increasing number of vessels into the region's seaports, thereby contributing 
further to the situation of over-tonnaging that existed in the Gulf well before the rise 
of trade levels after the 1973-74 oil price rises. 
In such an atmosphere of crisis in world shipping it is, on the surface, surprising that 
some of the Gulf States should have chosen the period 1975-1980 as the moment to 
intensify their participation in the international shipping industry by expanding their 
national fleets and entering into a number of joint shipping ventures. Table 1.3 
illustrates the sharp rise in the size of the individual and joint fleers of a number of the 
Gulf states in the 1970's. Kuwait, in the late 1960's, emerged as a front runner by 
investing in significant tanker and dry cargo fleets operated by K . O . T. C . (Kuwait Oil 
Tanker Company) and K . S . C . (Kuwait Shipping Company) respectively, but she has since 
been joined by Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia who have latterly strengthened the size of 
their fleets. In general, plans laid by the Arab and Iranian shipping lines to capture 
a larger share of bulk and dry cargo markets yielded unspectacular results up until 1977 -
even less so in the oil and gas trades. By the end of 1977 the Arab dry oargo fleet, 
including fleets from outside the Gulf, accounted for less than 2.5% of the worlds dry 
cargo fleet (Smith, 1978 p.67). However, from 1978-1980 there were signs that this slow 
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progress was about to end. In 1977, Middle Eastern countries placed orders for 740 dry-
cargo vessels totalling 7 million dwt, more than one third of the total tonnage ordered 
during the year (Smith 1978, p67), of which the Gulf slrates of Kuwait, Iraq, Iran and 
Saudi Arabia contributed 747,659 dwt. During the same year these four states also had 
2,509,720 dwt. of tanker tonnage on order (Middle East Economic Digest, 25 March, 1977 
p. xviii). By October 1977, the major Gulf dry cargo carriers (the United Arab Shipping 
Company, Iraqi Line and Arya Line) were together estimated to be carrying almost a 
quarter of the total seabourne freight into the Gulf (North, 1977, p.9). 
The rationale underlying the decision of some of the Gulf states to attempt to 
carry an Increasing proportion of their own trade in their own vessels rests upon a number 
of local factors which seem to favour such a policy. The key linkage involves industrial 
development with investment in shipping. Whereas it is clearly a more urgent priority 
for the states concerned to invest in the short term in the development of port facilities 
to alleviate trading bottlenecks, in the longer term attempts by Governments to broaden 
national economies via programmes of Industrialization are bound to involve additional 
commitments to shipping (Couper, 1978, p.107). Investment in shipping is also going 
ahead, despite the world shipping crisis of late 1970's, because although parts of the so-
called 'Developed World' are experiencing economic recession, the Gulf states are still 
expanding economically with a resultant high level of demand for manufactured goods. 
In reality, the range of alternative industrial diversification projects available to the 
Gulf states are limited. The region is, in general, relatively well endowed with local 
capital and energy resources but poorly supplied with a number of critical physical and 
human (especially managerial and technical expertise) resources. In theory, investment 
in International shipping provides a suitable form of down-stream industrialization because 
it is at the same time both capitally intensive, and, has relatively low manpower 
requirements. It has the further advantage of being an international activity which can 
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not only supply, in the short term, the necessary imported manpower to administer and 
operate new shipping ventures, but also offers possibilities of a large market in contrast 
to the problems which sometimes beset industrialization schemes in so-called Mess 
Developed Countries' which suffer from the disadvantage of limited market size. It 
is also an enterprise that can expand quickly by the purchase of new or second-hand 
vessels (Couper, 1978). 
Strategic considerations can also be added to the economic benefits which derive 
from a viable international earnings base. Firstly, given that the Gulf states will 
remain a substantial importer of general cargo into the foreseeable future, the development 
of local fleets permits these companies to apply for membership of international shipping 
conferences wherein they are free to influence the determination of conference rates. 
Secondly, the move by O . A . P . E . C . countries to develop an indigenous, heavy industrial 
base (including petrochemical, fertiliser and steel manufacturing plant) would be better 
served by the development of local shipping fleets than can provide spatial linkages 
between plants, markets and resource supplies (Couper, 1978). 
However, balanced against the positive arguments in favour of shipping investment 
are a number of issues which cast doubt of the wisdom of large-scale participation in 
the industry. It is arguable that an adequate service is already being provided by foreign-
flag liners operating in the Gulf and that the addition of Gulf owned vessels will only 
add to problems of over-tonnaging. Equally, significant involvement in the tanker trades 
in a period of shipping recession with its attendent relatively low freight rates does not 
bode well for a high rate of return on capital invested. A further critical factor involves 
the problem of attracting sufficient locally trained Arabs and Iranians to man and operate 
new vessels, without which Gulf-based companies will have to rely on the employment 
of foreign personnel. A study by H.P. Drewry (Shipping Consultants) of the involvement 
of oil-exporting countries in international shipping has concluded that the current training 
schemes for maritime personnel will not provide sufficient manpower to meet the demands 
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of the Arab states until well Into the 1980's, and possibly into the 1990's (Middle East 
Economic Digest, 25 March, 1977 p.ii). 
The Gulf states would be unwise to invest heavily in international shipping unless 
they can guarantee its commercial viability. In the uncertain world trading regime of 
the second half of the 1970's governments have reached cautiously towards plans for 
major state investment projects. Against this back drop of economic uncertainty and 
man power shortages, some governments have attempted to offset these problems by 
entering into joint ventures with foreign shipping lines and business men. This policy of 
risk minimization contrasts with the late I960*s and early 1970's when individual stares 
preferred to develop their own independent shipping lines (e.g. Kuwait Shipping Company; 
Arya Lines, Iran). Throughout the 1970's an increasing number of governments and private 
business men have formed joint shipping ventures, ranging from the establishment of 
major companies such as the Arab Maritime Petroleum Tanker Company (A .M.P.T .C. , 
formed in 1973) and the United Arab Shipping Company ( U . A . S . C . , formed in 1976), 
through to smaller-scale ventures such as plans advanced in January 1978 by Saudi business 
man Akram Ojjeh to form the Compagnie Maritime France-Saudi Arabia under a joint 
venture with France's state controlled Compagnie Generale Maritime (Smith, 1978, p.30). 
This trend broadly represents ' a logical compromise between owning and chartering' 
(Couper, 1978, p.HO) and gives local Arabs and Iranians the opportunity to graft the 
intertia of a long history of maritime trading Into the modern age of shipping. Unfortunately 
the traditional dhow trading sector of the Gulfs economy has been comparatively neglected 
in the recent past. 
1.6 DHOW TRANSPORT - THE RESPONSE OF THE INFORMAL SECTOR 
The history of steamship services to the Gulf stretches back 120 years but it is only 
In the last 30 years that a general policy of constructing deep-water berths has been 
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adopted. Set against this comparatively short history, the peoples of the Gulf littoral 
have created through the centuries (dating back into the third millenium B.C. ) , a society 
based on trading in sailing ships which nowadays have become loosely known as 'dhows'. 
In the 1980's, these craft and the men who operate and sail them are faced with an 
overall trend of decline in the demand for their services. On the one hand, they face 
competition on certain routes and in some trades from steamships, motor vehicles and air 
craft; on the other, the vast amounts of investment capital that has been spent on the 
purchase of modern fleets of steamships and the development of deep-water harbours is 
matched in most cases by the neglect of dhow transport. Transport development has 
threatened the traditional social and economic life of a number of societies in the so-
called 'Third World ' (e.g. the construction of a highway system across trie territory of 
Amazonian Indian societies), but it is ironic that in the Gulf a society whose existence 
was based on operating a transport system is itself eroded by its own decisions involving 
the replacement of indigenous modes of transport by new imported technologies. 
Historically, the Gulf acted as the 'middle-man' lying across one of the world's 
oldest maritime trade routes linking the Mesopotamian and Indus civilizations. Trade was 
established through a network of entrepots distributed along a 2000 mile corridor between 
the civilizations. Subsequently the trading system was expanded along the littoral of the 
Western Indian Ocean, and into the Red Sea and beyond. The hierarohial centre of 
gravity of these entrepots has changed through history with the ports of Basra, Siraf, 
Hormuz, Muscat, Bahrain, Kuwait and Dubai among those which have achieved 
pre-eminence. Broadly, timber , metals, building stone, spices and textiles flowed 
into the Gulf, while dates, tobacco, drugs,dried fruit, cotton and certain manufactured 
items were shipped out of the Gulf. The two major trading sub-systems (the Gulf-Indian 
subcontinent trades; and the internal redistributive trades of the Gulf itself) were 
supplemented by three further systems - the Yemeni trades (e.g. coffee); the African 
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trades (e.g. mangrove poles); and the European trades (eg manufactured goods) which 
were brought by steamship to East African and Indian ports. Elements of these five 
trading sub-systems still provide the basis of the modern spatial organization of maritime 
trade in the Gulf. 
However, all these trading systems have found themselves challenged by a widening 
network of local and foreign steamship services. The most serious consequence has been 
the eclipse of the dhow by the steamship as the major carrier of cargoes in and out of the 
Gulf. In relative terms the proportion of trade carried by dhows to and from South 
Arabia, the Red Sea, East Africa and the Indian Sub-Continent has now dwindled to a very 
minor amount. During the poast three decades the construction of roads and the 
adoption of modern maritime technology in the Gulf (Ro-Ro; LASH) threaten to contract 
further the spatial extent of the dhow trading network. 
In such circumstances the last three decades have been notable for the extent to which 
the relevant decision-making bodies (merchants, sailors, boat builders) have succeeded in 
adapting craft and routes to a new function which increasingly revolves around the task 
ofsuppfying the remoter corners of the Gulf which have hitherto been least touched by 
the process of modernization. Essentially, this function involves maintaining trading 
contact between the smaller towns and villages of the Gulf and the major entrepots. 
CHAPTER 2. 
THE PROCESS OF CHANGE IN THE PERSIAN GULF 
MARITIME TRADING SYSTEM 
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The problems discussed in Chapter One emphasize that during the last three decades 
the Gulf states have been involved in an accelerating process of change In which 
traditional institutions, attitudes and patterns of social and economic life have been 
challenged, and in some cases swept away, by a tide of new ideas and new technologies. 
In this atmosphere of change it is apparent that seaports and shipping services play a 
critical role in this process and, as such, contribute signifioantly to the economic health 
of the region (see Hoyle, 1973.) 
Whereas it is possible to treat each seaport as an individual unit, it is the case that 
the general nature of technological change affects all the ports of the region in much 
the same way, though with variation In the soale of impact. In a functional sense the 
seaports of the Gulf may be conceptualised as a unity, or 'whole', which incorporates 
an integrated set of ports bound together in an interdependent economy, and served 
essentially by a common network of shipping services, both local and international. The 
inter-relatedness of many of the ports in terms of their competitive or complimentary 
position within the region's economy often means that change experienced in one port 
will have a supplementary affect on others in the region. 
As such, the ports of the Gulf constitute the nodes in a regional trading system which 
is made up of a set of components (comprising a hierarchy of seaports linked together, and 
to the outside world, by a network of sea routes) whose function it is to work together 
to serve the general economy of the Gulf by supplying its society with the resources it 
lacks in exchange for resources in local surplus. It is therefore appropriate, in the context 
of this study of the affect of change on a set of ports within a trading system, to utilise the 
methodology of the so-called 'syste as approach' in order to frame a research hypothesis which 
is directed towards a causal analysis of change and its spatial implications. 
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2.1 THE SYSTEMS APPROACH 
The systems approach is presently a popular concept. The reason for its impact as 
a methodology lies in the growing realization that the specialist sciences, social and 
behavioural, as well as physical, cannot on their own provide the answers to many of 
the problems that bedevil mankind. As such, it has become the major synthesizing 
academic approach of the late twentieth century. Those who advocate efficiency 
(i.e. who seek to identify problem areas and bring about their rectification or improvement) 
and those who favour the use of scientific method (i.e. the construction of orderly, 
objective models of reality) naturally champion the system approach as one which is 
"unique in providing an integrated framework for the analysis of change which can give 
fopm to process studies and, at the same time, direct enquiry towards a search for 
causal explanation" (Langton, 1972, p.170). However, within the ranks of so-called 
humanists and *anti-planners' there is a considerable body of opinion which is fundamentally 
against the beaurocrafic methods of organized systems planning (Churchman, 1968, p. 14). 
Nor is the systems approach wholly accepted in Geography. Its use can be criticized 
on several grounds. Protagonists of systems theory in Geography have been challenged 
for empty use of terminology "which is typified by the use of the term feedback as an 
explanatory device rather than as a description of a fundamental research problem" 
(Langton, 1972, p.158). Feedback has in fact entered into Geography's jargon hall of 
fame (Floyd, 1973). Much of that jargon is itself of questionable validity. For example, 
the concepts of 'entropy' and 'homeostasis' have been called into question on the grounds 
that systems, as devised in geographical research are not real things, but abstractions 
from people's observed behaviour (Eliot Hurst, 1974, p.37). Further the use of the term 
'equilibrium' flies in the face of reality. The assumption that all social systems are, or 
should be, in a state of equilibrium is rarely, if ever, the case in an open system. Society 
is not static, or stable, in a functionalist sense, but is constantly changing in response 
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to a cobweb of stimuli. In practical terms, the use of a systems approach in Geography, 
unlike its use in mechanistic science, is often not amenable to the statistical quantification 
of observed human behaviour patterns, but has to fall back on the conceptual modelling 
of reality. This apparent concern for empiracism is considered by Langton ,(1972, p. 132) 
as a methodological weakness typified by the modelling of real world systems which 
ultimately "will contribute little to abstract 'syntactical* theory which is currently seen 
as the central objective of the subject (of Geography) by some of its practitioners" (Harvey, 
1969). 
Despite its flaws the approach has its positive attributes as shown by its increasing 
use in geographical and environmental research (Chorley and Kennedy, 1971; Berry and 
Horton, 1970; Bourne, 1975, Toyne 1974; Eliot Hurst 1974). Langton (1972, p.72) has 
argued that the "orderly presentation of evidence and the explicitness of conclusions" 
derived from the use of the systems approach may be the gain which justifies the method. 
In the field of development studies the systems approach is a useful vehicle upon which to 
study the processes underpinning social, economic and political change. As such, the 
approach emphasises that change occurring in one part of a system will have repercussions 
in other parts of the system, particularly those most closely linked to the part where change 
has occurred. An important merit is that the approach sets up a line of enquiry which 
focuses on the causal analysis of change. 
It is probable however, that the most important si ngle contribution of systems theory 
to geographical method lies in its pursuit of 'holism', a task which some believe to be the 
core concept of Geography (Simmons, 1976, p.82). In this sense, perhaps the most 
fundamental contribution which the adoption of a systems approach makes to the study 
of change in human geography is that it forces the discipline to consider even more 
carefully the analytical entity which it most frequently defines as a 'whole' - that is, a 
region. 
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2.2 THE PERSIAN GULF MARITIME TRADING SYSTEM 
2.2.1 SYSTEM BOUNDARY 
An areal definition of the Persian Gulf Maritime Trading System is depicted in 
Figure 2.1. Broadly its boundary is defined by the seaports, coastline and sea routes 
which were formely bound together in an integrated trading system based on short and 
long distance dhow routes. As such it is representative of the era 1850-1950 during 
which it suffered increasing competition from other forms of transport technology, 
notably the steamship. The basic outline of the system follows the one portrayed by 
Jewel (1969, p. l ) , entitled "The Dhow Season". It is representative of the maximum 
operational range of dhow routes which emanated from home ports in the Persian Gulf 
during this era. The term, Persian Gulf Maritime Trading System is perhaps clumsy, 
since geographically it formed a trading area which focused on the western Indian 
Ocean. However, the choice of the title is derived from the fact that ports within the 
Gulf were the common terminals for dhow routes linking the Gulf with either ports on 
the south Arabian/oast African Coast, or, ports on the western coast of the Indian Sub-
continent. Figure 2.2 depicts the location of all the seaports of the Persian Gulf. The 
boundary therefore, encloses all the dhow-based trading activity which was focused on 
the base ports of the Gulf. 
2.2.2 SUB-SYSTEMS 
Trading activity within the contemporary Gulf has seven district sub activities which 
together make up the total system of trade movement by sea. Figure 2.3 is a model which 
depicts each of these sub-systems, defined according to the function it performs in the 
context of the overall trading system. Sub systems A l , B l , C,D and E involve the 
conveyance of cargoes by the indigenous mode of maritime transport ( i .e. the dhow). Sub 
systems A2, B2, and C are served by modern modes of sea transport including conventional 
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liners, tramp vessels, bulk carriers, container ships, Roll on - Roll off ships and LASH 
craft, together with feeder vessels which compliment the larger unitized ships. 
Over the past 120 years the import and export trades by dhow between the Gulf and 
markets overseas (Al and Bl) have been challenged and curtailed by competition from 
steamer services (A2 and B2) . The redistribution of cargoes within the Gulf either os 
transit, transhipment or re-export trades (C and D) is to a large extent still carried on 
with the use of dhows. However, developments in LASH and Ro-Ro feeder systems, 
together with the construction of hard-surfaced roads, have also had the effect of 
contracting the amount of trade carried in dhows. The re-export of cargoes by dhow 
from the Gulf to markets in the Indian sub-continent and southern Arabia is still a 
significant form of trading activity in some ports. 
2.2.3 SYSTEM COMPONENTS 
The trading system and its sub systems are composed of three major types of components. 
The first type of component consists of the different kinds of port facilities including the 
deep-water commercial harbours (operating conventional, container or Ro-flo berths), 
industrial ports (usually incorporating specialized technology for handling bulk cargoes), 
oil terminals, and dhow harbours, all of which operate handling and storage facilities. The 
second type includes the craft employed to carry the cargoes, both traditional and modern. 
Finally, the cargoes carried make up the third element, ranging in type from bulk cargoes 
of oil , cement and ore, through to small consignments of textiles or matches. 
At any point in time the 'state' of the components and sub-components is determined 
by a trade-off between the age and type characteristics of the port and shipping components, 
and the demand and supply characteristics of the cargoes carried. All the components exhibit 
a hierarchial arrangement at any point in time; that is, some ports are busier than others, 
some shipping operators carry more cargoes than others, and some cargoes are more 
important (in volume and value terms) than others. 
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2.2.4 SYSTEM CONTROL 
Each component and sub-component is controlled by one or a number of human 
controlling agents who we may term decision-makers, whose task it is to ensure that 
each component operates to a level appropriate to achieve certain pre-selected economic, 
social or political goals. The major decision-making groups involved in the operation 
and development of harbours are national governments,port authorities and construction 
companies; shipping is controlled by shipping conferences and shipping companies in the 
case of steamers, and merchants, dhow owners and dhow crew in the case of dhows; the ordering 
and selling of cargoes is controlled by national governments, multi-national companies, 
national firms (both public and private) and private citizens. 
2.2.5 SYSTEM'S ENVIRONMENT 
The operation of the trading system is affected by its system's environment which 
constitutes those activities outside the system which affect the system's level of operation 
but which controlling decision-makers can do little about (Churchman, 1968, p. 35). In 
the Gulf context this includes both human and physical elements. In human terms, the 
rise and fall in the level of demand for cargoes, shipping, and port services within the 
hinterland and foreland of each port sometime occurs as a result of decisions made by 
personnel who are not overtly concerned with the operation of a port or the provision of 
shipping services. Secondly, political changes and events within the region may occur 
in such a way as to affect the level of trade of ports and shipping. Finally, naturol phenomina 
such as adverse weather conditions may interfere with the conveyance of cargoes between 
parts, particularly with respect to dhow transport. 
2.3 CHANGE IN THE MARITIME TRADING SYSTEM 
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2.3.1 THE MEASUREMENT OF CHANGE IN THE SYSTEM 
It is possible to measure the behaviour of the trading system over time by assessing 
the performance of its key components. The equilibrium state of each component can be 
guaged by measuring whether it is in decline ( i .e. the degree to which the process of 
entropy has set in) or whether it is managing to arrest the entropic process (i.e. by 
acquiring negative entropy). It is necessary to determine whether, for instance, the 
level of trade passing through a port is maintaining its previous level, or not. If the 
total system, or any component, is behaving in a manner which maintains its prevcus 
state it is describable as 'morphastatic'. If however the nature of change exerted on a system 
is of such a magnitude as to change the structure of the system (in both a functional and 
spatial sense in the context of the Gulf trading system) it is then to be classified 
as being in a 'marphogenetic' state. 
2.3.2 THE MEASUREMENT OF THE RESPONSE TO CHANGE BY DECISION-MAKERS 
Broadly, contemporary society in the Gulf is in the position of responding to change. 
Particularly technological change generated from outside the region. An understanding 
of the nature of the processes involved in change within the trading system can best be 
appreciated by analysing the response to change by the key decision-making bodies in 
each of the main types of component. This approach involves a detailed consideration 
of the responses of governments, shipping lines, shipping conferences, merchants, and the 
operators of dhows to the process of change. These responses will take the form of adaptations 
either successful or unsuccessful, to change introduced from 'outside*. 
2.3.3. DUAL SYSTEMS 
Section 2.2.2 has differentiated between modern and traditional forms of maritime 
transport in the Gulf. The existence of 'dualisms' both social and spatial, is a well-known 
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phenomenon in both the less developed (Friedmann and Alonso, 1964; Friedmann 1966; 
Hamilton 1974; Odell 1974; Keeble 1976) and more developed countries. Brookfield 
and Hart (1971) working in a Melanesian context have commented on the fact that the 
economies of a large number of the so-called "developed countries" are organised into 
two parts - one traditional and one modern. These two parts are structurally and 
behaviourially discrete, dealing with each other as though each formed a distinct type 
of social and economic organization. Brookfield (1975, p. 54) distinguishes between a 
'traditional' society which is loosely structured, organised in small units, employing 
a high degree of interpersonal relationships, and a 'modern' society which is sharply 
contrasted because of its tendancy to be finely structured into large units and organised 
on the basis of impersonal control vested in a few hands which operate on the basis of 
contractual relationships. Brookfield's research reinforces the earlier work of J .H . Boeke 
in Indonesia (1953) who also acknowledged the existence of a societal dualism by 
distinguishing between the fatalist, labour intensive, non profit-orientated traditional 
sector, and the modern, capitally intensive, materialist elhic. In the context of the 
Gulf such a distinction might prove helpful in analysing the contrasting operation and 
fortunes of the dhow shipping and international liner shipping sectors. 
2.4 AN HYPOTHESIS 
In spatial terms a societal dualism translates itself into a differentiation between a 'c 
and a 'periphery', in which a vibrant, expanding core region of a spatial system expands 
in contrast to a declining periphery. In the case of the Gulf the overall function of this 
thesis is to examine the veracity of core-periphery theory (Friedmann 1966) when applied 
to its maritime trading system which is currently beset by a series of changes in which 
modern transport technology is being adopted at the expense of traditional forms. The 
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following study considers Initially the overall effect of technological change on the 
spatial structure of the maritime trading system. It is proceeded by an analysis of the 
behavioural response to change by decision-makers in both the traditional and modern 
sectors of maritime transport. As such this thesis is directed to testing the following 
hypothesis : 
That since 1865, the intrusion of non-indigenous transport 
technology has resulted in the spatial dismemberment of a 
former maritime trading system based on dhow transport, 
and the formation of two systems, one traditional and one 
modern, that are structurally and behaviourally discrete. 
CHAPTER 3. 
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND SPATIAL STRUCTURE 
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"He denied for instance the world was round, and he 
had no conception of geography away from the seas 
he knew." 
(Villiers, 1940 P. 222) 
3.1 SYSTEM EQUILIBRIUM : INTRODUCTION 
Human and physical systems rarely, if ever, achieve absolute stability. Instead, 
they survive by maintaining a form of balance, or 'equilibrium*. To measure the 
health or vibrancy of a system at a particular point in time, the condition of the 
system must be compared with a range of possible equilibrium states which are 
representative of 'indexes of balance'. Chorley and Kennedy (1971, P. 203) define 
three basic types of equilibrium - 'steady state' , 'thermodynamic' and 'dynamic ' . 
It remains a controversial issue whether or not social systems (such as the Persian 
Gulf Maritime Trading System) can ever really attain 'steady state' equilibrium. Such 
a condition has been defined as a state of an open system wherein properties are 
Invariant when considered with reference to a given time scale, but within which its 
instantaneous condition may oscillate due to the presence of interacting variables 
(Chorley and Kennedy, 1971 p. 203). In social systems, the balance attained rarely 
depends on a fixed point or level (homeostasis), but may give the illusion of 
approximating that condition. With reference to change, steady state equilibrium is 
synonymous with gentle, orderly change, maintaining the balance between the components 
of the system. 
In contrast, 'thermodynamic' and'dynamic' equilibrium are representative of more 
radical displacement of the previous balance between components. Thermodynamic 
equilibrium is synonymous with the concept of 'entropy*. Certain types of change may be 
disruptive in character, precipitating the accumulation, rather than the arrestation of 
entropy within a system, and moving towards a condition of maximum entropy, which can 
be measured in terms of the degree of breakdown in hierarchical organization in a 
spatial system. 
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'Dynamic' equilibrium, defined as "a trajectory of unrepealed average states through 
time" (Chorley and Kennedy, 1971 p. 203), is linked to processes involved in growth 
rather than decline. A variation of this form of equilibrium is "dynamic metastable 
equilibrium", where, at a few points in time, a particularly large fluctuation initiates 
a new regime of dynamic equilibrium on a higher level than previously experienced. 
In the following sections, the nature of steady state equilibrium is discussed via an 
appreciation of the level of man's adaptation of sail-powered sailingcraft to regional, 
physical environmental conditions over a long period from the pre-lslamic era until the 
twentieth century. Secondly, the onset of thermodynamic equilibrium is measured with 
regard to the damaging effect that the introduction of steamships had on the level of dhow 
traffic. Thirdly, the nature of dynamic equilibrium is measured in respect of the 
contemporary rapid growth in the level of steamship traffic. Finally, the nature of change 
in the spatial structure of the Gulf Maritime Trading System is considered via an analysis 
of trade flows. 
3.2 STEADY STATE EQUILIBRIUM: SAIL POWERED TRANSPORT 
3.2.1 The Impact of the Physical Environment 
The Sea 
"Trust it little, fear it much, man at sea is an insect on a splinter, now engulfed, 
now scared to death." (Muir, 1924 p. 205). These are the words of the Caliph Omar 
when consulted as to the feasibility of a naval expedition in the Mediterranean in the 
7th century A . D . His dislike and trepidation for adventure across the high seas in 
those pre-lslamic days applied equally to the very earliest pioneers of sea travel along 
the fickle and sometimes tempestuous waters of the Persian Gulf. Early voyages up and 
down the Persian Gulf must have been precarious adventures. G . F . Hourani ( 1963, 
p. 113) notes that, "on the ocean, storms, reefs and shallows were ever present perils", 
H2 
while J . Hornell (1946, p. 230) surprisingly reminds us that even after perhaps three and a 
half thousand years of sailing in the Gulf, the Arab followers of Mohammed possessed an 
inherent and, "profound mistrust of an unfamiliar sea". Apparently, by 600 A.D. man had 
not yet developed a type of maritime technology to permit him to sail on the waters of the 
Gulf with any degree of confidence for his safety. Although perhaps Hornell is guilty 
here of citing the words of the land-based, desert folk of the interior of Arabia who 
naturally were afraid of the sea, as they were of several other types of unexplained 
and unfamiliar phenomena. The mysteries of nature persist, for as Villiers relates in 1939 
(1940, p. 233), when after witnessing an eclipse on board a dhow off the coast of South 
Africa he found, "it was not an easy matter to explain an eclipse to those simple 
superstitious men with their background of belief in jinns and the superstitious basis of so 
much of their religion." 
The Climate of the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean 
Shallows, sandbanks and coral reefs excepted, the physical environment of the 
Persian Gulf would be the perfect setting for maritime activity were it not for one 
distinctive element - the wind regime. Paradoxically, the disposition of the wind 
systems in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean has had both positive, and negative, 
effects on the conduct of maritime trade and navigation. At once, the directional 
symmetry of the wind systems had been both the raison d'etre for the establishment of 
long distance commercial route networks, and, by virtue of the strength and direction 
of the winds, the explanation for the difficulties and losses encountered in the business 
of navigation to and from the Gulf. 
Both the Gulf and the Indian Ocean are subjected to strong wind patterns at 
particular times, termed the "Shamal" and "Monsoon" winds respectively. One can 
only guess at the extreme difficulties into which sailing craft, both in the ancient and recent 
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past, must have got into while negotiating high winds and rough seas. Countless dhows 
must have been lost over the centuries, sinking in bad weather or breaking apart because 
of their inadequate construction, resulting in the Joss of thousands of lives. Even in 1957, at 
the demise of the era of the sailing dhow, A. H.J . Prins suggests that, "usually one in 
ten dhows fail to reach their destinations." (1966, p.3), a figure with which one would 
possibly dispute, but which one would reckon to be at least an indication of the fair 
proportion of losses due to bad weather. Villiers (1940) vividly recalls the traumatic 
experiences he had on board the boom "Triumph of Righteousness" while it was attempting 
to negotiate stormy seas off the coast of Kenya, while fully laden. The ship appeared on 
the brink of foundering. "One trouble with the big dhows", recalled Villiers, "was that 
they could not stand up to anything like a heavy sea Their one huge sail, though 
a glorious puller in ideal conditions of continuous trade winds without squalls, is a 
definite source of danger under any other conditions." (p.219). 
Climate in the Persian Gulf can be subdivided into three periods of approximately four 
months each. December to March is the cold season, when the wind blows from the north-
west and the west. The months of April, May, October and November have the most equable 
climate, while the period June to the end of September is characterized by extremely hot 
and humid conditions which have their own distinctive effects on maritime activity in that 
during the day time most forms of physical activity on the quayside of a harbour are 
precluded. In the hot summer months, the dhow captains and their crew spend the greater 
part of the daylight periods conducting verbal business beneath canvas shrouds that have 
been erected on deck; the business of unloading or loading a dhow with cargo by gangs 
of coolies or seamen being left until the cool of the early evening, unless there is some 
great hurry. On an annual evaluation, the prevailing wind in the Gulf is the "Shamal", 
a damp wind from the north-west which during the winter has been known to reach a 
velocity of 50 m.p.h. Another common wind is the "Qaws", a hot, dry airflow which 
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blows from the south-west and is often sand-laden, obscuring visibility. The net effect 
of these winds is that the influence of the "Shamal" makes the return journey "up-Gulf" 
for a sailing dhow an often frustrating and slow journey either against the prevailing 
north-west wind or else making little progress at all in a flat calm that can beset these 
waters. Hurrying home from Zanzibar to Kuwait, Villiers (1940, p.256) recalls the 
exasperation of the dhow captain as he exclaimed after the eleventh day of steadily 
adverse calm conditions, "None of my wives wants me (home)" and muttered that he 
"admitted for the first time that perhaps a new mainmast might be an improvement to his 
vessel 0 " 
If the wind systems within the Gulf at least posed some minor problems to 
dhow navigation, the wind reversals of the Indian Ocean were far more violent in 
nature, effectively curtailing all sailing traffic through Straits of Hormuz, down the Gulf 
of Oman and across the Indian Ocean at certain times of the year. The wind regime 
in the Indian Ocean is dominated by the alternate North-East and South-West monsoons, 
an annual transformation which proved to be very much a causal element conditioning 
the evolution and operation of the trans-ocean dhow networks. The weather system is 
characterized by the seasonal dominance of these two major wind patterns, each of which 
is affected by the relative disposition and unequal pressure attributes of land masses 
and sea expanses. Furthermore, as D.N. McMaster (1966, p. 16) notes, "the wind 
reversal is sufficiently decisive to be accompanied by a reversal of currents in the north-
eastern basin of the Indian Ocean. " On an annual basis, the north-east monsoon 
dominates the wind system from November to March; April is a month of flux culminating 
at the beginning of May with the reversal of the winds with the South-West monsoon which 
blows in that direction until September; October is again a month of indistinctive though 
shifting winds. In terms of the strength of the wind, the South-West monsoon is dominant. 
McMaster confirms (1966, p. 17) that for the North-East monsoon, "over 90 per cent of 
all marine wind observations are of force 0 - 4 on the Beaufort Scale and winds of gale 
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force (7 and above) are generally under 1 per cent of readings"; while for the south-
west monsoon, "at least 20 per cent of all observations recorded above force A . . . . and 
in July winds of gale force make up over 5 per cent of the observations over most of the 
area . . . . and attain 50 per cent east of Socotra Island." 
The Coastline 
The sea and the wind combined together to constrain, direct and hamper the progress 
of generations of Arab and Persian sailors on the high seas. While this may superficially 
appear to be somewhat of a "deterministic" approach, one is aware that in the idea of the 
man-environment relationship, criticism can be levelled at "determinists" who regarded 
the physical environment as the moving cause (in this relationship) and neglected interaction 
of feedback effects" (Harvey, 1969 p.115). In deference to this criticism, the view is 
taken here that 'man* acts as the 'moving cause* in a more balanced view which considers 
the Gulf more in terms of a "human ecosystem" in which generations of Arabs and 
Persians have sought to adjust and harmonize their living relationship with its physical 
environment. The length and breadth of the Gulf's coast, its contours both in depth of 
water and height of land can therefore be thought of in this context, where man at various 
times has sought to exploit to his advantage those harbours, or anchorages, which possessed 
some economic or political utility by virtue of their site or situation. "Fixed" and 
"moving" elements are both present In the structureaf he Gulf coastline. The Persian 
Gulf had only a 'fixed' number of suitable harbours that could be exploited as such in the 
thousands of years before man developed the technology to radically alter the configuration 
of natural shore lines. Sheltered mainland anchorages or bays denote the first class of a 
five-fold classification of natural harbours in the Gulf (e.g. Kuwait Bay, Bushire and 
Jask); island harbours affording a degree of security against mainland interference, a 
second (e.g. Bahrain, Qais, Hormuz, Qeshm); a third group is represented by harbours 
sited behind the protective barrier of a lagoon coast in sheltered creeks (e.g. Dubai, 
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Sharjah, and Ras Al-Khaimah); fourthly, there are the riverine ports (e.g. Basra, 
Uballah); and finally there are the non-natural harbours and anchorages, without 
any particular attributes of shelter and suitability, but which nevertheless have assumed 
an importance as a seaport at some time in history by virtue of their nodality with 
reference to their political and economic systems (e.g. Qatif, Al-Khobar, Doha, 
Abu Dhabi). 
"Moving" elements in the configuration of the Gulf coast are a reflection of the 
long-term processes of change in a physical environmental system. The process of change 
is slow, often undetectable in the life of a single generation, and affects not only the 
configuration of a shore line but also, most significantly, the depth of water in a harbour or 
harbour approach channel. The physical manifestation of this change is the sand or 
shingle bar, formed by two processes: long-shore drift, and deltaic siltation. An 
example of the former process is given by the direction of the south-west current, or 
long-shore drift, along the coast of what is now known as the United Arab Emirates: the 
creek harbours of Dubai, Sharjah and Ras Al-Khaimah have been afflicted by the pushing 
of a sandbar across the mouths of their creek harbours, effectively blocking off dhow 
traffic. The classic example of deltaic siltation in the history of the Gulf is the 
silting up of the mouth of the Euphrates-Tigres-Karkeh estuary and the gradual displacement 
of Ur and subsequent entrepots as a terminus for trade (de Morgan, 1959). Fisher (1963, p. 
366) describes the process as a "platform of alluvial material . . . . pushed southwards 
across the head of the Persian Gulf, ultimately forming a barrier behind which the waters of 
the Tigres and Euphrates were ponded back in a series of enormous lagoons and swamps." 
3.2.2. Man*s Adaptation to the Physical Environment 
Navigation 
"Hostility" sums up the oppressive physical environment with which early and modern 
inhabitants of the Persian Gulf littoral have had to contend. In time men learned to cope 
with, or at least adapt to a dangerous sea, an oppressive and limiting climate, a tortuous 
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coastline and a barren interior. This adaptation is no more vividly represented than in 
sphere of maritime venture and commercial activity. Despite an acquired knowledge 
of the reversal of the Monsoon winds, early sailing in local craft of various sizes and 
designs must have been a risky and haphazard business, the dangers of which we can 
only guess at because of the paucity of data available as to the sturdiness and 
operational radius of these vessels. 
Navigation is one field where a healthy respect for the elements seems to have shaped 
the actions of generations of sailors. Hourani (1963, p. 105) comments that primitive 
mariners "never sailed out of sight of coast", a technique to which the more sophisticated 
latter day sailors of the 1940's and 1950's resorted, at least in so far as the trans-oceanic 
trade from the Persian Gulf to East Africa was concerned. This modern irony is implicit 
in the fact that early astronomical science was developed by the Babylonians and was 
subsequently adopted by Phoenicians, Greeks and Arabs alike for laying sea passages with 
the aid of the stars. Hourani puts forward the reasonable thesis that, "it was probably on 
camel-back that the Arabs first learned to take guidance from the signs of the sky, for 
want of land marks." (1963, p.106), and reminds us that the desert is almost as featureless 
as the sea. However, Tibbetts (1961, p. 325) comments that (in the context of the Red 
Sea) 'real' nakhodas sailed up the middle of the sea. A certain knowledge of astro-
navigation seems to have been employed well before the arrival of Islam for the "Koran" 
mentions that, "he (Allah) it is who hath appointed for you the stars that ye guide yourself 
thereby in the darkness of land and sea; we have made signs distinct for a people who have 
knowledge." (Hourani, 1963 p. 106). The heavens are but one of the guide posts 
required for competent maritime navigation: In addition to the development of scientific 
astronomy by the Abbasid caliphs in the eighth and ninth centuries A . D . , the latitude 
of every port and headland was recorded in the books of nautical instructions known as 
"rahmanis" (a Persian term ) . Besides astronomical tables and latitudes, the rahmani 
contained information about winds, coasts, reefs and other general information that a 
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captain would need to know. The initiation of the use of the magnetic needle, or 
compass, was a later addition to navigation in the Gulf, not, according to Hourani, 
arriving until the end of the eleventh century, "when it was mentioned as being used on 
Arab and Persian ships trading between Canton, Sumatra and India." (1963 p. 108), 
though there seem to have been some technical problems with early prototypes of this 
instrument. 
Referring to the inertia of early navigational adaptations to the physical environment, 
in the modern situation it appears to be the human, rather than the technological 
adjustments that have remained as fundamental. Gulf sailors trust their experience and 
local knowledge first, navigational aids second. A form of social inertia is founded 
upon the handing down through generations of grandfathers, fathers and sons of sailors, 
of expertise in coastal navigation, where every reef and sandbank and every headland is 
intimately known. On board a dhow in 1939, Alan Villiers noted that when its captain 
spoke of navigation, "he was not speaking of a theoretical ability to make a voyage with 
the help of astronomical observations, wind and current data, the latest admiralty charts, 
headlines, paten logs, and all the rest of a long list of ordinary paraphernalia. Nejd? 
coaxed his ship along by his knowledge of local conditions, and the coasts of South 
Arabia (and the coasts of the Persian Gulf, Baluchistan and all Western India) were an 
open book to him. ° ( 1940 p.62). Later, when referring specifically to the Persian Gulf 
Villiers comments that, "every man in the ship knew those waters: there was none among 
them who had not been sailing for at least ten years. Nejdi knew every bank, every 
overflow, every low sanded point". (1940 p.270). Yet in this case in 1939, the dhow 
captain had no knowledge of astronomical navigation; at some point in history, succeeding 
generations had failed to transmit this knowledge to their sons. The very idea of sailing 
from Zanzibar direct across the Indian Ocean direct to Muscat was nonsense to the 
particular dhow master. He himself, and all his contemporaries knew only of the coasting 
route, though rhey regretted the decline in the art in Arab navigation, blaming it on the 
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influence of the Europeans who, with their cut-throat competition had left the Arabs only 
the coasting trades. 
3.3 THERMODYNAMIC EQUILIBRIUM : DECLINE OF DHOW TRANSPORT 
It is difficult to find statistical evidence to support the assertion that the dhow and the 
dhow-based trading system has been in decline since the infusion of steamship technology 
into the Gulf in 1862. However, certain sources do exist. 
Oman was the centre of gravity of the trading system in the mid nineteenth century 
because of the political control and sea power it exercised in both the eastern Gulf and 
the east African coast. It is natural, therefore, to look first for evidence of a down-turn 
in dhow traffic in the port of Muscat. Figures produced by R .G . Landen (1968, p. 219-21) 
taken from Precis Commerce provide the first concrete evidence supporting the hypothesis 
that the steamship had a damaging effect on dhow trade (see Table 3.1) . The data records 
movements of vessels entering and leaving Muscat 1874-1894. The figures, which appear 
to have been somewhat rounded, show that during this period there is evidence for a decline 
in dhow traffic from a peak of 910 movements in 1875 - 6 to a low of 268 movements in 
1893-94. This decline coincides with the gradual introduction of new shipping routes into 
the Gulf during the 1870's, 80's and 90's. Taking individual routes there are considerable 
fluctuations within each row of data. However, the most dramatic rate of decline appears 
on the India route which was most directly affected by the introduction of Hie India-Gulf 
steamship service; a less dramatic decline can also be detected on the Zanzibar and Yemen 
routes, and on the Persian Gulf route after 1885-86. The nature of the data fluctuation is 
illustrated by the calculated coefficients of variation tabulated below which reveal greater 
annual fluctuations on the Persian Gulf and Yemen routes and lower fluctuations on the 
India and Zanzibar routes: 
Muscat Dhow Traffic 1874-1894 
~ . w Standard Deviation (S) 1 f trt Coefficient of Variation : V = rr r-t — x 100 Mean (x) 
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TABLE 3-2 : NUMBER AND TONNAGE OF SAILING CRAFT AMD STEAMSHIPS 
ENTERING AND LEAVING THE PORT OF BOMBAY 1873-1908 
Sai l ing Craft 
IN OUT 
Vessels Tonnage (millions) Vessels Tonnage (millions) 
1873-78 213662 4.17 195180 4.35 
1878-83 233106 ' 4.28 I8O405 4.09 
1883-88 271863 4.52 204570 4.21 
1888-93 257820 4.20 199573 3.79 
1893-98 211155 3.42 174406 3.30 
98-1903 222389 3-48 I65055 3.15 
03-1908 252958 3.04 I65982 3.17 
Steamships 
IN OUT 
Vessels Tonnage (millions) Vessels Tonnage (millions) 
1873-78 1597 0.80 1645 0.83 
1878-83 2623 1.49 2739 1.57 
1883-88 5067 2.28 5173 2.37 
1888-93 5439 2.84 5828 3.45 
1893-98 6421 4.23 6761 5-13 
98-1903 7229 5-93 7843 7.09 
03-1908 9287 7.46 9779 8.57 
SOURCE : Wilson (1909). 
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TABLE 3.3 : OWNERSHIP OF DHOWS AND LEVEL OF STEAMSHIP 
TRAFFIC IN PERSIAN GULF PORTS, 1908 
„ , , „ , , _ , .. Number of Steamship 
Baglahs Smaller Dhows Total Dhows c a l l i n 1 P 1 9 0 8 * 
Manama 2 10? 109 65 
Muharraq 0 14 14 -
Abu Dhabi 0 10 10 -
Dubai 0 20 20 34 
Khor Fakkan 0 5 5 -
Lingeh 19 84 103 67 
Kung 14 43 57 -
Doha 0 60 68 -
Kalba 0 10 10 -
Ras Al-Khaimah 7 8 15 -
Kuwait 11 75 86 52 
Qeshm 5 104 109 -
Laft 0 34 34 -
Basidu 0 18 18 -
Dargwan 0 18 18 -
Sharjah 5 13 18 -
Sur 50 44 94 -
Umm Al-Qaiwain 1 0 1 -
Rams 0 1 1 -
-Bandar Abbas 3 53 56 158 
Matrah 7 20 27 -
Muscat 1 0 1 302 
Bushire 24 50 74 158 
Basra NR NR NR 169 
NR - Not recorded 
SOURCE : Lorimer (1915). 
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Aggregate Change {%) Absolute Change (%) 
India Route 28.34 26.67 
Persian Gul f" 55.71 49.05 
Makran " 35.79 31.07 
Yemen " 91.43 46.66 
Zanzibar " 35.79 25.32 
Across the Arabian Sea, Wilson and Edwards (1909) report on the movement of steam 
and sailing craft in and out of the Port of Bombay. These figures (see Table 3.2) are less 
conclusive, disguising local Indian coastal craft amongst those craft voyaging to Arabia 
or East Africa. The table reveals a fall in the tonnage of sailing craft leaving Bombay 
from a level of 4.35 million tons in the period 1873/78 to 3.17 million tons in 1903/08, 
and a corresponding rise in the tonnage of departing steamship tonnage from 0.83 million 
tons to 8.57 million tons swing the same time period. 
Larimer's work (1908) provides clues as to the nature of the dhow trading system at the 
end of the first decade in the twentieth century. Table 3.3. lists the ownership of large 
and small sea-going dhows at each of the dhow ports for which Lorimer acquired data. 
Generally, the ownership of Baghlas (large ocean-going dhows) can be construed as meaning 
that the port concerned was participating, or had the capacity to participate, in the long 
distance dhow traffic to India and East Africa. The smaller vessels were probably used 
in the coasting trade along the Arabian and Iranian coasts. In terms of the port hierarchy, 
Sur (in Oman), Bush ire, Lingeh, Kung and Kuwait appear to be the centres of the long 
distance trade, with Ras Al-Khaimah, Sharjah, Qeshem and Matrah (Muscat) as lesser 
ports. Figures for the number of steamers calling at these ports in 1908 are an indication 
both of those ports which experienced direct competition from the steamship, and, of the 
development of an embryonic future port hierarchy based on the steamship. 
The port and customs authority at Bahrain have been keeping records of the movement 
of dhows since the 1930's. Figure 3.1 illustrates dramatically the rapid decline in the 
registration of sailing-dhows and a commensurate increase in motor-powered dhows during 
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the period 1936-1969 (see appendix Table A) . From the 1950's onwards, as far as 
Bahrain was concerned, the technology of the sail was eclipsed by the motor engine, 
symbolizing the demise of the long-distance dhow trading system which was based on 
sail power. During this period the total number of dhows registered was also cut by one 
half. 
Figure 3.2 also illustrates Bahrain's local position with regard to the origin of 
visiting dhows for the same period 1936-1969 (see appendix Table B). Dhows arriving 
from East Africa died out in 1951, about the same time that the numbers of sailing dhows 
began to fall sharply. All routes display mild annual fluctuations with the exception 
of the Iranian route which displays a marked increase in the level of activity during the 
period, suggesting a switch from the 'trans-oceanic' to the 'coastal' trade, and the Saudi 
Arabian route whose sharp fall and rise In numbers is explained by the fall-off after the 
completion of the Saudi port of Ras Tanura, and the post 1950's oil-led rise in trade with 
the mainland. 
However, it is dangerous to base the evidence for the demise of the long-distance dhow 
trade on Bahrain's figures alone, since dhows voyaging to East Africa or India had different 
home ports, and ports of call. Data from the 'other end' of the system which had fewer 
terminal points ( i .e. Mombasa, Zanzibar and the Rufiji Delta in East Africa) would provide 
more concrete evidence. McMaster (1966) and Jewell (1969) provide conclusive evidence 
for the demise of the Africa trade. Table 3.4 lists the total number of Arabian and Indian 
dhows calling at Mombasa in the period 1947-1968. The figures are graphed in Figure 3.3. 
The least squares trend line has been computed for the period 1947-1968 in Figure 3.4 
and it shows clearly that the trading system was in an entropic state during this era. 
On the evidence of dhow flow data presented it appears that the traditional long-
distance dhow trade linking the Gulf with East Africa and India declined post 1862 to a 
point where it had contracted to a coastal trade along the Arabian, Iranian and West Indian 
littorals. 
TABLE 3-4 : NUMBER OF OCEAN-GOING DHOWS CALLING AT 
























SOURCES : (1) 1947-1961 D.N. McMaster (1966 p20). 
( i i ) 1962-1968 J .H.A. Jewell (1969). 
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At this point the research now turns to trade data to see if any corroboration 
exists that might suggest the realignment or contraction of a trading nexus. 
3.4 DYNAMIC EQUILIBRIUM : INTRUSION OF MODERN MARITIME 
TRANSPORT SYSTEMS 
3.4.1 Growth of Steamship Services 
The disturbing effect that the introduction of the steamship was to have on the 
Gulf trading system was really an accident. The Gulf route became inexorably bound 
up with the obsession of the British Government of the mid 19th Century to strengthen 
its communications with its Empire in India. The Gulfs geographical position vis a vis 
the continental United Kingdom - India land/sea route opened it to the influence of 
early technological and economic modernization which affected its own indigenous 
transport system. 
British commercial links with India were improved in stages, in two areas. Firstly, 
a series of improvements in transport links improved to speed and frequency of connection 
with India. These included the inauguration of the Peninsula and Orient Line Service from 
the U.K. to Alexandria in 1840, and from Suez to India in 1844; the completion of the 
Alexandria - Suez Railway link in 1858, and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. 
Secondly, the Governor Generals of India, Lord Dalhousie (1848 - 56) and Sir Bart I e 
Frere, presided over the modernization of the internal Indian transport system, the lynch 
pin of which were improvements to Karachi Harbour in 1850 and the construction of the Punjab-
Karachi Railway in 1861. 
However, within this second series of innovations it was developments in Indian shipping 
services that were to have direct influence upon the economy of the Persian Gulf. Landen 
(1968 p. 88) attributes this influence largely to the work of one man - William MacKinnon 
- who "inadvertently sparked off a revolution in the Persian Gulf". He was responsible, 
with Robert Mackenzie, for developing India's shipping services beginning on the east coast 
with the establishment of a Calcutta-Rangoon route in 1854, and forming a "Calcutta and 
Burma Navigation Company" in 1856. 
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TABLE 3.5 : DEVELOPMENT OF PERSIAN GULF STEAMER SERVICES 1862-1939 
1862 B r i t i s h I n d i a B r i t i s h 8 voyages per annum Bombay 
1866 II »! fi Twice a month r» 
1868 II tl 11 Fortn ight ly tt 
1869-79 Pers ian Mail 11 I r r e g u l a r 11 
1870 Bombay and Pers ian »i I r r e g u l a r n 
1870 Oman & Ottamar Ottomen I r r e g u l a r Instanbul 
1870 Anglo/Arabian & P .G. B r i t i s h Monthly by 1879 London 
1874 B r i t i s h I n d i a 11 Weekly Bombay 
1883-5 Messageris Maritime French I r r e g u l a r M a r s a i l l e s 
1896-97 11 11 ti Monthly Bombay 
1901 Russian & Pers ian Gul f .Russ ian Monthly Odessa 
1904 B r i t i s h I n d i a B r i t i s h Weekly,fast & slow Bombay 
1914 Hamburg-Amenka German I r r e g u l a r Bremen 
* 1925 Hans a German I r r e g u l a r Bremen 
* 1934 Yamashita Japanese Monthly Jap . Ports 
* 1936 Mitsui Japanese Monthly ft n 
1938 Hans a German I r r e g u l a r Hew York 
* 1938 Isthmian U . S . I r r e g u l a r Los Angele 
SOURCES i ( 1 ) Admin. Reports 1876:1901, Lorimer 2468-69. 
* (11 ) Annual reports , Bahra in! Government. 
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In 1862, utilising a subsidy from the British Government, MacKinnon founded the 
"British India Steam Navigation Company" and initiated a route to the head of the 
Persian Gulf where he linked up with the river steamer service run by the Lynch Brothers 
along the Tigres and Euphrates rivers. In integrating the two services the port of Basra 
was linked to Bombay and Karachi and services to Europe. The significance of the Gulf 
link to India was enhanced in 1874 by the construction of the Europe - India telegraph 
link running along the northern shore of the Gulf through Persia. Soon after the opening 
of the Suez Canal in 1869, the first direct sailing from Europe to the Gulf anchored off 
Bush ire in 1870. 
From 1862 onwards saw the gradual introduction of steamship services into the Gulf 
(see Table 3.5) . The period until the end of the nineteenth century saw two trends: 
Firstly the dominance of British freight and passenger services, despite some government 
subsidized French and Russian competition; and secondly, the degree to which the Gulf-
India route became impregnated by steamer services in direct competition to native dhows 
who formerly carried the cargoes of foodstuffs, spices and building materials. Cut price 
freight rates were to prove the problem for native dhows. Landen concludes that "after 
1865, local shipping could no longer compete seriously against the steamers on the ancient 
and vital India-Gulf trade routes, and increasingly the dhows were relegated to minor 
coastal operations, including irregular ocean voyages, or i l l i c i t trade including smuggling" 
(1968 p.98). This statement is not verifiable statistically but is deducted from Larimer's 
(1915) analysis of the level of trade in 1908. Londen's overall thesis is that the impact 
of the introduction of steamships into the waters of the Gulf was a destructive influence 
in that i t undermined the Gulf maritime economy and enfeebled many of those functions 
associated with established commercial and maritime enterprises. This conclusion is too 
simplistic: total destruction never occurred. This implies extinction. In fact, dhows continue 
and still continue to visit India, though on a lower level of frequency and carrying 
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different cargoes. A more accurate conclusion would be to note that the traditional 
dhow economy was forced to adapt to changed circumstances - an adaptation which 
was to have spatial consequences since it represented a contraction of the spatial system 
into a 'high level' activity system based on the Persian and Omani Gulfs and a 'low level' 
activity system along the Asian and African coasts. 
The net result of the gradual increase in the number of steamship services to 
present levels was the construction of an array of deep-water harbours along the coast 
of the Persian Gulf . Data for the early build-up of port traffic ( i . e . pre 1950) is 
unobtainable in a comprehensive form for comparative purposes. However, the following 
section (3.4.2) measures the pattern of increase in deep water harbour traffic for the period 
1962-1971, whereas the recent levels of dhow traffic flows are recorded in section 4.5. 
3.4.2 Growth in Port Traffic 
Gulf Ports - Comparative Growth in Trade 1962-1971 
An underlying element in the decision to invest in the construction of new or 
expanded deep water port facilities is the trend in the growth of trade, particularly of 
imports, at Gulf ports. Table 3.6 represents a compilation of the growth patterns of 
import tonnages discharged at each of eleven major seaports for the period 1962-71. No 
data was available for Muscat during this era. 
The statistics recorded in Table 3.6 are graphed in Figjre 3.5 and illustrate the 
fluctuations in their respective levels of trade. In terms of a port hierarchy, six ports -
Basra, Kuwait, Khorramshahr, Dammam, Bandar Shahpour and Dubai - can be termed 
'major' in the sense that they handled greater than 500,000 tons of imports in 1971, and 
five 'minor* - Doha, Bahrain, Abu Dhabi, Bandar Abbas and Bushire, handing less than 
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T A B L E 3.7 
TREND IN GROWTH R A T E S OF T H E PERSIAN G U L F 
D E E P - W A T E R P O R T S , 1962-1971 : RANK ORDER 
Rank Port 0 
1 Dubai 19°8' 
2 Khorramshar 18°41 
3 Basrah 15°11 
4 Dammam 14°0' 
5 Kuwait 11°13 
6 Bandar Shahpour 10°46 
7 Abu Dhabi 8°30 
8 = Bandar Abbas 4°18 
= Bahrain 4°18 
= Doha 4°18 
11 Bushi re 0°42 
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Rank Change 1962-71 
1962 1971 in respect of 1971 Rank 
1 . Kuwait Basra +1 
2. Basra Kuwait -1 
3. Khorramshahr Khorramshar 0 
4. Bandar Shahpour Dammam +1 
5. Dammam Bandar Shahpour -1 
6. Doha Dubai +2 
7. Bahrain Doha -1 
8. Dubai Bahrain -1 
9. Bush ire Abu Dhabi +1 
10. Abu Dhabi Bandar Abbas +1 
11 . Bandar Abbas Bush ire -2 
Most significant in the changing pattern of rank order is the upward movement of 
Dubai by two places, and the downward movement of Bushire, also by rwo. However, 
Figure 3.6 illustrates more clearly the real pattern of growth in imports over the whole 
period. Least squares trend lines were computed for each of the eleven ports. The rate 
of growth for each port is ranked in Table 3.7. During the period under study, Dubai 
heads the list of ports that may be said to have grown at a 'dynamic' rate of increase, 
including Khorramshahr, Basra, Dammam, Kuwait, Bandar Shahpour and Abu Dhabi. 
Slower rates of growth are evident for Bandar Abbas, Bahrain and Doha, while Bushire's 
level of imports appears to be virtually static. 
3.5 CHANGE IN SPATIAL STRUCTURE: THE PATTERN OF TRADE 
3.5.1 Introduction 
Two methods are tested in order to try and establish whether or not the modern nexus 
of trade interconnectivity fits the traditional dhow system pattern that had reached maturity 
in the mid-nineteenth century. In both cases international trade data for 1971 is used, 
covering published data for all the Gulf states for that year converted for comparative 
6b 
purposes into the Kuwaiti Dinar at international currency rates quoted on Page 203 
of the Third Annual Report of the Central Bank of Kuwait, 1972: 
Country Currency KD per unit 
Saudi Arabia Riyal 0.079365 
Iraq 
Bahrain 






Oman Rial 0.856633 
Iran Rial 0.004342 
3.5.2 Graph Theory Analysis 
The dhow trading system was essentially a functional region consisting of a 
set of centres (ports) between which there was a high degree of association. Given the 
demise of the sailing dhow an important question now needs to be answered. Has the former 
functional region been dismembered? 
Nystuen and Dacy (1961) have suggested an operational procedure for identifying 
hierarchical regions by graph-theoretical procedures. Using an origin-destination 
matrix of flows, the first stage consists of ranking the locations according to the total 
incoming flow. In the second stage, the dominant flow from each location is defined as 
the largest outgoing f low. If this dominant flow is to a lower order centre, the origin 
centre is termed 'independent' but i f the dominant flow is the high order centre, the flow 
is termed 'nodal' (Hay 1973). The nodal flows may then be mapped, producing a range 
of patterns, from simple dominance of all centres by one centre, through an integrated 
hierarchy in which one centre dominates all other centres directly or indirectly, to 
an absence of hierarchy in which a large number of independent centres exist. 
Hay and Smith (1970) applied this technique to flows of rail traffic between 27 
major Nigerian towns and failed to identify a clear hierarchical pattern suggesting that the 
technique is not only able to identify hierarchies but also to demonstrate their absence from 
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TABLE 3.8 : TRADE BETWEEN THE STATES OF THE PERSIAN GULF AND OTHER 
STATES IN THE MIDDLE EAST, EAST AFRICA AND SOUTH ASIA 
(By Value 1971) 
Kuwait Bahrain Dubai A.Dhabi Oman Qatar S .Arabia I r a n I r a q 
Kuwait — 1.13 1.22* 1.21 0.1*0 1.07 7.36 6.55 6.72 
Bahrain 1.13 - 1.60 o.55 0.39 1.1*3 11.10 2.26 0.50 
Dubai 1.22* 1.60 - 3.61* 1.35 1.71 0.1*1* 6.23 0.06 
Abu Dhabi 1.21 o.55 3.61* - 0.55 0.51* 1.72 0.65 0.15 
Oman o.ho 0.39 1.35 0.55 - 0.11* 0.00 2.62 0.06 
Qatar 1.07 1.1*3 1.71 0.51; 0.12* - ?-73. 1.22 0.03 
S. Arabia 7.36 11.10 O.kh 1.72 0.00 3.73 - 1.1*7 0.89 
I r a n 6.#. 2.26 6.23 0.65 2.62 1.22 1.1*7 - 1.02 
I r a q 6.72 0.50 0.05 0.15 0.06 0.03 0.89 1.02 -
Lebanon 1.30 0.99 0.72 0.76 0.11 3.27 37.65 1*.21 7-8 
Egypt 1.58 0.02* 0.07 0.09 0.00 0.07 1.72 0.00 6.72 
Jordan O.OU 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.25 3.23 0.13 1.33 
Sudan 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.67 0.05 0.21 
S y r i a 2.01 o.o2* 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.19 0.1*8 0.10 3.63 
Afghanistan 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.91 0.02 
Eth iop ia 0.12 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.28 0.00 0.01* 
Turkey 1.55 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.78 3.07 
Yemen 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.1*8 0.00 0.05 i 
Dem Yemen 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.15 
Somalia 0.1*0 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.06 6.33 0.12 0.08 
Kenya 0.68 0.20 0.51* 0.07 O.ll* 0.09 0.00 0.1*1 0.35 i 
Tanzania 0.92 0.11 O.ll* 0.06 0.02 o.oi* 0.00 0.00 0.1*3 
Malagasy 0.1+3 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
I n d i a 8.Oli 2.29 3.53 0.35 0.96 1.10 5.1*1* 11.58 6.61 
Pakis tan li.76 1.83 1.90 0.1*7 0.52 0.99 3.81 2.21 2.1*5 
S r i Lanka 0.80 0.20 o.l*o 0.00 0.02 0.00 2.29 1.91* 1*.26 
1. Figures are i n m i l l i o n Kuwait dinars 
2. Nodal flows are underl ined. 
Source : Appendix Table 
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some systems. 
Applied to total trade flows by value (imports plus exports) between the Gulf 
States and surrounding states in the wider Middle East, East African and South Asian 
theatre (see appendix Table C) the technique produces the results in Table 3.8. The 
interpretation of results depends upon which period is compared to 1971. For example, 
comparing these results with the situation in the mid-nineteenth century when Muscat 
was the pivot of all Gulf trade, having strong links with East Africa and India, certain 
patterns are clearly apparent in 1971. The steamship era has seen a reorientation of 
the original trading system: Muscat has lost its nodality and its strong trade links with 
Africa and India. Kuwait now has the strongest links with East Africa; within the Gulf, 
Saudi Arabia has assumed a nodal position with strong links in the mid Gulf region with 
Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait, as well as close ties with the Lebanon; in the lower Gulf, 
Iran now has close ties with the United Arab Emirates (Dubai) and Muscat. 
However, the chief drawback of this method of analysis in this context is that it only 
represents a nodal hierarchy, and does not render a clear pattern of intra-system trade in 
order to judge whether or not, trading patterns in the post dhow era have changed 
fundamentally. 
3 .5 .3 . Location Quotient Method 
This problem is overcome by applying the location quotient method in order to judge 
the spatial pattern of Intra-regional trade in 1971. The measurement of a port's foreland 
in comparison with other ports in a regional system such as the Gulf is dependent upon data 
availability of the origins and destination of intra-system cargoes. The information is 
available for the level of the nation state, but it is not possible to break i t down by 
port of entry and departure, particularly with regard to Iran's four major general cargo 
ports. However, using the data matrix in appendix (C) of total foreign trade by value 
between the nine major Gulf states within Gulf regional system, it is possible to gauge 
the level of internal inter-linkage. 
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The notion of a 'location quotient' is borrowed from work on industrial location 
by P. Sargent Florence in 1943. Underlying the idea of the location quotient is the principle 
of a relative comparison between the performance of an Individual port, or state, with the 
average total performance of all the ports, or states, in the total regional system . 
Britton (1965) and Bird (1969) used similar adaptations of Florence's benchmark idea to 
consider the traffic flows of individual ports, at Melbourne in the former study, and all 
the major British ports in the latter. An earlier application of the benchmark principle 
was in the study of the direction of world trade at the nation state level by Alexandersson 
and Norstrom (1963, pp 17-29). Bird (1971) p. 141, neatly summarises Alexandersson's 
and Norstrom*s "trade distribution index" as follows : 
"In simple terms their trade distribution index works on the principle that i f 
Country ' A ' has seaborne trading connections with other nations such that the trade 
mix perfectly matches the composition of world trade, the foreland indices of 
Country ' A ' would work out a 100 for every other country, each of which would 
constitute a foreland at this level and aggregation of statistics. But i f the trade 
between Country 1 and 2 is twice the hypothetical situation (where the share of Country 
l 's trade going to Country 2 is twice that of 2's share of world trade) then the index 
is 200 and so on pro rata" 
(with half the average presented by 50). 
This index has been adapted to consider trade between member states within the Gulf 
Maritime Trading System, the data being an aggregate of imports and exports, and, all 
modes of transport. The index is stated mathematically as follows : 
TGS1 - GS2 
I = TGS1 X100 = TGS1 - GS2 x TPGS x 100 
TGS2 T C S 1 * T ( 3 S 2 
TPGS 
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TABLE 3.9 : LOCATION QUOTIENTS WITHIN THE ORIGINAL (LONG DISTANCE) 
GULF MARITIME TRADING SYSTEM, 1971 
Kuwait Bahrain Dubai A.Dhabi Oman Qatar S.Arabia Iran Iraq 
Kenya u*i 11*2 272 255 287 133 _ 8U 82 
Malagasy 1*1*3 22 156 - - - - - 2 
Somalia 22 17 1 2 - 23 375 6 k 
Tanzania 273 110 102 323 70 93 - - U5 
India 103 101 111 76 119 100 55 11*8 96 
Pakistan 129 170 126 21ii 139 190 82 59 75 
S r i Lanka hi 3k 51 1 10 1 91* 100 21*9 
Yemen 69 6 0 9 - 12 312 7 1*5 
Dem Yemen 121 67 7U 2 29 - - 23 356 
TABLE 3.10 : LOCATION QUOTATIONS WITHIN THE MODERN (SHORT DISTANCE, 
REDISTRLBUTIVE) DHOW TRADING SYSTEM, 1971 
I r a q Kuwait Qatar S.Arabia A.Dhabi Oman Bahrain Ira n Dubai 
I r a q - 397 k kk 38 Ik 52 68 1* 
Kuwait - 68 153 132 ko 5o 185 1*7 
Qatar - 200 152 36 163 89 168 
Saudi Arabia - 92 1 1*11 31* 11* 
Abu Dhabi - 2l*3 106 80 610 
Oman - 75 300 209 
Bahrain - 113 108 
I r a n - 271* 
Dubai -
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where I = Trade distribution index 
TGS1-GS2 = Total trade between Gulf State *T and Gulf state '2* 
TGS1 = The total foreign trade of Gulf State '1 * 
TGS2 = The total foreign trade of Gulf State '2 ' 
^PGS = The sum of al l imports and exports in the Persian Gulf Maritime 
Trading System. 
The results are assembled in symmetrical matrices in Table 3.9 and Table 3.10. 
A total of '100' represents the system average, 200 twice the average, 50 half the 
average andso on. The non-publication of foreign trade statistics for the smaller Gulf 
States of Sharjah, Ajman, Umm Al-Qaiwain, Ras al Khaimah and Fujairah precludes 
them from analysis, though were data available, high above average scores would 
probably be linked with Dubai. The technique is useful in highlighting the more 
significant links in a regional system, indicating the tightness of economic bonds within 
a system and how many of them are marine in character. 
Table 3.9 is a compilation of the location quotients for those states which formed 
the original dhow-based Gulf maritime trading system as it existed, for example, in 
the early nineteenth century, and between which trade is now carried on using mainly 
steamer transport. The pattern of results reveals that much of the original pattern of 
inter-connection survives: Kenya maintains above average quotients with the Gulf 
Shaikhdoms, as does Tanzania, which also maintains strong links with Iraq; India and 
Pakistan still have strong trade connections with the Gulf Shaikhdoms; Saudi Arabia has 
close connections with Yemen and Somalia, and Iraq close ties with democratic Yemen. 
Overall, however, this pattern is deceptive as the general proportional level of trade 
between the Gulf and the states of the Indian Ocean Basin is much lower than in the 
nineteenth century. 
In the era of steamships, the dhow trade routes have contracted from their former 
trans-oceanic routes to regional redistributive trades, principally within the Gulf. 
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Location quotients indicated in Table 3.10 and Figure 3.7 are significant in that 
they represent the modern pattern (1971) of intra- Gulf trading relationships. Focusing 
on the survival of the dhow, ma {or 'above average' quotients - Kuwait-Iraq, Saudi Arabia-
Qatar, Abu Dhabi - Oman, Abu Dhabi-Dubai, Oman-Dubai - are all indicative of 
routes subject to the development of road transport either now, or in the near future. 
Bearing in mind development in road transport along the Gulf only four interconnections offer 
themselves as strong dhow routes, assuming pattern of trade continues: 
Location Quotient 
1. Bahrain-Saudi Arabia 411 
2. Oman-Iran 300 
3. Dubai-Iran 274 
4. Kuwait-Iran 185 
CHAPTER 4 
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND BEHAVIOURAL RESPONSE I 
DHOW TRANSPORT 
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"I should hate to see Diesel engines put in 
fine booms . . . . " 
(Villiers, 1940 p.328). 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The position of the Persian or Arabian dhow and the men who sail them is very 
much akin to the malaise of any endangered living species. In Darwinian terms, 
the long process of evolution has led to the adaptation of physical designs and spatial 
spheres of influence linked to the precise environmental circumstances in operation at 
a particular point in time. Dhows, and their sailors, have to adapt to survive. Their 
plight is ecological and adaptive, and as such, dhows and dhow life may be regarded 
as a persecuted species in a biological (ecological) sense. Essentially, the dhow is 
competing for space on the economic ocean, in which 'stronger' forms of transport 
threaten to eliminate dhows as a contemporary mode of transport. The dhow is thus 
involved in a continuous 'search' process to find a spatial and economic 'niche' within 
the Gulf Maritime Trading System, with the result that competitive pressures on the 
dhow are forcing increasing specialization of routes and trades. 
This section seeks to substantiate whether this 'fight for survival' is a reality, 
by testing the hypothesis that adaptation and survival take place on two fronts. Firstly, 
through the mechanism of technology via an adaptive design and re-design of craft to 
suit changing environmental circumstances. Secondly, via the spatial process of 
'search' for appropriate routes and commodity trades geared to providing sufficient 
financial return to ensure the survival of the socio-economic system. 
In both cases, man as sailor, boatbuilder and merchant, practices 'feedback control' 
by responding to changing environmental circumstances. The range and manner of his 
response is conditioned by a number of elements; the availability of resources, both 
material and human, in sufficient quantity and quality to permit adjustment, the 
availability of information, both speedy and accurate enough to produce an appropriate 
response, and the perceptive ability to adjust spatially and technologically in the 
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right way. 
4.2 ADAPTATION OF A SPECIES 
4.2.1 Technological Adaptation 
The development of the dhow as a mode of transport falls into two distinctive eras. 
The first era is represented by conception, evolution and adaptation of maritime craft 
in response to the climatic and general environmental conditions found in the Persian 
Gulf, Red Sea and the Western Indian Ocean maritime space. This man-environment 
relationship forms the basis for the genesis and general design of the dhow. The second 
era belongs to the phase of adaptation and refinement brought about by the introduction 
of largely European sailing and motor craft external to the Gulf Maritime Trading 
System, via the introduction of square-rig design, the motor engine, thesteamship and 
other twentieth century modes of transport. 
Given this neat split in design terms, it is debatable whether explanation should 
then proceed on a chronological basis. The history of the evolution of ship design in 
the Middle East is incomplete and any attempt to show the evolution of shipping at each 
period in chronological order would leave too many gaps. Further, explanation on a 
'closed geographical system1 basis is again inappropriate. To speak of the Gulf dhows 
in a 'closed' sense in inaccurate. Section 2.2.1 has already defined the wide spatial 
organisation of the dhow transport system stretching in a vast triangle from Arabia to 
East Africa, across to the West Indian subcontinent. Hourani (1963, p.88) is sympathetic 
to the view that the treatment of the dhow cannot be limited in spatial extent to the Arab 
world, commenting that, "the western half of the Indian Ocean from Ceylon round to East 
Africa, forms a cultural unity which has to be treated as a whole." As such, ship designs 
do not always take account of national boundaries and there is considerable evidence of 
the diffusion of innovation both between points within the Indian Ocean, and from beyond. 
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Faced with chronological gaps and overlapping spatial boundaries, the explanation 
of the technological adaptation of dhow transport is more acceptable If it is focused 
on the detail of design construction as representative of general adaptation to environmental 
inputs, set within each of the two defined eras. Such explanation concentrates on the use 
of building materials, methods of construction and refinements in motive power, shape 
and design features. 
4.2.2 Early Dhows 
Hourani (1963) considers that: "the outstanding features of medieval Arab ships of the 
Indian Ocean are two: the manner in which the planks are sewn together, not nailed, 
and the fore and aft set of the sails" (p.88). Such distinguishing design features are the 
result of over 1,000 years of adaptation. Unfortunately, there Is a paucity of pictorial 
evidence to confirm the design of early Indian Ocean shipping, and such data as exists 
relies heavily on scattered literary volumes of all periods down to latter medieval times. 
Early sources suggest that the people of the Gulf lacked both the building materials and 
the expertise to build seagoing vessels. Early evidence points to a Mediterranean-Gulf link 
in design and construction, as distinct from the latter links with India and Europe. Hourani 
(p. 10) speculates that Assyrian naval enterprise in the Gulf, hampered by lack of 
suitable timber in Mesopotamia, solved the problem by importing timber from what is now 
Lebanon, to Nineveh. Hornell (1946) amplifies this link by speculating that the Arabs 
of the Byzantine Empire, anxious to create a powerful fleet, but lacking in 'know-how', 
took Syrian (Phoenician) and Greek shipwrights into their service (p. 231). 
The first definitive information on design dates back to the first century A . D . , when a 
Greek merchant from Alexandria systematically related an account of the existing commercial 
conditions along the Red Sea and East African coast (in "Periplus of the Erythraean Sea", 
translated by W.H. Schloff, 1912). The Periplus relates the first salient design 
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characteristics of the dhow - its "sewn construction". It appears that at that time 
vessels had been constructed which were capable of sailing from Arabia to East 
Africa (Dar es Salaam). Periplus relates the siting of vessels unfamiliar to the Greeks 
and Romans, with the planking of the hulls being sewn, instead of being nailed together, 
to an inner framework of ribs, edge to edge. In another passage, Periplus notes that 
Ommana, a trading centre on the south coast of the Persian Gulf, was a shipbuilding 
centre, exporting completed vessels called 'madarata'to the Hadhramaut and Yemen. 
Glaser (1890) derived a link between those vessels found at Rhapta and those of Arabia 
by deriving 'madarata' from the Arabic term muddara'at, meaning "fastened with palm 
fibre". 
Records of constructional methods are largely absent from the second to the ninth 
centuries (Hornell, 1946, p. 234), but the association between the Gulf and the 
construction of 'sewn' craft is confirmed by Abu Zayd in the tenth century (G. Ferrand 
1922) who vouches for the 'fact' that the system of ship construction with planks sewn 
together is a speciality of the shipwright of Siraf, on the south Persian coast. The same 
writer adds that oil, mixed with other materials, was used to finish the hulls of ocean-
going ships to close the holes drilled for the sewing twine, and for caulking the seams. 
Recent archeological evidence would appear to confirm these facts. S.A. Matheson 
(1973) has reported the discovery of a 'blubber factory' of large storage vats, lined 
with a thick black oily deposit, in excavations on the site of Siraf, which was probably 
used to waterproof the bottoms of the dhows in a manner akin to the modern method using 
dammar and lime. 
The method of propulsion was by a sailing rig of a particular type - the 'lateen'. 
The shape of the lateen rig was ideally suited to sailing 'with' the strong wind of the 
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Indian Ocean Monsoon systems, but not 'against' it. The harnessing of this wind system made 
voyages between the Indian subcontinent and Arabia possible. These voyages must have led 
to the discovery of teak and coconut wood on the coasts of S.W. India (Calicut) and hence-
forth, the boatbuilders of the Persian Gulf, who suffered from a lack of suitable, durable 
hardwoods, transported teak and coconut wood to the Gulf for boatbuilding purposes, a 
practice that is perpetuated today. Hourani (1963) notes that teak has been found in 
Babylonian, Achaemenid, and Sassanian remains. A native species of south India, Burma 
Thailand and Indonesian (p. 90), Its value in boatbuilding lies in its great strength and 
elasticity. It is soft enough to be worked easily, and its durability means that once seasoned 
it does not split, crack or alter its shape. 
Ocean- going vessels, prior to the incursion of European technology post 1507, were 
of a general style directly adapted to the limitations and opportunities imposed by the physical 
environment. The lateen rig was adapted to climatic control, the sewn planks of teak and 
coconut wood to the availability of planks for hulls and palm fibre for stitching. Nails 
were not used. Such craft were designed for the transportation of resources within the 
trading system, and were constructed with the resources of that system. 
The type of 'dhow* sighted by the Portuguese sailor, Alfonso de Alberqueque, when 
he sailed into Hormuz Harbour in 1507, would have been similar to those sighted by Marco 
Polo in Hormuz in the thirteenth century. An unchanging design, described by Marco 
Polo condescendingly as: "wretched affairs . . . many of which got lost . . . for they have 
no iron fastenings and are only stitched together with twine made from the husk of the 
India nut. They beat this husk until it becomes horse - hair, and from this they spin twine 
and with it stitch the planks of the ship together. It keeps well and is not corroded by sea-
water but it will not stand up to a storm. The ships are not pitched, but are rubbed with fish oi l . 
(Yule, 1871, p. 102). 
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4.2.3 Surviving Europeon Maritime Influences 
When Vasco da Gama first viewed strange carvel-built (edge-to-edge) ships off 
Mozambique in 1498 (Hornell, p. 235) from his clinker-built square-sterned, square-
rigged Portuguese galleon, it began an unresolved era of competitive ecology, for the 
dominance of either local, or extra-regional modes of vessel design within the Indian 
Ocean. This is represented by a 480 year process in which the native craft of the Gulf and 
Western Indian Ocean have been ousted from a position of total control of intra-system 
trade to one of decreasing spatial control of such trade in which the survival of the 
species has only been assured by considerable adaptation in the design of craft. 
"The most important consequence from the contact of Arab and Indian mariners and 
shipwrights with the western intruders was the substitution of nailing for sewing in the 
building of hulls of their ships; nails took the place of pegs, and twine sewing. Rapid 
advance was made in the art of shipbuilding; the square-rigged design was introduced in 
the place of sharp two-ended ones previously characteristic of Persian Gulf and Indian 
shipping . . . . " (Hornell, p.237). The adoption of nailed designs was a process of 
imitation. Hourani (1963, p.93) comments that soon after 1500, ships of the Malabar 
coast of India were already being built with iron nails, possibly due to a desperate attempt 
to imitate the new Portuguese enemy, or possibly copying the example of Chinese junks, 
which had long been visiting Calicut. 
The influence of the Portuguese, and later European design for sailing ships and 
steamships, has been largely responsible for the designs of the contemporary family of 
dhows, which are adapted in terms of their construction, design and size to the new 
competitive situation brought about by the use of expatriate craft within the original dhow 
system. 
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Modern dhows have certain common features. They are built of teak wood on the 
shores of the Gulf, India, Pakistan, South Arabia and East Africa, using the same simple 
tools used at the time of the Portuguese supremacy - a 'bow drill 1 and 'adze'. Boat 
builders now use nails and 'clinker' construction, but work from memory, without formal 
plans for design. Dhows group into two 'families': those with (square) transom sterns 
which derive from European influence; and those with double-ended hulls, which 
represent traditional 'pre-European' design. Most are now fitted with diesel engines 
as the main mode of propulsion. Masts are still fitted, in most cases, though sails are 
rarely used. 
The 'sewn-hull* boat has not been entirely eclipsed by the 1970's. The 'mtepe-daw' 
of the Lamu archipalego has disappeared, but small numbers of carvel-built, sewn canoes 
and fishing boats have survived In niches along the South Arabian coast. Villiers (1940) 
spotted sswn fishing boats on the Hadramaut coast at Shihr, and a few of these 'surf 
boats still survive on that same coastline between Hadramaut and Dhofar (Kaplan, 1974). 
A fine distinction clearly needs to be made between a slight balance of superiority 
in favour of the nailed method of construction, which in itself is insufficient to have 
hastened the decline of dhow transport, and the Influence of European commerce which 
changed the entire commercial structure of the Indian Ocean, bringing about the rapid 
disappearance of the sewn dhow. 
4.2.4 Modern Dhows - Adaptations 
Arriving at an adaptive typology of dhows is not a straightforward process. The 
word 'dhow' itself is a popularized term describing a variety of craft not described as such 
by Arabs, Persians, Indians or Africans. English writers have been largely responsible for 
the incorrect word 'dhow' . The label 'dhow' or yaw' is, in fact, Swahili in origin; the 
peoples of the Gulf having their own generic word for ship ('saflnah') or use the modern 
term 'launch'. Expatriate controllers of dhow transport now rejoice under the even less 
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appropriate term 'country craft". 
Because of the wide spatial reach of operation of these craft, classifications are 
difficult unless the writer has a well-travelled knowledge; the main problem being to 
distinguish regional terminology for the same craft in different parts of the system. 
Hornell's (1942) 'tentative* classification of Arab seacraft sets the pattern for other 
formal, and less formal, statements about craft typology present in specific locations 
(Villiers, 1940; Bowen, 1951; Gildemeister, 1882; Kindermann, 1934; Hourani, 1963; 
Jewel, 1969; Kaplan, 1974; Prins, 1966; McMaster, 1966; Wilson and Edwards, 1909; 
Omani Government, 1973; Walker, 1975). Varying in emphasis and range, these attempts 
do have a common denominator: that of distinctions derived from the shape of the hull. 
Adaptive designs fall into 2 families based on the shape of the hull; firstly, the 
square, or transom-sterned family, subject to minor modification of shape, size and 
decoration, derived mainly from the European influence since the sixteenth century; 
and secondly, the 'double-ended* family, coming to a point at both bow and stern, of 
older vintage. Figure 4.1 is an attempt to subdivide, functional terms those dhows presently 
operating within the Persian Gulf Maritime Trading System, together with those that have 
recently become extinct. Figures 4.2, 3, 4, and 5 are sketches of the twelve most 
common ly found dhows in the contemporary Persian Gulf. They are not drawn exactly 
to scale but are intended to denote the shape and style of the hulls. Vessels '1 ' , '3* and 
10 ' are survivors of the double-ended species; the others are square-sterners. 
DOUBLE-ENDERS 
Mtepe 
The Mtepe dhow of the Lamu archipelago on the East African coast is the most recent 
example of the extinction of a double-ender. The disappearance of this dhow, however, 
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in the early years of the twentieth century was not precipitated by hull shape, but by 
construction technique. The Mtepe is the last example of the disappearance of a 
carvel-built, sewn dhow from the system. Their hulls were built up of strokes sewn 
together with coir twine, and were caulked with coir fibre hammered into the seams 
from within. The mode of construction, like similar craft in Western India and Sri 
Lanka made them susceptible to leaks and general deterioration of the sewing in heavy 
seas. Ultimately, the Mtepe befell the same fate as other dhows within the trading 
system, rendered obsolete by the introduction of nailed dhows permitting greater safety 
and size, and larger operational trading areas. Mtepes ceased their short-sea trading 
of mangrove poles and firewood between Rufigi and Zanzibar over 60 years ago. 
The extinction of the Mtepe also represented the elimination of the double-enders 
for the East African corner of the system. However, In the Gulf, Red Sea and Western 
Indian subcontinent, regional varieties of this mode of craft adapted to nailed 
construction and survive within the contemporary system. 
Boom 
The Arab Boom (or Bum) is one of the most representative and symbolic of all Persian 
Gulf dhows. It is a ubiquitous craft. Villiers' description of a boom (1940) praises the 
design: "An upstanding, handsome thoroughbred of a ship . . . . she was massive without 
being heavy; strong with no hint of sluggishness; stout though sweetly lined. She sat 
on the blue water of Ma'alia Bay like some handsome sea-bird, and her beak like bow 
added to the illusion. She was low in the bow and high aft, in the manner of Arab deep-
sea dhows, though as in all Kuwait booms, her cutwater was straight and carried up into a 
short built-up bowsprit, which reached out twenty feet before her, more as a symbol than 
for use " (p.l 1). "Her teak mainmast stood ninety feet above the sea and her 
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tremendous lateen yard was made of the trunks of three trees lashed stoutly end to end with 
many seizings of oanvas-bound-rope. She stank abominably of fish-oil, as do all dhows... 
and other queer odours which rise from the main hatch." (p. 12). 
Villiers was aptly describing a thoroughbred dhow closely associated with the rise 
of Kuwait as a port state in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, linked to the 
transoceanic trade of dates, mangrove poles and other commodities around the system, 
between the Gulf and East Africa. The Boom slotted into the niche left by the demise 
of the Baggala in the transoceanic trades. In the Gulf of the 1970*s, the Boom (along 
with the Sambuk) is the most common dhow of the Gulf, trading chiefly on intra-Gulf 
routes. 
Booms vary in size from 90 to 300 tons displacement, normal dimensions averaging 
100 ft. long x 20 ft. broad x 10 ft. deep. As double-enders, they have distinctive 
bows and sterns. The long bowsprit, or stem-head is raked forward at an angle of about 
45° , giving the craft greater speed, particularly in a following sea. The cutwater is made 
of planks, and reaches well above the hull, rounded off at its extremity. The extreme 
tip is painted black, and behind this is a white band separating the black from the brownish 
unpointed wood. In general, Gulf dhows lack colour, in contrast to the way that Indian 
and Pakistani, Yemeni dhows display it. The stern is distinguished by the yoke steering 
attachments. Rising upward and backwards, the pointed stem carries a long rudder which 
has a yoke set athwartships, through the upper part of the outboard rudder. The rudder is 
often colourfully decorated and is activated by ropes and chains secured to its extremities. 
These pass forward along the ship's quarter and then by a system of pullies turn inboard 
to the wheel. 
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Cargo is stored in a hold (in former times built to house a specific storage capacity 
of Basra dates) beneath the main deck, as well as on deck. Most Booms still 'carry' 
a main mast raked forward at an angle, though some have now dispensed with the 
mast, since all Booms now carry an inboard engine (one or two) usually of American or 
Japanese manufacture. The stern houses an optional wheelhouse on the 'poop', together 
with two compulsory 'zulies', or outboard 'privies'. 
Dhang? 
The Indian subcontinent's equivalent of the Boom is the Dhangi, a double-ender 
ranging from 50 - 200 tons. The word Dhangi is "Baluchi" and the craft are built on 
the coasts of Sind and Kutch. Their design is essentially similar to the Boom with the 
exception of the stemhead projection which is cut off just abcv e the hul l , with the 
addition of a short bowsprit-like projection, a modified rudder, and the use of coloured 
bands on the hu l l . These craft rarely venture into the Gulf, but usually run between 
Pakistan and India, or Pakistan and East Africa (Jewell, 1969). At the beginning of the 
twentieth century, Wilson and Edwards (1909) reported rare runs from Kuwait and 
Muscat, to Bombay. A small number of these craft were present in Dubai harbour during 
1972-73. 
Yemeni Dhows - Zarouk 
The Red Sea or Yemeni dhow is also double-ended and the equivalent of the Boom. 
Two such dhows visited Dubai in 1973, distinguished by their multi-coloured bands and 
ornamental 'poops'. 
Bel em 
The river craft known as the Belem, trades on the route between the ports of the 
Shart al Arab (Basra, Abadan, Khorramshahr, Gosbar, Khosrowabad, Bahmashir, Sauduni), 
and Kuwait. They are small craft, under 50 tons, lacking the long bowsprit of the Booms, 




Numerically, the wider variety of square-stemmed vessels present with the modern 
system is perhaps indicative of the success of European influences on design in the last 
450 years. However, there are examples of adaptive failures. 
The Baggola 
The Baggala is now an extinct type of dhow, probably because in the adaptive 
evolution although the closest Arab cousin to Portuguese men'o'war, it was too large a 
craft to survive the down-turn in trading conditions throughout the system subsequent 
to the arrival of the steamship. The Baggalas were the largest dhows in contemporary Arab 
maritime history, and were built mainly at the port of Sur in Oman, where in modern 
times they are still portrayed as a symbolic reminder of the past. The English translation 
of 'mule* from 'Baggala" is unkind, for its sturdiness is surpassed by its appearance. This 
largest of all Arab dhows (some were over 500 tons, but most were between 200 and 400 
tons) were (with regard to their size and the shape of their hulls) the closest in adaptation 
to European design. These long distance dhows were built and sailed out of the major 
ports of the Persian Gulf in the Nineteenth and early twentieth centuries - Sur, Muscat, 
Lingeh, Kuwait, Bahrain, Bandar Abbas, Bushire - carrying crews of between 40 and 50 
men (Wilson and Edwards, 1909). Wilson and Edwards report the dimensions of two 
Baggalas, the "Mahmoodi" (516 tons) and the "Salamati" (396 tons), which visited Bombay 
at the turn of the century, as 140ft. long x 29' broad x 18' deep and 133' x 28' x 15' 
respectively. At the bow, a Baggala had a stem head projection, bollard-like, surmounted 
by a peg design, her stern pitched high and square, in the manner of a sixteenth century 
Portuguese caravel, emblazoned with ornamental carvings and 5 stern windows. In 1940, 
Villiers believed there to be Jess than 50 in existence; his description of one such Baggala 
he boarded is a fine descriptive obituary to a craft which became too costly, both to build 
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and to run, by the twentieth century: "She was a craft of the Middle Ages She 
was beautiful from the outside and she was beautiful on board. Her windowed stern was 
especially lovely. Its elliptical erea of ancient teak was covered with intricate pattern 
of excellent carving and her curved bow swept up from the sea as gracefully as the breast 
of a swan. She was big, for an Arab. Her oiled teak sat prettily in the water with a 
grace and strength and sweetness of line that sung of sea-kindliness despite all Nejdis 
comments on the vulnerability of her stern. I wondered how, if her stern was so vulnerable, 
she had managed to survive so long, for she dated back to slaving days. She was very old -
more than half a century, like so many Arab vessels, every line of her flowered and blended 
perfectly into a harmonious and lovely whole, though she had been put together on the 
beach at Sur by carpenters who could not understand the most elementary plan." (p.87). 
Ghanjah 
Pronounced 'Ranja' the Ghanjah is the surviving, smaller cousin of the Baggala. It 
has survived because its smaller size (averaging between 100 - 200 tons, Wilson and 
Edwards, 1909) which puts it in the same class as the Boom, although few remain today. 
Kaplan (1974) has recently sighted one off the coast of Dhofar, but few if any trode in the 
Gulf . It has an Indian-Omani design ancestry. Originally they were built on the coast 
of Kutch (Kutch Mandv?) but they were later purchased by, and then copied, by the Arabs 
of Sur and Muscat as a form of Arab 'Kotia ' . Like the Baggala, it has a high, arched 
transom stern, embellished with vine meander carving and five carvel windows. Its 
distinctive bow has a circular stem head carving; possibly alluding to a backward-looking 
Parrot's head (Jewell, 1969) or more like a rosebud (Wilson and Edwards, 1909). 
Kotia 
The Indian Kotia is not a native carft of the Gulf, but is a frequent trader in Its 
waters, particularly to the ports of Muscat and Dubai and occasionally to Kuwait and Bahrain, 
She is similar in size and style to the Ghanjah, without possessing the distinctive stemhead, 
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bearing witness to her close geographical and design heritage, built-on the coast of 
Kutch. They are built chiefly at Kutch Mandvi, Mangalore and Calicut (up to 200 
tons) and have an operational radius ranging from 3asra in the west, Chittagong and the Nicobar 
Islands in the east, Malagasy in the south, and up the Red Sea to Jeddah (Wilson and 
Edwards, 1909). Their main route in 1973 was to visit Dubai (where they were easily 
distinguishable by their square sterns and multicoloured bands running fore and aft on 
the forefoot) to load cargo for Western India. 
Bet? I 
Accompanying the Kotia on voyages between Dubai and India in the early 1970's 
is the Indian Betil. They are smaller (50 - 100 tons) coastal craft of European design 
origin, without the embellishment of thetfern . They are built at the ports of the 
Kattiawar Coast and the Gulf of Kutch (e.g. at Kutch Mandvi, Newanger, Verawal 
and Jaffrabad). 
Padow 
A distinctive visitor to Dubai on the same route to the Indian subcontinent is the 
smaller, essentially riverine Padow, normally associated with the coasting trade from 
Bombay, north as far as Broach. Normally up to 60 tons, the vessels are built in the Gulf 
of Cambay (Bassein, Surat). 
Associated with the smuggling trade between Dubai and Indian/Pakistani coasts 
are two untypical vessels, not associated with the traditional trading system, but adapted 
successfully, with the use of powerful inboard motors, to high speed sorties on the ocean: 
The Purpose-built Smuggler 
The "purpose-built" smuggler is a long, lean craft, built mainly on the Indian 
coast, possessing a raked bow and a square stern, one or two masts raked forward, a 
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prominent deckhouse, usually surmounted by an awning draped overall. The sleek 
style is augmented by the power of up to three inboard engines, permitting the 
attainment of speeds up to 18 - 20 knots. 
Pakistan? Fishing Dhow 
This lower, flatter craft, ostensibly and functionally a fishing craft, is used in 
trades similar to the purpose-built smuggler. 
Sambuk 
Along with the Arab Boom, the Sambuk is the most ubiquitous dhow within the 
Gulf . There are three distinctive types of Sambuk used in the Gulf: Firstly, the ocean-
going Sambuk; secondly, the coasting Sambuk on the internal Gulf trade routes; and 
f inal ly , the fishing Sambuk, which along with the Bedeni and the smaller Houri are 
representative of the Gulf fishing dhows. 
The link between Portuguese design and Arab shipbuilding is most pronounced in the 
transom stern of the ocean-going Sambuk, which at the zenith of the Persian Gulf Trading 
System in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were common along the Gulf coast, 
south Arabian, Red Sea and East African coasts. Built formerly at Sur in South Arabia, 
the Red Sea and at Ras Ahila, their displacement varies from 75 - 150 tons (with average 
dimensions of 80 f t . long 20 f t . broad and 10 f t . deep). Meaning 'fast' in Arabic, the 
reason for rheir disappearance (there were few visiting the Gulf in the early 1970's), is 
probably a function of the demise of the large-sized ocean-going dhows on rhe Gulf-
Africa route, associated with the eclipse of the Baggala and Ghanjah. The style is 
distinctive: Her bow curves upwards from the waterline in a graceful sweep to end just 
above the hul l , and can be likened to a barred scimitar. The ocean-going Sambuk has 
a shorter, steeper bow piece in comparison with the longer, shallower angle of the Gulf 
Sambuk. In both cases, the stern is a transom, raked backwards, ornamented in blue 
and white on ocean-going craft. The Gulf Sambuk is still built along the Arabian coast 
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of Muharraq, Dubai, Ajman, Sur) and is used either as a small coasting craft or as 
a fish erman, having been adapted from their original use as pearlers adept at 
manoeuvring the shallow pearl banks of the Gulf because of their short keels. 
Jalbut 
The final square-sterned Arab coasting craft of the Gulf is the Jalbut ('{oily boat') 
or its Iranian cousin, the Banush. They are distinguished by their bolt upright bow and 
transom stern, reminiscent of the old English naval jolly boat from which its name is 
probably derived. They are generally of less than 50 tons displacement and 50 f t . in 
length. They are not ocean-sea craft and have been adapted from their original use of 
pearlers on the Gulf pearl banks, into (with the addition of an engine) coasting craft 
in those areas where they were formerly used as pearlers (around the Bahrain? archipelago) 
between Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Iran, and along the Trucial (United Arab Emirates) 
and Omani coasts. 
4.3 OPERATION OF THE DHOW TRADING SYSTEM 
The operation of the dhow trading system involves two basic groups of participants: 
firstly it includes the services of those people who actually go to sea and sailed the 
vessels, the so-called 'sea people' whose activity is voyaging and whose skills in navigation 
are widely valued (Couper, 1973, p . 232); and secondly the organization of trade is 
conducted through a network of merchants and owners of dhows. As such the operation 
of the trading system depends on a close, symbiotic relationship between the interests and 
roles of the sailors, and those of the merchants and owners (who often formed a part of the 
ruling eli te). The navigators who command the dhows occupy an important position in the 
social hierarchy of the Gulf l i t toral , as do the craftsmen who build the ships. The sailors 
tend to view their craft partly as a medium of social contact interwoven in a network of 
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inter-port kinship relations and social interactions, contrasting with the owners and 
merchants who view a dhow primarily as a linkage factor in the regional economy. 
4.3.1 OWNERS 
It is not the case that dhows are usually operated in commercial fleets. In the 
contemporary Gulf i t is more usual for a single dhow to be operated (often on a specific 
trade route) by an individual private owner or group of owners. The cost of constructing 
a new dhow in the 1970's was so expensive (with prices ranging accorcfng to size from 
$15,000 - $30,000, plus a further $7,500 - $20,000 for the price of an engine -
Martin and Martin, 1978) that few citizens other than the more successful merchants, 
well organized 'smugglers', and members of ruling families can afford to own more than 
one vessel. In the recent past, however, when the dhow was a more prominent mode of 
transport in the 1930's and 1940's, wealthy merchant families such as the ruling Al Sabah family 
of Kuwait would have a finger in a score or more of large dhows. Villiers (1948, p. 401) 
relates how in the late 1930's Kuwaiti merchants used their wealth which was derived from 
their ownership of date plantations along the Shatt Al Arab to finance the construction of 
dhows (built in Kuwait) for participation in the deep-sea trades to Africa and India. Owners 
minimised the risk on their capital investment (in the form of money advanced to a dhow 
captain to enable him to commission the construction of a new dhow) by ensuring that the 
dhow captains (nakhodas) were left as nominal owners of their dhows, so as to provide 
a form of insurance whereby in the event of a loss of a dhow at sea a surviving nakhoda 
would pay for the dhow plus its lost cargo. 
In the 1970'$ wealthy merchants and ruling families were less inclined to own numbers 
of dfows, preferring to invest their capital elsewhere. Those private citizens who do own 
dhows are faced with high purchase prices together with a dwindling number of yards 
where new craft are constructed. Kuwait (Dawha), Bahrain (Manama and Muharraq), 
Doha, Dubai and Kung (in Iran) were significant centres for dhow construction in the 1970's. 
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In such oases merchants and nakhodas 'shop around' for the best price quoted for a new 
dhow and it is not uncommon for a Kuwaiti merchant to commission the construction of a 
new dhow in , for example, the Qatari port of Doha (Kaplan, 1974, p . 334), or for a 
Dubai merchant to have his built in Kung before it is towed back to Dubois creek. In 
the latter case a merchant takes advantage of the superior skills and speed of construction 
in the Iranian port together with a cheaper final cost as a result of the relative 
cheapness of labour costs in south east Iran (Martin and Martin, 1978, p.211). 
Ultimately citizens own dhows for profit rather than pleasure . The proportion of 
profit after a voyage which accrues to an owner after payment of all expenses, 
including food for the crew, fuel costs and harbour dues, varies from 10% to 50%. The 
earning capacity of a dhow working in Gulf waters depends on the size of the dhow and 
its crew, the location of its base port, and the nature of its trade ( i . e . 'normal' or 
'smuggling'). An indication of the earning power and cost involved for a Bahraini 
merchant engaged in trading on the short sea route from Manama to the Saudi port of 
Al Khobar in 1973 is set out below : 
Bahrain? Dinars 
Gross earnings of a 90 ton dhow (per round trip) 220 
(a) Costs: Food 20 
: 2 drums of fuel 11 
sub total 33 
(b) Total amount for distribution 189 
of which : (1) Owner takes 50% 94.500 
(11) Nakhoda receives 20% 37.800 
(111) Balance is distributed among 
8 crew members for 2 days 
work. 56.700 
Which leaves BD 7.087 per crew member. 
99 
This earnings level of 50% confirms the rate for owners related by Villiers in 
1939. However, elsewhere In the Gulf Martin and Martin (1978), also researching 
in 1973, have reported lower levels of profit. For example, a dhow which transported 
1500 bags of stone chips (used for making mosaic floors) from Abadan to Kuwait earned 
the owner 10% of the cargoes value which was $2,340 (p. 157); while a 'boom' operating 
from Khorramshohr to Kuwait earned the owner $4700 for a cargo of ghee worth 
$18,700. 
4 .3 .2 . CREW 
Each trading dbo«v is operated by a crew consisting of a captain (nakhoda) and between 
5 and 15 men depending on the size of the vessel. Larger crews do exist but were more 
common earlier in this cenlury when there were a greater number of large dhows and long 
distance voyages than in the 1970's. Nakhodas hove considerable social prestige in 
Gulf society based on their skill and knowledge of ports and trade conditions over a wide 
area. They usually come from families of high social standing in their home communities; 
i f they do not they wi l l be unlikely to receive any financial backing or employment from 
dhow owners. In hierarchical terms, however, the role of a nakhoda is fixed: a nakhoda 
can never become an important merchant, and visa versa. The head of a nakhoda family 
could however attain the status of a lesser merchant, usually confined to trade in shipbuilding 
materials such as Malabar teak. 
The Arab bedu are not by nature seafaring men. Hence, a majority of the nakhodas 
and dhow crews employed by owners in Arabian parts are 'foreigners', often of Iranian 
nationality, though of Arab descent, confined to certain tribes (e,g, Bani Tamln, Bani Kab, 
Al Hola) and certain Iranian ports (e.g. Henyam, Qeshm). A number of coastal villages 
on the Iranian coast have a tradition of supplying Arab and Iranian dhows with crews. These 
villages include Ganaveh, Rig, Kangan, Tombok, Kung and Taheri. Prins (1966) found that 
in such villages as Kangan, Tombok and Taheri there was a very high rate of employment in 
100 
maritime occupations, with ratios as high as 8 out of 9 male villagers employed as 
sailors. As such, the crews of dhows were away from home for a considerable period 
each year unless they were working in home based trades which was often not the 
case. 
Mates are distinguished from ordinary deck hands by virtue of their superior sea-
manship which occasionally places them in charge of a vessel. However, in the past the 
overall social hierarchy of owners, nakhodas and crews was fused together into a unified 
structure based on the principle in indebtedness described by Villiers in 1940 (p.297): 
"Debt was the accepted thing and to spend a lifetime owing money was apparently 
usual. The sailors owed money to the nakhodas, the nakhodas to the merchants, the merchants 
to other merchants, or to the Shaikh. Working without a banking system, with insurance, 
usury, and even interest forbidden - at any rate in theory - by the Islamic Law, the 
economic side of the port of Kuwait (in 1939) was a dark maze. It was obvious however 
that the whole industry rested on a structureof debt. It was equally obvious that nakhodas, 
though they imagined themselves to be the owners of their booms were not the real owners 
at a l l . It suited the merchants apparently to finance the nakhodas rather than run the 
ships themselves and for this there were many excellent reasons. The nakhoda perhaps 
paid more for the financing they received than the ship could be expected to earn. In 
other words the money advanced to nakhodas to run the ships for themselves, brought larger 
dividends than the same money would have done if the merchants had invested directly in 
the ships." 
4 .3 .3 . AGENTS 
No trading system as complex as the Gulfs could exist without the availability 
of agencies operating in ports distant from a dhow's base. In the past successful merchant 
families established agencies usually run by sons or trusted local agents in the major ports 
in the trading system, both in the Gulf, and beyond in Aden, Bombay, Mukhalla, Muscat, • 
I 
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Zanzibar and Dar es Salaam . This legacy of merchant households persisted throughout 
the 1970's as a vital link in the chain of trading operations. The function of each 
agency consists of buying and selling cargoes from incoming dhows, collecting debts, 
supervising the exchange of foreign-currency, arranging the transhipment of cargoes 
from ship to shore , and providing interpreters where necessary. Many of the agents 
are wholesalers themselves and hence are able to supply a dhow directly with specialist 
cargoes. 
4.3.4 SHIPPERS 
By 1980 the number of speculative dhow voyages (common in the past) on which 
nakhodas and crews load cargoes in the hope, rather than the certainty, that they wi l l 
be able to sell them in the Gulf or western Indian Ocean are very rare. Cargoes are 
nearly always consigned to a specific destination on behalf of a specific party, either as 
*whole' cargoes such as cement, or as 'part' cargoes made up of individual consignments 
such as iron bars, motor cycles, clothing and foodstuffs. 
Broadly, four types of shipper utilise the services of dhows in the Gulf , Firstly, 
cargoes are shipped in fulfilment of orders placed by governments or commercial companies, 
or of orders placed by firms operating branch retailing or wholesa ling outlets in different 
Gulf States. In this manner contracts for cement, steel, sheep, etc. , are arranged between 
two parties, of which the seller, or his agent, arranges for the transportation of the cargo 
by dhow between two ports. In some cases, firms such as 'Kewelram' and 'Danawella' (whole 
salers and retailers of clothing and textiles) supply their branch outlets in the United Arab 
Emirates from their main warehouses in Bahrain. 
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Secondly, private individuals, shop keepers or representatives of firms wil l visit a 
Gulf port with the intention of purchasing certain items, after which they wi l l arrange 
for the transportation of their purchases by dhow to a specified destination. For example, 
shopkeepers and merchants from small Iranian coastal villages and towns such as Charak, 
Lingeh, Puhul and Minab, and Iranian islands such as Hormuz, Larak and Qais visit 
Dubai at certain times during each year to stock up with items such as turmeric, tamarid 
and rice. 
Thirdly, private individuals who visit some of the higher-order Gulf ports such as 
Kuwait, Bahrain and Dubai sometimes arrange the transportation of particular items 
purchased (such as motor vehicles and household electrical equipment) back to their home 
port or country. 
Finally, 'smugglers' (either individuals or well-organised groups) either arrange for the 
carriage by dhow of cargoes destined for specific ports or a relatively remote coastal 
rendezvous in the Gulf , or beyond, or arrange for the elaborate concealment of smuggled 
items amid 'normally' manifested cargoes. 
4.3.5 BASE PORTS 
During the 1970's the 'base ports' of the Gulf can be classified into two types 
according to their function. The first group includes the major deep-water ports of the 
Gulf which by virtue of their domination of imports and re-exports in the region support 
a significant number of cargo dhows to perform the 'feeder' redistributive function of 
serving smaller, spatially dispersed coastal communities, as well as the other major 
ports. The ports include Basra, Khorramshahr, Abadan, Bushire, Bandar Abbas, Kuwait, 
Bahrain, Doha Dubai and Muscat-Matrah (in the Gulf of Oman). In this context the 
modern deep-water ports of Bandar Shahpour, Dammam, Abu Dhabi and Sharjah do not 
possess large numbers of home-based dhows. 
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The second group includes a large number of Iranian and Arabian coastal towns 
and villages (see Figure 2.2) which support a number of operational trading dhows (usually 
between 5 and 20, though in some cases more) because they constitute the most important 
mode of transport with links to the higher-order ports of the Gulf . This set includes 
Gosbar, Hendljan, Daylam, Rig, Ganaveh, Bolkheyr, Dilwa, Dayyer, Kangan, Kung, 
Puhul, Khamir, Basidu, Qeshm, Tiab, and Jask (all of which are Iranian and are base 
ports for dhows whose primary function is to export surplus, locally-produced cargoes -
agricultural produce and manufactured items - and Import what foreign goods the villagers 
and townspeople require), A l Khobar and Qateef (Saudi Arabia), Sharjah, Ras Al Khaimah 
and Khor Fakkan ( U . A . E . ) . 
4.3.6 CONDUCT OF TRADE 
The dhow trading system is not a highly organized and regularized component of the 
overall Gulf trading system. Although there are some regular 'runs' for dhows on certain 
routes (e.g. Manama - Al Khobar, Manama-Bushire, Dubai - Bandar Abbas) more often 
than not the operation of dhows is irregular, fluctuating with the whims of nakhodas, 
cargo availability season and prevailing weather conditions. It is an essentially slow 
moving part of the GulPs economy. However, it is not an inefficient service. Dhows 
make their voyages at any time of the year (weather permitting) and are able to move 
in and out of small creeks, shallow channels and natural harbours which do not have the 
facilities to handle larger vessels. Further, merchants and crew alike regard their dhows 
as floating, low-cost warehouses as well as a means of transport. It suits merchants 
to have 10,000 packages of dates divided among the holds of a number of dhows rather 
than in the hold of a steamer which could unload and flood a market in a single day. 
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Chapter 3 has provided evidence of the demise of regular trans-oceanic dhow trades 
which formerly linked the Gulf with ports in the western Indian Ocean li t toral . During 
the last three decades the risky business of peddling cargoes to their best advantage on 
long-sea trades (e.g. Kuwait - Zanzibar) has given way to the more stable short-sea markets 
within the Gulf . The contemporary function of the dhow is to redistribute cargoes imported 
into the Gulf by steamer, motor lorry and aircraft, supplemented by the conveyance of 
locally produced primary products and manufactured articles. Redistribution is carried 
on 'legally' between the Arab states of the Gulf, and between Iran and the Arab states, 
and 'Il legally' via smuggling trades channeled principally from Arab entrepots into Iran. 
Apart from the occasional visiting dhow from East Africa, South Arabia and the Red Sea, 
the one exception to the prevailing short-sea function is the significant long distance trade 
with India and Pakistan into which a considerable volume of cargoes are smuggled, mostly 
from Dubai. 
Despite its slow moving pattern, short-sea trades have been stimulated by the 
replacement of sail by the diesel engine. The speed at which dhows {ourney from point 
to point varies with the size of the engine and the nature of the weather conditions. A 
sailing dhow could attain speeds of 15 - 20 knots with a favourable wind, 8 - 1 0 knots 
against the wind and 3 - 5 knots in light wind conditions, but on average an engine-
powered dhow is faster and less susceptible to bad weather. The following list records 
the approximate journey times for dhows travelling on selected routes (as supplied by 
nakhodas interviewed in 1973): 
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Time in Hours 
Motorized 
Dhow Sailing Dhow Motorfeed dhow 
Bahrain 24 48 Bahrain - A l Khobar 2 
Abadan 10-20 24-26 i i - Doha 6-8 
Bus hire 15-20 24 Dubai - Muscat 72 
Al Khobar 24 24 • i - Sur 96 
Dubai 72 72 •1 - Khor Fakkan 24 
i t - Bush ire 36 
I I - Charak 24 
I I - Qais 24 
I I - Dayyer 30 
I I - Bolkheyr 36 
The freight rates charged by nakhodas vary according to the dimensions and weight of 
the cargo, the route and the speed of delivery. A small sample survey was conducted in 
the field to ascertain the general level of freight rates charged. Fifteen dhow captains 
were interviewed at random, five from each of three ports studied in depth (Kuwait, Bahrain 
and Dubai). Naturally, business involves individual quotations which vary from Nakhoda to 
Nakhoda, though i t is doubtful whether the results obtained in Table 4.1 would have varied 
significantly i f a larger sample had been taken, bearing in mind that only the general nature 
of freight rates was sought. Often unanimity appertained with regard to the rates quoted 
on specific routes. In cases where a range of rates was quoted, the maximum and minimum 
levels have been recorded, and the average level calculated. 
Figure 4.6 (a, b and c) represents isohyet diagrams based on the quoted freight rate 
charges from Kuwait, Bahrain and Dubai. In each case, and for reasons of standardization, 
the rate quoted was for the conveyance of a cargo of one tonne of rice (10 'gunny* bogs) 
between two points at the winfer/spring of 1973 rates. Figures a, b and c are comparable 
by virtue of the conversion of rates into a common currency, namely the Kuwaiti Dinas at 
rates published by the National Bank of Kuwait in 1973 ( K . D . I = B.D. 0.749997 or 
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TABLE 4»1 s Comparative Dhow Freight Rates quoted f o r the Carriage 
of 1 ton of Rice between Two Ports, 1973 
Origin Ports 
Destination Ports Kuwait Bahrain Dubai 
(KD) (BD) (QDR) 
Max-Min*1 Av. Max-Min* Av. Max-Min* Av. 
Al Khobar 4.5- 5-0 4.75 — 1-5 3.5 -4.5 4.0 
Doha 4.0- 6.0 5.0 2.0 -4.0 3.0 - 2.25 
Dubai 4.0- 6.0 5.0 4-5 -5-25 4.875 - -
Kuwait - - 4-5 -5-25 4.875 4.5 -5.0 4.75 
Muscat 8.0-10.0 9.0 - 5.0 - 3-5 
Bushire 4-5- 5-0 4-75 4 .5-5 .25 4.875 - 4.5 
Dayyer - - 4.5 -5.25 4.875 - -
Ganaveh - 4.0 5.25-6.O 5.625 - 4.5 
Fao 2.0- 2.5 2.25 - - - -
Gosbar 2.0- 2.5 2.25 - - - 5.25 
Basra - 2.5 - - - -
Abadan - 2-5 - - - — 
Khorramshahr - 2-5 7.0 -8.0 7-5 - -
Bahrain 3-5- 6.0 4.75 - 3.0 -3.25 3.125 
Abu Dhabi 4.0- 6.0 5-0 1.25-2.0 1.625 
Sharjah - 5.0 - -
Lingeh 5.0-10.0 7-5 - - 2.25 
Bandar Abbas 6.5-IO.O 8.25 - - 2.25 
J ask 8.0-10.0 9.0 - 3.0 -3.25 3.125 
Charbahar - 10.0 _ - - 3.5 
Salala - 12.5 _ - - 7.5 
Ras Al Khaimah - - - - 2.0 
Khor Fakkan - - - - 2.0 
Qeshm - - - - 2.25 
1 Minab - _ - - - 2.25 
S i r i q - - - 2.75 
t 
, Charak - - 2.25-4.25 3.25 
Gwadar - - - - 4.5 
Bulkhair - - - - 4.5 
Asalu - - — - 4.5 
Rig - - - - - 4.5 
Mas i rah - - _ - - 7.5 
Sur - - - - 3.5 -7.5 5.5 
Qeshm - - l 1 - - 2-5 
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Q.D.R. 0.0749997, Annual Report, p. 203). In the resulting maps the pattern 
corresponds broadly to the 'spheres of influence' discernible in Figure 4.7. If the 
lowest rate surface is considered (i .e. the area where freight rates are less than K.D. 2.19) 
then Kuwait would appear to have an 'advantage' foreland along the Kuwaiti coast 
and the Iranian coast as far as Hendijan; Bahrain has an 'advantage' foreland which 
includes the Saudi coast and the north coast of Qatar; and Dubai has an 'advantage' 
foreland which includes the Iranian coast from Lavan island to Siriq, the U.A.E. coast and 
the Musandam peninsula. The Iranian coast between Daylam in the west and Chivu in the 
east appears to be open to competition from Kuwaiti and Bahrain? dhows. 
4.4. CARGOES CARRIED BY DHOWS 
The survival of dhow transport within the Gulf ultimately depends on the ability of 
their operators to secure cargoes to carry: Cargo dhows literally carry any cargo that 
fits the size of their hulls, varying in type from dates to dynamite, ghee to gold bullion. 
In this context its important to observe the continuity in the selection of cargoes carried 
over hundreds of years. 
4.4.1 TRADITIONAL CARGOES 
It appears likely that dhows have been carrying broadly similar cargoes for hundreds, 
even thousands of years. Archaelogists have revealed the antiquity of certain non-perishable 
cargoes such as clay jugs and other items of pottery (Wiitehouse, 1971), but foodstuffs are 
probably the most basic type of cargo. Table 4.2 . lists the major cargoes carried by dhows 
in the last 200 years (Abu-Hakima, 1965; Lorimer, 1915; Prins 1966) during which food 
items are a major component. The unfavourable rainfall regime along the Gulf littoral 
makes it an unfavourable region for growing vegetables and cereal grains, and for rearing 
livestock. However, the Tigris - Euphrates river basin, fertile soils within the valleys of 
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TABLE 4.2 
TRADITIONAL CARGOES CARRIED BY DHOWS 








(Date and Palm Products) 
(Wheat, Barley, Millet) 







Building Materials (coir rope, stone, bamboo, teak, mangrove poles) 
Semi-Precious Metals (tin, lead, iron, copper) 
Precious metals (gold, silver) 
Pearls 
Piece-goods (Clothing and textiles) 
Household items (Clay pots, copper jugs) 
Carpers 
Passengers (Slaves, traders, journeyors) 
Source: Larimer (1915); Abu Hakuma (1965); Prins (1966) 
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Oil field supply materials 
Passengers. 
Source: Foreign Trade Statistics (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, U .A .E . , Oman) 
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the Zagros (Iran) and Omani Mountains, and isolated Arabian oases offered favourable 
environments for agriculture. Accordingly, the dhow formed part of a trading system 
which linked up with camel and mule routes which distributed foodstuff throughout the 
Gulf and further afield. Dhows transported local cargoes such as dates from Iraq, fresh 
and dried fruit and vegetables, livestock, wheat, barley, rice and tobacco from Iran 
and Oman, coffee imported from the Yeraan, and ghee and spices from India. 
Five other basic items have been carried by dhows for centuries - building materials, 
precious and semi-precious metals, household items, salt and passengers. India was a 
major source of cargoes of tin, lead, iron copper, teak, bamboo and items of pottery. 
East Africa supplied cargoes of mangrove poles and slaves. The people of the Gulf 
supplied cargoes of household utensils, crockery and carpets from interior 'Persia', while 
for centuries cargoes of cotton piece-goods, items of clothing and embroidery passed along 
the Gulf en route from sources of manufacture in Mesopotamia and India. 
4.4.2 CONTEMPORARY CARGOES 
A comparison between Table 4.2 and Table 4.3. reveals a striking similarity in the 
nature of cargoes carried in the 1970's and those transported a hundred years earlier. All 
those cargoes carried in Table 4.2 with the exception of slaves and bulk cargoes of semi-
precious metals such as iron and lead are still carried by dhows. In fact, the carriage 
of locally produced cargoes such as fresh fruit and vegetables, and livestock, remains 
a major form of cargo particularly on the cross-trade routes which link Iran with the Arabian 
states. Traditional cargoes produced outside the Gulf such as Pakistani 'basmati' rice or 
Indian Teak and tamarind are still redistributed through the Gulf aboard dhows, though they 
may arrive aboard liners. In general, traditional cargoes remain the staple cargoes despite 
the I ncursion since World War Two of a number of 'new* cargoes. 
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These 'new* cargoes include oil Field supply materials, liquid Fuels, raw steel 
structures, motor vehicles, household electrical items such as radios, air conditioners, 
plastic goods, dgarettes, and various items oF machinery. These 'general' cargoes are 
more commonly carried on dhow routes connecting the Arab Gulf States (except Iraq), 
rather than on routes between Iran and the Arabian coast. 
The nature oF cargoes carried in the modern GulF is best examined via a detailed 
analysis oF cargoes transported in specIFic routes. The Following section Focuses on 
cargoes carried in and out oF the ports oF Kuwait, Bahrain and Dubai in the early 1970's. 
4.4.3 CASE STUDIES: CARGOES AT KUWAIT, BAHRAIN AND DUBAI 
KUWAIT 
The state of Kuwait looks to its northern neighbours For a large proportion oF its daily 
food requirements as witnessed by long convoys of lorries loaded with Fresh Fruits and 
vegetables which arrive daily From Iraq and Lebanon through the Al Abdal? customs 
post. However, I ran is also a major supplier oF Fresh FoodstuFFs, most oF which arrives 
by dhow through the dhow harbour adjacent to the SieF Palace. 
Iran supplies by Far the greatest proportion oF imported dhow cargoes (see Table 4.4) 
the majority oF which originate from villages along the Shatt Al Arab and its delta. The 
villages (Sauduni, Gosbar, Bah mash ir, Khosrowabad) supply Kuwait with seasonal cargoes 
oF oniors, dates, tomatoes, grapes, nuts, watermelon, raisins, vegetables, fresh fruits 
and alfalfa. Elsewhere, other Iranian towns and villages (including Hendijan, Day I am, 
Rig, Ginawar and Bushire) also supply Kuwait with fresh produce. A characteristic cargo 
which usually arrives aboard small banush dhows (see Figure 4.4.) consists of thousands of 
bags of mosaic stones and mosaic powder, together with large quantities of gravel, marble 
and gypsum, all of which is used in the Kuwaiti construction and building industries. The 
river ports of Abadan and Khorramshahr supply Kuwait with the necessary aggregate, along 
with heavy cargoes of ordinary, white and oil-well cement. 
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T A B L E 4 .4 
K U W A I T : C A R G O E S A R R I V I N G B Y DHOW, 1971 
I b y we igh t ) 
( A ) E x c e e d i n g 3 ,000 ,000 K g 
6276488 O n i o n s * 
3865535 F r e s h V e g e t a b l e s ( o t h e r ) 
4594585 A l f a l f a 
37984486 Mosaic S t o n e s * 
10618959 Mosaic P o w d e r 
22929550 O r d i n a r y C e m e n t 
4370000 Oil Well C e m e n t 
( B ) 1, 500,000 - 2 ,999 ,999 K g 
* = V a l u e e x c e e d s 
K . D . 100,000 
S o u r c e : K u w a i t , F o r e i g n 
T r a d e S t a t i s t i c s , 1971 
2213993 Marble 
2901500 G y p s u m 
1128675 O t h e r C h e m i c a l P r o d u c t s 
1959995 D r i e d D a t e s 
2663062 Tomatoes 
2032771 C e r e a l (Animal F e e d ) 
2018584 M a r g a r i n e a n d V e g e t a b l e Fa t * 
( C ) 500,000 - 1 ,455,000 K g 
543908 G o a t s a n d S h e e p 
752993 G r a p e s 
979428 N u t s * 
1060113 D a t e s 
559221 Watermelon 
634925 R a i s i n s 
725731 O t h e r F r e s h F r u i t 
879841 B r o a d B e a n s 
732972 G a r l i c 
1264740 Palm l e a v e s a n d Wood 
774736 T a b l e S a l t 
975435 Date K e r n e l s 
540282 Cot ton f a b r i c s * 
518206 P e r s i a n C a r p e t s * 
730000 White C e m e n t 
778917 F a i t I r o n / S t e e l B a r s 
584792 F i n i s h e d 1/S S t r u c t u r e s 
O t h e r S i g n i f i c a n t C a r g o e s I b y w e i g h t ) 
Raw C o t t o n 490532 K g 
G r a v e l 422150 »• 
E a r t h e n w a r e 446575 " 
( b y v a l u e ) 
B u l k , a r t i f i c i a l 
t e x t i l e s K D 138207 
B u s e s 265319 
C l o t h i n g 115003 
114 
T A B L E 4 . 5 
K U W A I T - E X P O R T C A R G O E S B Y DHOW, 1971 
(by w e i g h t ) 
E x p o r t s a n d R e - e x p o r t s ( K g ) D e s t i n a t i o n ( R o u n d e d %) 
I r a n I r aq S a u d i B a h r Qat U A E Oman Demyem. 
R i c e 12050152 97 1 1 1 
S a n d E 76950000 32 2 66 
I ron / S t e e l s c r a p E 6511488 95 5 
D i e s e l F u e l E 4029240 35 21 44 
Oil Well C e m e n t E 2268000 1 99 
S h a p e d Wood E 1639162 35 57 8 
I r o n / S t e e l b a r s 1629272 5 36 36 23 
I r o n / S t e e l p i p e s 1385590 26 32 14 21 7 
Non f e r r o u s s c r a p E 1336000 100 
I ron / S t e e l s c r a p 1107784 4 4 92 
Wheat F l o u r E 984060 42 55 3 
White C e m e n t 853450 82 18 
P a i n t s E 840995 7 27 1 63 2 
O r d i n a r y C e m e n t 833350 17 75 8 
K e r o s e n e E 765100 7 57 36 
D r i l l i n g m a c h i n e r y E 714977 15 1 35 49 
Date K e r n e l s 697750 91 9 
A p p l e s 622385 95 1 4 
S a n i t a r y goods 578979 52 1 3 44 
In su la t ion b r i c k E 548000 NA 
P o r c e l a i n 544788 100 
D r i e d D a t e s 544590 4 22 7 
S u g a r 481637 98 1 1 
T e a 497034 78 2 6 12 1 
S y n t h e t i c animal 
f e e d s t u f f 469650 11 89 
C i g a r e t t e s 293636 100 
P r e f a b r i c a t e d 
b u i l d i n g s E 466780 14 11 57 18 
A i r c o n d i t i o n e r s E 123961 23 1 6 68 2 
C a r s 347408 79 6 7 7 
L o r r i e s 151000 11 1 87 1 
= E x p o r t s (al l o t h e r c a r g o e s a r e re - e x p o r t s ) 
* = V a l u e e x c e e d s K . D . 100,000 
S o u r c e : K u w a i t F o r e i g n T r a d e S t a t i s t i c s , 1971 
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Import cargoes from the Arab Gulf states tend to be very mixed in type, and low 
in both value and tonnage. The most significant cargoes are quantities of Japanese-
made cotton fabrics, clothes and other textiles 'sent on' from the main agencies from 
warehouses in Bahrain, and seasonal supplies of Omani dried fish and tobacco. 
The distribution of export and re-export cargoes from Kuwait shows a wider geographical 
distribution tfian for imports though the pattern also emphasises the dominance of Iran as a 
market. However, the 'official' figures in Table 4.5 do not record unaccounted quantities 
of smuggled cargoes of watches, transistors, televisions, cigarettes and other high tariff 
items which are landed at points along the Iranian coast from Khorramshahr to Bushire. 
Rice is the most significant re-exported cargo (usually Thai and Burmese varieties) and is 
sent to towns and villages along the Iranian coast together with regular supplies of tea, 
sugar and wheat flour. 
Heavier cargoes leaving Kuwait include large quantities of scrap metal (much of which 
is in the form of wrecked motor vehicles) bound for the Iranian steel smelter at Ahwaz. 
Further down the Gulf, Kuwait played a key role in the early 1970's in supplying the lower 
Gulf (U.A.E.) with cargoes of building materials to support the intensive construction 
boom in the years before deep-water ports became fully operational. These cargoes 
included steel, building sand, timber, paints, pre-fabricated buildings, sanitary ware, 
air conditioners and oil field supply equipment. 
BAHRAIN 
Taken overall, Bahrain has a special dhow trading relationship with Saudi Arabia 
(ie. with the ports of Al Khobar, Qateef and Dammam) and Iran ( i .e. coastal towns and 
villages from Bushire to Lavan Island). The nature and intensity of cargoes reflects this 
relationship - see Table 4.6 and 4.7. 
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T A B L E 4 .6 
B A H R A I N : C A R G O E S A R R I V I N G B Y DHOW A T T H E P O R T O F MANAMA, 1971-1972 
( b y p a c k a g e s ) 
1971 1972 
Dates 21679 34025 
Wheat b r a n 38323 63675 
D r y F i s h 55113 45360 
R i c e 16699 3211 
F l o u r 9860 -
S u g a r 1000 -
Wheat 3160 6399 
B a r l e y 1967 5590 
C o f f e e 3548 8995 
G a s c y l i n d e r s 88238 102279 
C o n c r e t e 44468 33846 
C h a r c o a l 4964 248 
F r e s h f r u i t s 1104283 1136634 
G e n e r a l c a r g o 694499 758758 
( b y n u m b e r s ) 
H o r s e s 17 8 
C a m e l s 109 287 
C o w s 7328 5282 
G o a t s 56260 29528 
S h e e p 9459 6252 
C e m e n t ( b a g s ) 1806380 989595 
S o u r c e : B a h r a i n : C u s t o m s A u t h o r i t y , Manama 
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T A B L E 4 . 7 
B A H R A I N - R E - E X P O R T E D A N D T R A N S I T C A R G O E S , B Y DHOW, 1971 
E x p o r t s a n d T r a n s i t C a r g o e s - 4 month s t u d y 
Ko_ 
( R o u n d e d %) 
Des t ina t ion 
S a u d i Q a t a r K u w a i t 1 I ran U A E 
Househo ld items 514478 77 1 3 11 8 
G e n e r a l C a r g o 865550 43 3 5 4 37 
C l o t h e s a n d ishoes 594321 81 7 6 6 
T e x t i l e s 342056 77 20 2 1 
Mi seel 1. Food 804995 59 11 4 12 13 
D r y F i s h 110716 100 
C o n s t r u c t i o n mater ia ls 85848 10 72 18 
T o b a c c o ( loca l ) 18680 100 
S p i c e s 137633 64 3 14 19 
R i c e 723508 5 2 70 12 
Number of P a c k a g e s - J a n u a r y a n d J u l y 1971 
O R I G I N 
S a u d i Qatar K u w a i t I r a n U A E Oman Ihdi P . D 
G e n e r a l C a r g o 19 12 20 21 28 
F r u i t a n d v e g e t a b l e s 56 4 1 32 2 5 
L i v e s t o c k 3 70 25 2 
R o s e w a t e r 100 
G h e e 10 87 3 
D a t e s 97 3 
D r y F i s h 26 74 
R i c e 65 35 
Househo ld Goods 100 
B u i l d i n g Mater ia ls 
( B a m b o o ) 13 3 84 
G a s C y l i n d e r s 20 75 5 
T o b a c c o 90 10 
Number of d h o w s in 
Sample 96 15 8 80 45 4 2 1 
Oman 
11 
* T h e s e f i g u r e s a r e an a g g r e g a t e of man i fes ts for f i r s t week in M a r c h , 
J u l y , S e p t e m b e r , D e c e m b e r , 1971. 
S o u r c e : p e r s o n e l r e s e a r c h , B a h r a i n , C u s t o m s D e p a r t m e n t . 
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In the early 1970's agents based in Manama re-exported to Saudi Arabia (shipped 
in transit, in small lots) large quantities of household items (suitcases, sewing machines, 
air conditioners, clothing, shoes and textiles - mostly of Japanese and Chinese origin) 
cargoes of Omani tobacco and dried fish, and Pakistani 'basmati' rice. In return the 
most important cargoes arriving from Saudi Arabia were locally produced fruits and 
vegetables. 
By early 1980's the dhow trades with Saudi Arabia are threatened with obsolescence 
In the wake of the construction of the Bahrain - Saudi Arabian mainland causeway. Less 
threatened, however, is Bahrain's role as a foreign 'central place' supplying Bushire 
and other smaller Iranian towns and villages to the south (Bolkheyr, Dilwa, Lowor, Dayyer 
Kangan, Ayyarnat, Tombok, Taheri, Asalu, Naband, Tiban, Shihu and Lavan) with Thai 
and Burmese rice, household items and general foodstuffs (ghee, spices, tea). In return 
these settlements send to Bahrain locally produced cargoes of fruit, vegetables and 
livestock. Elsewhere, cargoes arriving from and departing to other Gulf states are general 
mixed in type. 
DUBAI 
Similarly, Dubai has a special trading relationship with two neighbouring states - Iran 
and Oman - see Tables 4.8 and 4.9. However, dhow cargoes to and from Oman have 
declined during the 1970's in response to road construction between the U.A.E. and 
Oman. It is not possible to differentiate cargoes carried by dhow (as opposed to those 
carried by road or air) in the official Dubai statistics tabulated in Table 4.9, but it is 
likely that most of the cargoes of building materials, machinery and household goods now 
journey by lorry or half-truck. 
However, dhow links with Iran are still very important. Dubai plays a similar role 
to Bahrain in this respect supplying a different set of Iranian 'central places' with a 
similar set of 'central goods' The towns and villages supplied include Chirviyeh, Qais 
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T A B L E 1.8 
D U B A I - O N E MONTH S A M P L E O F I M P O R T E D DHOW C A R G O E S , 
J A N U A R Y , 1971, B Y V A L U E 
( R o u n d e d %) 
Import C a r g o e s Q . D . R . K u w I r a n Oma Qat B a h r S a u d i • i I r a q Ind Pak S r i L . 
F r u i t £ 
V e g e t a b l e s 367548 1 48 18 1 32 
G e n e r a l C a r g o 903511 26 41 17 15 1 
C l o t h e s a n d h 
S h o e s 428292 11 67 
G e n e r a l food 368059 5 9 85 1 
B u i l d i n g 
Mater ia ls 85274 24 3 12 9 52 
R i c e 7237 97 3 
G a s c y l i n d e r 76882 86 14 
L i v e s t o c k 282100 99 
Dates 162950 72 1 26 1 
F i s h 55560 68 32 
T o b a c c o 900 100 
Cot ton 16000 100 
R o s e w a t e r 12500 100 
S a l t 1000 100 
Bu l l ion 355000 78 
S o u r c e : p e r s o n a l r e s e a r c h , Duba i C u s t o m s D e p a r t m e n t 
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T A B L E 4 . 9 
D U B A I - E X P O R T A N D R E - E X P O R T C A R G O E S , B Y DHOW, 1972 
Q . D . R . 
I r a q Q a t a r K u w a i t I r a n 
Oman B a h r a i n S a u d i F a r Somalia 
Arab i la E a s t 
Househo ld goods 55360924 25 5 5 6 9 22 28 
F o o d s t u f f s 72841893 8 4 2 2 2 80 2 
T e x t i l e s a n d 
p i e c e goods 9431141 3 23 3 6 6 53 6 
M a c h i n e r y 6925739 32 14 3 2 8 37 4 
B u i l d i n g mater ia ls 10153030 79 7 5 8 
E l e c t r i c a l goods 3293326 6 6 15 37 36 
S t a t i o n a r y 229918 70 2 1 3 24 
P h o t o g r a p h i c 
goods 137759 5 6 89 
C o s m e t i c s 437558 10 10 5 5 70 
Medical goods 472950 1 98 
F u e l s & oil 48805 11 2 20 54 10 3 
A r m s e t c . 1330000 2 7 15 54 7 14 1 
Oil f ie ld s u p p l i e s 4442591 21 14 15 22 28 
L i q u o r & wine 5434960 100 
' F a r E a s t ' = I n d i a , S r i L a n k a a n d P a k i s t a n 
S o u r c e : G o v e r n m e n t of D u b a i , T r a d e S t a t i s t i c s , B u l l e t i n , J a n u a r y 1973 
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Tavuneh, Charak, Mraw, Bostanu, Kung, Basidu, Lingeh, Bandar Mua I lira, Puhul, 
Khamir, Bandar Abbas, Salakh, Laft, Henyam, Deyrestan, Susa, Larak, Qeshm, Hormuz, 
Tiab, Menab, Kargan, Kuhestak, Siriq, Bunji, Kuhmubarak and Jask. Re-exported cargoes 
include rice, tea, sugar, spices, flour and household items, while Dubai imports livestock 
(goats, sheep and camels,) dates, fresh fruit and vegetables, salt and rosewater. 
Cargoes between Dubai and the other Gulf states, South Arabia, East Africa and the 
Indian sub-continent are less defined, though the smuggling trade with India and 
Pakistan is marked by cargoes of bullion, drugs, textiles and items such as watches. A 
similar set of smuggled cargoes make their way to Iranian destinations. 
4.5 THE PERSIAN GULF DHOW NETWORK 
The geographical pattern of the network of dhow routes which focus on the seaports 
of the Persian Gulf proved difficult to piece together, not least because of the scale of 
research that is required. Detailed origin-destination data was obtained by translating 
from the Arabic, hand-written customs ledgers housed in port authority premises in Kuwait, 
Bahrain and Dubai. This process is necessitated because details of dhow movements are 
not published but have to be extracted from various sources. The process was time 
consuming, bearing in mind that only a limited research time-budget was available and the 
large volume of dhow movements in and out of major dhow ports (e.g. the volume of incoming 
dhows at Kuwait for the years 1968, 1969 and 1970 was 10,961, 11,019 and 11,076 
respectively). 
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Accordingly,with regard to Kuwait, the extent of the dhow network and its 
level of traffic flow is based on a two month sample (January and July 1971). However, 
in tSe cases of Bahrain and Dubai, where dhow transport forms a most significant element 
in the total trading performance of the State, a 100% sample was obtained in each 
case. The data obtained is tabulated in appendix 'D' , together with some less 
detailed, published statistics of Saudi Arabian and Abu Dhabian dhow movements. As 
such, the Table depicts the total dhow network for the year 1971, with the exception 
of links between Iraq and Iran, Oman and Iran, and 'internal' flows between Iranian 
ports. 
Ideally, a temporal analysis of the changing dhow network structure of the Gulf 
(using two indexes for the non-planar graph) : 
e c - v + 1 
= ; and 
v(v-l) v(v-l)-(v-l) 
Kansky, 1963, Haggett and Chorley, 1969), would have been of use in gauging the 
effects that modern steamships have had upon the Gulf's maritime economy. However, 
runs of data for anything but the most recent past do not exist, and such an analysis 
was therefore not possible. 
4.5.1 Pattern of Dhow Flows 
The complex pattern of dhow flows focusing on the Persian Gulf for the year 1971 
is depicted in Figure 4.7 , based on data tabulated in appendix Table 'D' . However, this 
pattern is not a complete picture of the total flow structure of dhow interconnections, 
and hence its interpretation must be related to those elements which are missing. The 
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pattern is necessarily incomplete because of Hie reasons discussed in Section 4.5: 
namely, that it is probably beyond the capacity of one research worker to assemble 
the entire flow pattern of Persian Gulf dhows, unless he or she has unlimited time; 
and secondly, even i f this were possible, not all dhow flows are recorded, so the 
pattern would still be incomplete. 
As such, therefore, any appraisal of Figure 4.7 should bear in mind the following 
aspects of the data on which it is based. Figure 4 .7 . is a composite of the following 
data sets : 
1. The total pattern of dhow flows (incoming and outgoing) during 
1971 focusing on the ports of Bahrain, Doha and Dubai. 
2 . The total pattern of 'incoming' dhow flows at the ports of Abu Dhabi 
and Al Khobar during 1971 . 
3. An estimate of the total patterns of 'incoming' dhow flows for Kuwait 
during 1971 (based on the route 'means' x 12 of the two monthly sample 
survey - see Section 4.5) . 
However, Figure 4 .7 , lacks the following data, which were they available, 
would have permitted a cartographic representation of the total pattern of dhow 
flows. 
1. Dhow flows between Iraqi and Irani ports 
2. Dhow flows between Omani and Irani ports. 
3. Dhow flows between Irani ports. 
4. Outgoing dhow flows from Kuwait, Al Khobar and Abu Dhabi. 
5. Dhows emanating from the smaller Arabian ports (e.g. Ruwais, 
Sharjah and Khosab). 
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TABLE 4.10 : Hierarchy of Dhow Routes - 1971 
Total Number of 
Rank Route Daily Interact ion Index =Dhows per route 
per annum 
1 Kuwait - Abadan 8.40 
eL Kuwait - Gosbar 7-64 
3 Kuwait - Sauduni 6.33 
4 Bahrain - Al Khobar 5.19 
5 Dubai - Indian ports 4.89 
6 Dubai - Bandar Abbas 3.89 
7 Kuwait - Khowsrabad 3-58 
8 Kuwait - Bahmashir 3.25 
9 Dubai - Muscat 2.38 
10 Bahrain - Bushire 2.28 
11 Dubai - Puhul 2.14 
12 Kuwait - Khonamshar I .64 
13 Dubai - Doha 1-39 
14 Dubai - Bahrain 1.22 
15 Kuwait - Ganaveh 1.14 
16 Dubai - Kung 1.08 
17 Dubai - Ras al Kharmah 1.00 
18 Bahrain - Doha O.99 
19 Kuwait - Dubai 0.77 
20 Dub ai - Khamir 0.75 
21 Kuwait - Hendijan 0.72 
22 Kuwait - Rig O.71 
23 Bahrain - Damm an 0.68 
24 Kuwait - Bahrain O.67 
25 Dubai - Pakistani ports O.63 
26 Doha - Bushire 0.62 
27 Dubai - Al Khobar 0.61 
28 Bahrain - Ruwais O.59 
29 Doha - Abu Dhabi O.55 
365 
Source : Appendix Table D 
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In spite of the limitations of the data, it is felt that Figure 4.7 is worthy of 
illustration because it undoubtedly portrays the major dhow routes in the Gulf and gives 
a visual impression of the relative patterns of flow with regard to those ports for which data 
was available. Subject to data limitations, the following major flow patterns are 
discernible. Firstly, Dubai, Kuwait and Bahrain are the dominant dhow ports within 
the Persian Gulf: Dubai appears to head the hierarchy of long-distance flows; the 
significance of Kuwait appears to be inflated by the heavy volume of short-distance 
flows, particularly with regard to links with ports along, and in the vicinity of the Shatt 
al Arab; Bahrain appears to function in a pivotal role and the major 'mid GulP 
entreport. Secondly, the pattern of 'cross-Gulf flows between Arab States and Iran 
appears to be extensive (see Section 4.6.2 with reference to Tariff barriers.) 
A hierarchy of dhow routes (subject to the data limitations already discussed) is 
outlined in Table 4.10, confirming the 'nodality' of Kuwait, Bahrain and Dubai. The 
hierarchy is calculated by use of a notional 'Daily Interaction Index', ' I ' (I = Total 
Annual flow of dhows along one dhow route, in one direction, between two ports / 365), 
which gives an average annual 'daily' f low. The routes listed in the hierarchy are those 
with an index greater than 0.50 ( i . e . average one dhow every two days), of which there 
are twenty nine. 
The nature of the pattern of 'nodality' is explored further in Table 4 . 1 1 . Using 
Nysteun and Dacey's (1961) method for the identification of nodal regions (explained 
in Section 3.5.2),. Table 4.11 displays a 'matrix of dominant associations' in relation 
to dhow flows that focus on Kuwait, Bahrain, Doha and Dubai. In each case, the nodal 
(dominant) flow is identified. Broadly, the pattern reveals that the spatial structure of 
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TABLE 4 » H : Matrix of Dominant Associations ; Dhow Flows, 1971 
After J . Nystuen and M. Dacey. 
"A Graph Theory Interpretat ion of Nodal Regions", 
Papers of the Regional Science Association 7 ( l96 l ) , pp29~42. 
Origins Destinations 
Kuwai t Bahrain Doha Dubai Total 
Khorramshahr * 600 53 21 0 684 
At ad an 3066 45 21 40 3172 
Khowsrabad * 1308 9 o 0 1317 
Bahmashir * 1188 0 o 0 1188 
Sauduni * 2310 1 3 4 2318 
Gosbar * 2790 0 o 15 2805 
Bandar Shahpour * 24 2 0 11 37 
Hem j an * 264 0 0 0 264 
Day lam * 156 6 1 1 164 
Ganaveh * 416 30 1 10 457 
Rig * 260 17 0 1 278 
1 Kharg * 12 l 0 0 13 
Bushire 294 * 832 228 46 1400 
Bolkheyer 12 * 51 3 24 90 
i Dilwa 104 * 134 3 0 241 
Lowor 0 * 61 2 0 63 
Dayyer 0 * 136 30 29 195 
Kangoon 0 * 65 18 0 83 
Ayyarnat 0 * 45 33 0 78 
Tombok 0 * 5 3 0 8 
i Taheri 0 5 * 18 0 23 
Asalu 0 0 * 15 2 17 
Nab and 0 0 * l * 1 2 
Tib an 0 0 * 12 0 12 
Lav an 0 2 * 21 13 36 
Mogan 0 5 2 * 6 13 
Chirviyeh 0 0 * 2 * 2 4 
Qais 0 0 0 * 59 59 
Tanaveh 0 * 1 0 0 l 
Charak 6 4 9 * 71 90 
Mr aw 0 8 6 * 109 123 
Bostanu 0 11 0 * 75 86 
Kung 0 1 12 * 393 406 
Lingeh 0 0 2 * 147 149 
Bandar Muallim 0 0 0 * 63 63 
Basidu 0 0 0 * 33 33 
Dulab 0 0 1 * 32 33 
Puhul 0 0 6 * 781 787 
Khamir 0 0 0 * 272 272 
Laft 1 0 * 51 52 
Salakh 0 0 0 * 14 14 
Henyam 0 0 0 * 36 36 
Deyrestan 0 0 0 * 25 25 
Suza 0 0 0 * 93 93 
Larak 0 0 0 * 13 13 
Qeshm 0 5 0 * 137 142 
Dargahan 30 9 0 * 61 100 
/ C o n t ' d . . . 
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TABLE 4 . l i C o n t ' d . ) 
Origins Destinations 
n 
Kuwait Bahrain Doha Dubai Total 
Hormuz 0 0 0 * 47 47 
Bandar Abbas 0 14 6 * 1421 1441 
Tiab 0 0 0 * 17 17 
Menab 0 0 0 * 110 110 
Kargan 0 0 0 * 146 146 
Kuhestak 0 0 0 * 10 10 
S i n k 0 0 0 * 45 45 
Bungi 0 0 0 * 38 38 
Kuhmub ar ak 0 0 0 * 18 18 
J ask 0 0 o * 136 136 
Kuch 0 0 o * 35 35 
Kal at 0 0 0 * 54 54 
Tang 0 0 0 * 6 6 
Konorak 0 0 0 * 71 71 
| Charbahar 0 0 0 * 93 93 
Fasabandar o 0 0 * 56 56 
; Dubai 283 446 * 507 - 1236 
i Kuwait - 243 73 * 283 599 
Bahrain 243 - 364 * 446 1053 
I Doha 73 364 * 507 944 
• Al Khobar 74 * 1894 54 223 2245 
' Abu Dhabi 129 147 * 201 176 653 
Ras al Khafgi 6 * 6 0 5 17 
• Das I s land 18 * 47 0 4 69 
Dammam 0 *- 249 6 5 260 
Qatif 0 * 164 0 0 164 
' Ruwai s 0 * 215 0 0 215 
Ras Tanura 0 * 118 0 2 120 
Juba i l 0 * 13 0 1 14 
Sharjah 12 11 4 •* 69 96 
Ras al Khaimah 12 11 7 366 396 
Jebel Dhana 0 1 0 0 1 
Khosab 0 1 0 * 53 54 
Umm Said 0 0 * 1 0 l 
Pakis tani ports 0 2 3 230 235 
Indian ports 24 29 24 *1786 1863 
Afr ican ports 0 2 7 * 9 18 
Basra 6 2 13 * 115 136 
Aden 0 8 0 * 53 61 
Muscat 30 54 53 * 499 636 
Khor Fakkan 6 23 0 * 134 163 
Sohar 0 * 16 0 3 19 
Kalba 0 3 0 0 3 
Dibba 0 0 0 * 5 5 
Sur o * 125 125 
Seeb o 0 ' 0 * 12 12 
Masirah 0 1 3 11 15 
S a l a l a 0 1 0 ' * 80 81 
* = Dominant Flow 
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dhow flows is relatedtoa fetfor of distance between origin and destination ports, moderated 
to a degree by tfie nature of port hierarchies. That is to say, the larger dhow ports of 
Kuwait, Bahrain and Dubai, appear to be characterked by nodal relationships that are 
virtually discrete, 'dividing up' the Gulf into upper Gulf ports focusing on Kuwait, 
middle-Gulf ports on Bahrain, and lower-GuIf ports on Dubai, respectively. Whereas, 
the lower order centre ( i . e . dhow ports) of Doha appears to be 'nesting' within the 
general area of Bahraini dominance (see Figure 4.8) . 
4.5.2 Cross Trades 
Sections 4.5 and 4.5.1 suggest that the spatial structure of the Persian Gulf dhow 
network may be at least partly explained by the frictional effect of geographical distance, 
modified by the hierarchical pattern of 'central places' (Christaller, 1966, transl.) In 
order to test this hypothesis, a series of Regression analyses was performed on the flow 
data of dhow movements through the ports of Kuwait, Bahrain, Doha and Dubai. The 
aim of the analyses was to test whether or not the flow pattern of dhows could be predicted 
by measuring the geographical distance between any two ports, moderated by a consideration 
of the respective population sizes of the ports concerned. The use of 'geographical distance' 
was preferred to 'time distance* because of the distortion caused by varying weather 
conditions upon journey times (see appendix Table 'F') . The analysis could only be 
performed on dhows interacting between Arabian ports and Iranian ports, because the 
absence of population census data for small Arab ports precluded the analysis of dhow 
flows between Arab ports. As such, population data taken from the Iranian Census of 1966, 
was used to measure the 'size' of Iranian ports (see appendix Table 'E ') . 
The Regression analyses were performed to measure the 'predictability' of 'F' (the 
flows between two dhow ports) from the relationship P/D (Population of port, divided by 
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TABLE 4 .12 •' Kuwait Dhow Flows : Residuals from Regression Analysis 
Aba dan + 611 
Bushire - 133 
Shahpour - 278 
Bulkheir - 54 
Bahmasiiir + 954 
Charak - 36 
Bargwan - 44 
Dilwa + 21 
Day lam - 89 
Gosbar + 2612 
Ganaveh + 212 
Hendi jan + 40 
Khorramshahr - 659 
kharg - 233 
Khowsrabad + 1223 
Rig + 65 
Sauduni + 2128 
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TABLE 4«13 • Bahrain Dhow Flows ; Residuals from Regression Analys is 
Abadan + 10 
Ayyanat + 43 
Bandar Abbas - 4 
Bostanu + 4 
Bushire + 812 
Shapour - 10 
Bulkheir + 44 
Challat - 3 
Dargwan + 1 
Dayyer + 129 
Dilwa + 126 
Day lam - 6 
Ginawar + 19 
Khorramshahr + 28 
Kung - 10 
Kangoon + 52 
Kharg - 12 
Khowsrabad + 4 
Lavan - 8 
Laft - 6 
Lowar + 55 
Mr aw + l 
Mogam - 3 
Qeshm - 5 
Rig + 7 
Sauduni - 7 
Taheeri - l 
Tambok - 7 
Tanuzeh - 1 
Charak _ 2 
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TABLE 4,14 : Doha Dhow Flows ; Residuals from Regression Analys is 
Abadan + 7 
Asalu + 9 
Ayyanat + 30 
Bandar Abbas - 4 
Bushire + 218 
Bulkhair - 2 
Ghallat - 1 
Charak + 4 
Chiru - 4 
Dulab - 4 
Dayyer + 25 
Dilwa - 3 
Day lam - 6 
Gmawer - 6 
Khorramshahr + 10 
Kung + 5 
Kangoon + 10 
Lingeh - 6 
Lavan + 14 
Lowar - 3 
Mr aw + 1 
Mogan - 4 
Nab and - 3 
Puhul + 1 
Sauduni - 3 
Taheeri + 13 
Tiban + 8 
Tombok — 3 
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TABLE 4 » 1 5 ' Dubai Dhow Flows : Residuals from Regression Analys is 
Lingeh + 78 
Kung + 334 
Bandar Muallim + 32 
Basidu + 1 
Dulub - 1 
Puhul + 743 
Khamir + 230 
Laft + 13 
Henyam + 7 
Salakh - 18 
Degrestan - 5 
Susa + 51 
Qesham + 83 
Bandar Abbas + 1328 
Hormuz + 3 
Larak - 14 
Tiab - 13 
Minab + 58 
Kargan + 120 
KuhestaK - 20 
S i n k + 25 
Bunji + 16 
KuhiTubar ak - 1 J ask + 104 
Kuch + 28 
Kal at + 36 
Tang - 8 
Kondrak + 57 
Chahbahar + 52 
Bo.s t anu + 37 
Charak + 42 
Qais + 29 
Chiru - 26 
Mogan - 26 
Lavan - 28 
Abadan - 80 
Asalo - 28 
Bushire - 19 
Sauduni - 27 
Shapour - 28 
Bolkhegr + 1 
Dayyer + 7 
Day am - 38 
Fasabandar + 50 
Gosbar - 10 
Ganaveh - 27 
Nab and - 8 
Rig - 31 
Mr aw + 72 
Dargwan + 19 
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distance). The prediction was made in terms of a linear relationship of the form : 
log F = a + b (log P/D) 
2 





The graphical representation of the analyses is represented in Figures 4.9, 4.10, 4.11 and 
4.12, for Kuwait, Bahrain, Doha and Dubai respectively. Residuals from the analyses 
were calculated and tabulated in Tables 4.12, 4.13, 4.14 and 4.15. Figures 4.13, 
4.14, 4.15 and 4.16 display the spatial pattern of positive and negative 'residuals' for ea 
analysis. 
INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS 
An analysis of dhow interaction between Arabian and Iranian ports is significant 
because, lacking the competition from road transport development that threatens to 
challenge the viability of routes between Arabian ports, these routes have a reasonable 
chance of survival. The results obtained indicate that the analyses achieved the highest 
level of explanation using Kuwaiti data, followed by Dubai, with lower levels of 
\explanation for Doha and Bahrain. Thus, the hypothesis that Kuwaiti dhow flows may be 
explained by a P/D relationship is reasonably substantiated by the result, but low levels 
2 
of r for Dubai, Doha and Bahrain are more diff icult to explain. In all probability the 
village population factor has a dlstotfing effect on results. That is, whereas most of 
Kuwait's dhow flows are of a shorter distance to the larger villages and towns of the more 
densely populated S.W. corner of Iran, many of the flows from Dubai, Doha and Bahrain 
are to the smaller villages of the southern and south eastern coast of Jran. These 'villages' 
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such as Naband (population 16), Taheeri (199), Bunji (283), Konorak (144) and Siriq 
(189) (see Table *E* in the appendix) are very small in size but have sizeable dhow flows 
to Arab ports irrespective of the distance involved (see Table *F' in the appendix). 
The significance of the high Iranian customs tariff and its effect in stimulating dhow flows 
to small Iranian coastal villages is discussed in Section 4 .6 . 
« 
Kuwait 
Figure 4.13 emphasises that the positive residual flows (ie. flows greater than 
'expected') are heavily concentrated in the riverside villages on the east bank of the 
Short al Arab, focusing on the link between Khuzistan and Kuwait. Hendijon, Ganaveh, 
Rig and DI Iwa also display positive residuals. 
Bahrain (see Figure 4.14) 
A contiguous belt of villages with positive residuals lies due north of Bahrain 
from Ganaveh in the west to Ayyarnat in the east, but concentrating heavily on Bushire. 
Doha (Figure 4.15) 
Doha is not a major dhow port but has a large positive residual link with Bushire, together 
with positive residuals with many of the smaller villages along the Iranian coast from 
Dayyer to Puhul. 
Dubai (Figure 4.16) 
Judging by the positive residuals, Dubai dominates dhow flows along the south-
eastern Iranian coast from Qais, through Qeshm Island and along the northern coast 
of the Gulf of Oman, but focusing on Bandar Abbas. 
4 .6 . MERCHANT PERSPECTIVES 
"Basically we do business on speculation" 
(Kuwaiti Merchant, 1972) 
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Merchants think spatially, as well as economically. Transport technology is the 
basic uti l i ty permitting them to carry out trading transfers between spatially dispersed 
regions. To gain an understanding as to the rationale behind the trading relationships 
of key merchants, in so far as it impinges upon transport utili2ation, trade perception 
and behaviour patterns, an interview survey was carried out in the ports of Kuwait, 
Bahrain and Dubai. Posing a questionnaire for merchants presents certain problems. 
They are shrewd and canny, not unnaturally keeping their cards close to their chest in so 
far as the competitive world of business acumen is concerned. Consequently, their 
attitudes to questioning ranged from extremely helpful through to total unco-operation. 
The positivist/objective stance of modern quantitative geography demands that their 
answers be quantified and mathematically mulled over for explanatory or predictive 
purposes. Such an exact process is not possible with regard to this particular survey. 
Quoting numbers and figures in the field of commercial enterprise is taboo in the suqs 
of Kuwait and other Gulf port cities, as much as it is in the Boon Skyscraper in the 
Rockefeller Centre, New York. Apart from business caution, problems of data collection 
are compounded by a lack of tax laws within the Gulf states. Books and records of 
transactions are unnecessary for accounting purposes and hence are quite often absent, 
certainly private. To have approached these businessmen with an * a-b-c- ' type of 
questionnaire with a quick-firing succession of answers to be sought would have been 
to invite suspicion. To counteract this form of research environment, the questions to be 
posed were fixed firmly in mind, but the interview often took the form of a conversation. 
The accuracy of any given response, is, of course, untestable, except by empirical 
observation or statistical back-up. The results are therefore to be treated with sceptism. 
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The objective of the interviews was both specific and random. Directly, the aim was to add 
some subjective flesh to the objective bones of statistical data collected elsewhere; by 
eliciting the motivation (goal) of each merchant with regard to his perception of 
alternative trade and transport options and his interpretation of events through feedback 
of an informative or operational nature, and to gauge his appreciation of the behavioural 
environment within which he was obliged to operate. In short, one hoped to put the 
merchant's world in a socio-economic and socio-political context. On the random side, 
the process of conversation often gave insights into the psychological, social and economic 
side of his l i f e , through comments and asides not directly sought by questioning. The 
result is a collection of interviews, individually specific to a particular merchant or 
trade, but collectively a commentary on the functional disposition of a particular entrepot, 
and on the Gulf as a trading system. 
The selection of merchants to be interviewed was not a random process. They represent 
a group sample chosen on a size/significance basis, rather than any area! sub-division 
of the port city concerned. The sample group was selected in consultation with the 
Chambers of Commerce of Kuwait, Bahrain and Dubai, who identified the major commodity 
trades of the ports, together with the most significant merchants defined on the basis of 
size, turnover, size of operation and experience. 
Such a process, though having its pitfalls, is possible in relatively small seaports 
such as Kuwait, Bahrain and Dubai, where though an apparent profusion of merchants 
exists on first inspection, experience teaches that the major percentage of foreign trade is 
handled by a comparatively few, large, multi-faceted merchant families who dominate 
trade, or who are at least highly representative. These merchants are often long-
established members of the politico-economic community in each port, whether Arab or 
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non-Arab in culture. The term 'merchant elite' is an appropriate term,. History has 
described a parallel identification between the political and business elite; more 
often than not they are one and the same. Major merchants have political power 
and prestige as well as financial strength, ranging in stature from Shaikh Rashid bin 
Said Al Makhtum of Dubai, who might be described as the chief merchant of that port 
as well as its ruler, through to large merchant families in Kuwait, who are not members 
of the Al Sabah ruling family, but nonetheless, wield significant power and influence 
in the Majlis and Diwan Amiri . 
MeraSants are often multi-faceted in their business operation and commodity 
specialization. They are often both importers and exporters, wholesalers and retailers, 
sometimes on the same, deceptively small premises. Commodities and business links 
often have a diverse range, though most merchants have a 'specialization'. Nor is 
merchant influence confined to one port: the major merchants exert considerable 
business influence and interlinkage elsewhere in the Gulf and beyond, through a network 
of agencies, entrusted and run by members of the same family or by trusted partners. As 
well as making money in other Shaikhdoms and other ports, in the pre-electronic age of 
communication, merchant agencies acted as information filters and business attenae, 
receiving and disseminating news of business opportunities, intrigues and calamities, 
through a network of dhow routes traversing the Arabian, Persian, Indian and East 
African coasts, a role they still perform. Nor were, and are, the merchants purely 
engaged in trade and (because of their financial success) power politics: they have a 
high stake in transportation too. Merchants often own the local means of transportation. 
The modern merchant elite has a wide involvement in the ownership of transport, sharing 
the costly running and construction of shipping lines, airlines and even dry docks. In 
fact, merchants are financiers, bankers and industrial entrepeneurs, as well as traders. 
The most successful merchants are therefore in a very real sense the financier string-
pullers of the state and that is why in trying to answer the question of "who controls" 
(who takes the decisions?), the answer very often is one man or one select group of 
men, a merchant elite, who take decisions across a number of boardroom tables and 
along a number of business fronts. This narrow, political and economic power base 
has its parallels with Japan. 
The Merchants 
"The wholesale trade of any city wi l l extend outwards as far as the 
limits of commercial intelligence available to that city's Merchants." 
(J.E. Vance, 1970, p . 156). 
The answers supplied by the merchants (see appendix Table 'G ' ) to the questions 
posed, (see appendix Table 'H ' ) , revealed opinions on two key aspects of the nature 
of the Gulf's business community at a time of rapid change in the GulPs history; 
namely their perception of commercial opportunities, and their perception of the 
role of transport in facilitating or hindering the perceived business opportunities. 
4.6.1 THE GEOGRAPHY OF MARKET PERCEPTION 
Commercial 'intelligence' involves two main tasks: firstly, the seeking out of a 
commercially viable and suppliable 'market'; and secondly, once i t is found, the 
exploitation, or avoidance of any official sanctions or regulations, which lie 
athwart that market. This section examines the perception of Gulf Merchants towards 
both their market opportunities and tariff barriers. 
Merchants within the Gulf Shaikhdoms have limited internal markets. The three 
Sheikhdoms studied all have small populations: Kuwait (800,000), Bahrain (200,000), 
Dubai (100,000) (Beaumont, Blake and Wagstaff, 1975, p . 177). As such, local 
merchants seek business opportunities to re-export to markets within the Gulf and 
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TABLE 4.16 : Kuwait - Exports and Re-exports by Dhow, 1971 
Value (KD) Weight (Kilos) 
Iraq 13,567 85,487 
Saudi Arabian 117,364 3,120,879 
Bahrain 588,245 4,590,162 
Qatar 419,140 1,386,055 
S. Yemen 17,356 253,664 
Sharj ah 54,606 466,083 
Oman 285,499 4,450,958 
Dubai 860,511 8,716,715 
Abu Dhabi 860,672 6,628,592 
Ras Al Khaimah 34,572 949,754 
India 4,477 8,259 
Iran 2,262,833 30,632,487 





TABLE 4.17 : Bahrain - (Exports and Re-exports 1972) 
Value (BD) Weight (Kilos) 
Abu Dhabi 568,819 1,794,670 
Dubai 2,204,365 4,806,713 
India 49,363 76,822 
Iran 1,916,194 17,417,144 
Kuwait 2,145,628 2,943,066 
Oman 446,985 1,969,741 
Qatar 332,708 3,343,958 
Saudi Arabia 16,522,858 25,259,312 
Iraq 5,642 31,556 
Source : Foreign Trade Stat is t ics , 1972, 
Ministry of Finance and National Grading. p3. 
TABLE 4.18 : Dubai - (Exports and Re-exports 1971 and 1972) 
(QDR) 
1971 1972 
Qatar 14,416,239 11,247,757 
Iran 63,924,175 -
Muscat 17,397,759 30,488,635 
Far East 11,143,624 17,539,063 
Ceylon 2,570,411 -
Bahrain 5,680,746 6,964,993 
S. Yemen 425,200 51,000 
Kuwait 5,220,492 6,454,550 
Saudi Arabia 3,998,875 6,444,752 
Abu Dhabi 2,770,386 -
Other States 236,805 87,819,819 
Source : 1972 Foreign Trade Stat is t ics , 
Port and Customs Dept., Dubai. pp79~80. 
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elsewhere in the Middle East and South Asia. 
Tables 4.16, 4.17 and 4.18 illustrate the destination, and level of the re-export 
trade of Kuwait, Bahrain and Dubai. Kuwait was the only state for which the author 
was able to obtain a breakdown of trade statistics that differentiated dhow transport 
from ocean steamer, air and road transport. Since interest focuses on the nature of 
dhow transport, those figures are tabulated in Table 4.16. Undifferentiated figures 
for Bahrain and Dubai, however, can be construed to be largely representative of dhows, 
with the exception of the Dubai-Oman trade of which much travels by road (though 
no corroborative statistics exist.) An analysis of the multitude of trade routes across the 
waters of the Gulf breaks down into three major specialist trade patterns with regard 
to the three states studied: 
1 . Gulf Shaikhdoms - Iran trade, 
2 . Trade between the Arab States of the Persian Gulf , 
3. Trade between Dubai and India and Pakistan. 
1. Gulf Shaikhdoms - Iron Trade 
Iran is supplied by the Arab shaikhdoms with a range of commodities, some legally 
imported, some il legally. Trade falls into two categories: food and smaller amounts of 
clothing and building materials supplied to many of the more 'remote* towns and villages 
along the Iranian coast; and secondly, articles such as radios, watches and cigarettes 'smuggled' 
into Iran to avoid heavy duties. Of course, much of the information gained with respect 
to the smuggled commodities was obtained by conversation with several merchants and 
officials and was not corroborated statistically. For example, in Table 4.18, figures 
for Iranian re-exports mysteriously 'disappear' for 1972, subsumed presumably under 'other 
states'. The author has personally witnessed sailors from an Iranian dhow berthed at Bahrain 
(Manama) stitiching jute bags over cartons of American cigarettes destined presumably for 
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Iran. Such trades are frustrating for the researcher who knows their great significance, 
particularly on routes to India, Pakistan and Iran, but who faces a lack of statistical 
evidence with which to measure their precise value. Yet their existence has to be 
stated. 
The analysis of dhow flows in Section 4.5.2 and the application of a modified 
gravity model has indicated that the ports of Kuwait, Bahrain and Dubai each have their 
spheres of influence along the Iranian Gulf coast. Broadly, the villages along the waterways 
of the Shatt Al Arab in the west up to and including Bandar Rig in the east, fal l within 
Kuwait's sphere of influence, from the town of Bushire to the village of Ayyarnat within 
Bahrain's and from Qais Island to Iran's villages on the Gulf of Oman within Dubai's area 
of trading dominance. It is perhaps stretching Christaller's Central Place model beyond its 
theoretical assumptions (Haggett, 1972, p.287) to suggest that the pattern of dhow flows from 
Iranian villages to and from Arabian ports is explained by a form of maritime 'central 
place system' stretching across the Persian Gulf , but in effect that is what happens. Faced 
with poor, slow or costly land communication along the Iranian coast or across the Zagros 
mountains to higher order centres such as Bushire, Shiraz and Bandar Abbas, merchants 
within the small coastal villages, particularly those south-east of Bushire, naturally 
gravitate to nearest higher order centre across the Persian Gulf to obtain some of the 
basic essentials of l i f e . Naturally, there is an Iranian customs tariff to be complied with 
(see Section 4.6.2) but the Iranian Government Issues import 'permits' to villagers who 
are themselves, exporters of local produce, and such permits are used to purchase goods 
In Arabian ports. 
The Dubai merchant, Mohammed Al Fothaim, commented on the frequent visits to 
Dubai (by dhow) of Iranian shopkeepers to buy foodstuffs, vegetable o i l , turmeric and 
tamarind. Trade statistics reveal that Kuwait and Bahrain specialise in re-exporting two 
basic food commodities - rice and tea (which has a high rate of consumption in Iran). 
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Value Weight - Kilos 
Kuwait ( 1 ) Rice KD 11,599,202 673,009 
(1971) Tea KD 388,241 129,991 
(2) 
Bahrain Rice BD 652,591 12,736,355 
(1972) Tea BD 157,677 377,625 
Sources: (1) Kuwait Foreign Trade Statistics, 1971 
(2) Bahrain Foreign Trade Statistics, 1972. 
Dubai, unfortunately, does not publish re-export figures by commodity. The Iranians 
consume Thai or Burmese rice rather than the more costly Pakistani (basmati rice) and visit 
agents Youssef Akbar A l i Reza (Bahrain and Dubai), Shrukralla, and United Rice (Bahrain), 
W . J . Towell (Kuwait) and C. Purchottam (Bahrain and Duba$. The Purchottam family 
is long established in the Gulf region: Landen (1968, p . 15) noted the dominance of 
Indian merchants in the Gulf in the late nineteenth century, of whom, 'typical was Rathansi 
Purchottam, who in the 1890's was not only the largest exporter in Muscat, but one of the 
two leading arms merchants", (p. 139). In Kuwait, the Purchottam family are major re-
exporters of tea, along with Mustafa Sulaiman Abdul Karim and Haji Ibrahim Marafie. In 
Dubai, two of the largest tea importers, Jinda Tea Sales, and Gulaibi Tea, estimate to sell 
98% and 80% of their tea to Iranian merchants respectively. 
2. Trade between the Arab States of the Persian Gulf 
Trade between Arab Gulf states, using dhows, can be classified into two categories: 
•regular' trades and * irregular' trades. The best example of a 'regular' dhow trade route 
is the one linking Bahrain with the Saudi ports of Al Khobar and Darnmam. Bahraini 
merchants take advantage of three market factors in their favour to sustain a year round 
transhipment trade with Saudi Arabia. Firstly, they pay no duty on transhipped goods 
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passing through the Free Transit Zone at Mina Sulman. Secondly, in many cases, 
Bahrain! merchants are agents for the Gulf for a variety of foreign manufactured 
products. Thirdly, the speed of discharge and customs clearance facilities in 
Bahrain is used to its best advantage. 
Ameen Trading are a typical import-export f irm. They are commission agents for 
firms manufacturing clothes and shoes in China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Japan. Having 
direct contact with suppliers they are able to purchase large stocks of new items, 50% of which 
they re-export (tranship) to Saudi Arabia. Holding the agency on such items precludes 
Saudi businessmen from importing directly. Akund Awazi agency imports similar items, 
shipping 85-95% to Saudi markets. 
Table 4.19 and Figure 4.17 illustrate the spatial pattern of Bahraini re-export flows 
and underline the function of Bahrain in operating as a 'warehouse' for goods destined for 
Saudi markets. The data was acquired by sorting through and aggregating all the customs 
manifests at Manama based on a stratified sampling method. A l l the transit and local 
shipping bills (re-exports) were aggregated for a calendar month at three monthly 
intervals (March-June-September-December) for 1971. Tonnage of cargo by destination 
was recorded. The pattern reveals three types of trade: Firstly, the dominant regular 
transit trade to ports in eastern Saudi Arabia-; secondly, a transit/re-export trade of 
a lower order of magnitude to other major Gulf ports; and thirdly, a less regular, 
smaller scale trade to small villages and towns on the southern Iranian coast. 
Irregular trades within the Gulf are explained mainly by merchant exploitation of short-
ages. The movement of rice and certain building materials are examples. Pakistani 
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'basmati' rice Is consumed as a staple food i n all the Arab states of the Gulf . The 
main supplier is W . J . Towell, a firm who has held the monopoly since 1958 because 
of its ability to purchase an entire Pakistani crop (by public tender) for distribution 
through the Gulf and elsewhere in the world. In 1973, the firm distributed basmati 
through the Gulf as follows: 





Abu Dhabi 6,000 
Muscat 3,000 
Source: W . J . Towell. 
This proportional distribution leads from time to time to redistributions between states by 
merchants who sell on demand, and therefore the price rises. The pace of construction 
activity along the Gulf , coupled with the propensity for world price rises in such 
commodities as steel and cement, presents certain Gulf mercharts wi th the chance to 
exploit their situation. For example, Kuwaiti merchant Badr Al Salim re-exports steel 
products to Iran and Saudi Arabia by utilizing his large stock and under-selling world 
price rises in Soviet, Chinese, Japanese, Korean and Indian steel. In a similar vein, 
Mustafa Sultan was selling steel bars at KD 61 a ton in February 1972, compared with 
the world price of KD 68. The juxta-position of Kuwait and Iraq attracts Iraqi commercial 
attaches to recommend purchases of 'Kuwaiti ' steel through government contracts. Cement, 
is another commodity in great demand throughout the Gulf , and is exploitable in the 
sense that shipping 'charter rates' are an open market, allowing specialist merchants such 
as Khalid Al Ghanaim (Kuwait), Mohammed and Ahmed Hap and Abdullah Kayed Ahli 
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(both Dubai) to purchase large quantities of cement by charter, for later redistribution 
to Gulf markets. For example, in 1971/1972 the following major tonnages of cement 
were imported into Dubai: 
Origin 1971 1972 
India 75,005,000 Kilos 31,740,935 Kilos 
Pakistan 56,100,000 106,381,000 
Kenya 83,102,500 51,700,000 
Source: Dubai Foreign Trade Statistics 1972, p . 227. 
3. Trade between Dubai and India and Pakistan 
Although the dhow trade between Gulf ports and East Africa is largely eclipsed, the 
traditional link between the Indian sub-continent and the Gulf continues, though few dhows 
in this trade route venture west of Dubai which has become the major terminus of the trade . 
The dominant direction cr the trade has been reversed In favour of flows of commodities 
to India and Pakistan with ships returning to Dubai usually with empty holds. The nature 
of the gold smuggling trade, together with the re-export of watches, radios and other consumer 
goods is discussed in Section 4 .6 .3 . However, Dubai merchants dealing in imported textiles 
(chiefly from Japan) serve to illustrate the basic nature of business perception with respect 
to the Indian/Pakistani market. Basically, India in particular, despite the distance factor, 
is seen as a large market of 600 million, where, to quote one Dubai merchant, " i f you 
take "\% of 600 million, that is still a large number." Messrs. Royal Traders and Regal 
Traders of Dubai, exploit what they call the demand,, "of rich people crazy for non-Indian 
products", including re-exported Japanese textiles (despite domestic Indian production of exce-
llent handloom cotton textiles), British silk, Japanese and Swiss watches and American 
cigarettes. Royal Traders reported 25 - 40% profit margins on Japanese textiles smuggled into 
India. The extent of this particular trade (all conveyed to India by purpose-built dhow) can 
be judged, in the absence of re-export figures, by import statistics denoting very 
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high import levels of Japanese nylon textiles-. 
Imports of Japanese Nyl on Textiles, Dubai 1971/72: 
1971 1972 
Kilos Value (QDR) Kilos Value (QDR) 
2,492,350 45,220,021 3,633,200 76,959,311 
Source: Dubai: Foreign Trade Figures, 1972, p.184 
4 .6 .2 . TARIFF BARRIERS 
An important issue concerns whether or not 'Developing' states should protect 
their economies by sheltering behind high tariff walls. The Economist, P.A. Samuelson, 
advances the theory that, "in any economic system unhampered trade promotes a mutually 
profitable international division of labour, greatly enhances the potential real national 
product of all countries and makes possible higher standards of living all over the 
globe." (1958, p.672). However, in reality, " i t is rare that unhampered trade is 
allowed to take place between nations." (Toyne, 1974, p.253). Instead, the existence 
of tariffs and certain trade agreements constrain the forces of specialization and free 
trade. In some cases, developing counties have felt themselves quite justified in a policy 
of tariff protection in the national interest, or on specific social or economic grounds 
such as the need to curb unemployment or to protect newly established industries. Since 
1948, the United Nations sponsored General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has sou; 
to lower tariff walls, or at least to promote certain international commodity agreements 
(ICA) where it is established that either widespread unemployment or considerable surpluses 
cannot be avoided by normal market forces under free trade conditions. In practice, many 
Developing Countries feel that tariff protection is the only way by which foreign trade can 
be constrained and their economies allowed to develop to the stage at which they are able 
to derive reasonable terms of trade (H .G. Johnson, 1967). 
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Trade policy instruments that a state may use to protect its domestic industry by 
restricting imports, are basically of two types: The first policy aims to control the 
price of the imported product through the use of customs duties, taxes and other charges 
levied on importation. Alternatively, there are policies designed to limit tfie 
quantity of goods imported through the imposition of import quotas, licences, or, in the 
case of the Persian Gulf , the Arab boycott of items made by firms deemed to be in 
sympathy with Israel. However, "recourse to quantitative import restrictions has 
tended to be the exception to general practice at least in the majority of developed 
countries, while the customs tariff has gained in importance as a trade policy instrument. 
This is in line with the concept of non-discrimination in international trade, one of the 
basic principles of GATT, which governs 85% of total world trade." ( O . M . H i l l , 1970, 
P.13). 
Tariff Policy within the Persian Gulf 
1. Historical Significance 
Differential customs tariffs are a major factor in the movement patterns of certain 
commodities in Gulf's intra-system trade. In fact, tariff barriers are of historical, as well 
as contemporary significance, and examples of the relationship between trade patterns and 
tariffs go back at least two hundred years. The Arab historian, Abu Hakima (1965), cites 
a case study from the late eighteenth century in his History of Eastern Arabia: In 1770 -
80, the merchants of the Turkish controlled port of Basra contrived to avoid paying the heavy 
duties levied on imports by their over-lords. The main trade route was Bombay-Muscat-
Bush ire-Basra-Baghdad-Aleppo. Basra merchants arranged for cargoes of Indian cloth, 
building materials, sugar, spices, metals and drugs to be consigned via Kuwait (then known 
as 'Grain') and on by caravan to the markets of Aleppo to avoid these duties. Abu Hakima 
estimates that in bypassing Basra, the merchants defrauded the Turkish Government of 15-17% 
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of the value of customs duties. In this same link In the 1790's both Abu Hakima (1965) and 
Landen (1967 comment on the contrasting ability of the Government of Muscat to exploit 
this entrepot trade in a more water-tight fashion than did Basra. The abandonment of 
'Gombroon' (Bandar Abbas) as a trading station by the Europeans in 1763, left Muscat in 
commercial control of the Gulf of Oman and Straits of Hormuz and able to exploit trade in 
the period 1750-1800 by charging a 6%% duty on all imports (latter reduced to 5%). Landen 
(1967, p.61) estimated that, "in the last decade of the eighteenth century about 5/8 of the 
total long-distance trade in the Persian Gulf passed through Muscat". Couched in systems 
terms, the customs revenue, noted by Abu Hakima (1965) as being used for storage and 
reinvestment, allowed Muscat, in the period from 1750 until the coming of the steamship 
in 1862, to move into a state of dynamic equilibrium in which the acquisition of 
substantial customs revenues and their investment ultimately led a growth on the spatial 
extent of Omani commercial control, particularly in the actual expansion of the Omani 
trading empire to include ports of East Africa and Zanzibar in the reign of Sultan Said 
bin Sultan 1806-1856. 
The port of Lingeh provides another classic historical case-study of the sensitivity of 
merchants to tariff conditions. Lingeh inherited the nodal trading position of Hormuz and 
Bandar Abbas as a strategic entrepot at the head of the Gulf, from the late eighteenth 
century onwards. Gunther Schweizer (1972, p. 15) plots the demise of Bandar Abbas, and 
relates it to anarchic conditions in Iran during the eighteenth century, and in particular 
to the decision of Nadir Shah (1727 - 1747) to develop the port of Bush ire as his naval 
power base. Without emanating Muscat as an entrepot, Lingeh nonetheless built up a 
sizable transit trade during the nineteenth century based on liberal trading policies. A 
severe blow was struck to this modest commercial success when in 1887, Lingeh fel l under the 
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the cause of which was directly attributable to the zeal of the reformed Persian Customs 
and the disastrous imposition of a high customs tarfff which effectively shattered the basis 
of Lingeh's transit trade. Faced with financial loss, the merchants of Lingeh looked elsewhere 
for a base to trade profitably, turning ironically to a competitor, the port of Dubai on the 
Arabian coast. Initially establishing agencies in Sharjah, Lingeh merchants eventually 
migrated in large numbers to Dubai, where it was estimated (Lorimer, 1915) that goods 
imported could be sold for 10% cheaper than similar goods imported through Lingeh. 
Bahrain offers a more recent example of how the significance of customs revenue 
has dropped away in terms of government revenues after the oil finds of the twentieth century 
came on stream. Figure 4.18 illustrates that until 1935, Bahraini revenues depended wholly 
on import customs whose quantity depend on the success of the pearl trade. In the 1920's 
Bahrain employed a 5% tax on imports, a 2% tax on re-exports and a 1 §% tax of 
transhipped or transit oargo. This World Slump of 1929-30, together with the competition 
from Japanese cultured pearls led to a reduction in revenues in the early 1930's, due 
principally to the drop in price of commodities such as rice, coffee and flour. Duties 
were therefore increased in 1933 - 34 from 5 to 10% on luxury items, and from 5 to 15% 
on tobacco and liquor. However, fortunately oil revenues began to be paid from 1935 onwards, 
leading to a position by 1950 where oil revenues assumed the major significance in terms of 
national economy, leading to a point in 1958, where the Government was able to scrap the 
2% transit tax, and tfiereby stimulate its transit trade to Saudi Arabia without endangering 
economic stability. 
11 . Contemporary Policy 
Contemporary trade policy within the Gulf consists firstly of the case of a variety 
of tariff barriers designed to affect the prices of certain imports, and secondly of an Arab 
Agreement for the promotion of Trade and an Israel? Boycott, both of which are designed to 
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T A B L E 4.20 
' : Comparative Customs tar i f f on Selected Commodities vithin the Gulf - 1973 
Kuwait Bahrain Qd tar Abu Dhabi Dutxu Oman Saudi Iran Iraq 
Pharmaceuticals h 5 2.5 2.5 3 5 Nil 
Domestic Iron h 5 2.5 2.5 3 7 20 30-15 
Stationery h 5 2.5 2.5 3 7 IS liO-Nil 
Air Conditioners h 10 2.5 2.5 3 17 5 25-35 
Refrigerators h 10 2.5 2.5 3 7 15 25-35 
T.V./Radios h 10 2.5 2.5 3 7 15 25-75 
Record Players h 10 IS 2.5 3 7 15 25-75 
Fresh Heat h 5 2.5 2.5 3 5 Nil loR-Nil 
Watches h 10 2.5 2.5 3 7 10 30-2 
Ready-made Clothes h 10 2.5 2.5 3 7 25 200R-500R 
Shoes k 10 2.5 2.5 7 25 100R-600R 
Cotton Textiles h 5 2.5 2.5 3 7 20 18.3R-90R 
Nylon Textiles f 2.5 2.5 3 7 20 18.3
R-90R 
Canned Food h 2.5 2.5 3 7 25 6^501? 
Fresh Fruit h 5 2.5 Nil 3 7 Nil 3
R-25R 
Timber U 5 2.5 2.5 3 7 s 750R-20O0R 
Photo Film h 10 2.5 2.5 1 7 100R-20R 
Alcohol 100 50 50 2.5 3 5-0 Ban 80R-320R 
Cigarettes h 15 10 2.5 3 7 SR 5 
per kilo 
lOO^OO 
Live Animals h 5 2.5 2.5 3 7 Nil Nil 
Eggs h 5 2.5 2.5 3 Nil S^Nil j 
Coffee h 5 2.5 2.5 ' 7 SR 0.30 per kilo 3 0 R-30 R 
Tea h 5 2.5 2.5 3 7 SR 0.60 
per kilo 
Sl R - i i9 R 
Rice h 5 2.5 2.5 2 7 Nil 1 R -Nil 
Wheat h 5 2.5 2.5 2 M l Nil-Nil 1 
Flour h 5 2.5 2.5 7 Nil Ni l -S R j 
Sugar * 5 2.5 2.5 7 2.5
R-5.2S R 
Perfume h 5 2.5 2.5 3 7 20 li00
R-6O0R 
Furniture 10 2.5 2.5 3 7 30 100-200 
Steel Bars «. 2.5 2.5 - 7 5 2 R _ 2
R 
Cars h 10 2.5 2.5 3 17 30 15-20 
lorries U 10 2-5 2.5 3 17 10 25-Nil 
Cardomon U 5 2.5 2.5 3 7 SR 1.50 
per kilo 
Cement h 5 2.5 2.5 2 7 SR 21 
per ton 
Soap h 5 2.5 2.5 3 7 15 35R-^0R 
N.B. Dubai U.625 unt i l Sept. 1973 Air Cargo : 2% (Watches, gems of \H) 
Saudi New Tariff June 1973 , 
Iran Duty and C.B.T. (CommerciaiPBensfit Tax) 
Sources : Respective Customs TuriffE. 
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affect the quantity of trade between nations. 
Tariffs 
Basically, customs duties are normally levied to provide revenue to the government, 
or to protect domestic industry, or for both reasons. Table 4.20 is a comparative display 
of the customs tariffs in effect in the Gulf in 1973 for a selection of commodities. Scrutiny 
of the table records a three-fold classification according to the scale of tariff . Kuwait, 
Qatar, Abu Dhabi and Bahrain operate a low tariff policy with duty on most items below 
5% ad valorem. The duty collected provides Government with revenue which forms a 
decreasing proportion of total revenue earned in the wake of the oil industry and industrialization 
projects. These low tariffs, therefore, are symbolic of the states desire to attract trade 
through low tariff walls in order to stimulate the growth of national economies, plus the 
attractive transit and re-export commerce. Oman is representative in an intermediate 
category. Most items carry a 7% duty, though there are much higher rates on certain key 
commodities ( i . e . 17% of air conditioners, cars and lorries). 
Saudi Arabia and Iran are representative as the third, high tariff category. The two 
richest states have embarked upon a programme of industrialization to diversify their o i l -
centred economies. Characteristically, with growing industrialization the emphasis usually 
shifts from duties levied primarily for revenue, towards duties designed to project domestic 
industry. For example, the high duty payable on cigarette imports into Iran reflects a 
protectionist policy towards local industry. Kuwait, though a low tariff state, aJso protects 
its local industry via higher tariff rates on imported substitutes. 
Trade Agreements 
Apart from the unique boycott of firms who trade with Israel, some Gulf states operate 
i 
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certain preferential arrangements. The Arab Agreement for the Promotion of Trade, 
1957, was signed by Kuwait, Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Yemen. In this 
agreement intra-regional trade in certain industrial items carried a 5% or 25% reduction 
on usual tariff rates. Agricultural production in these Arab League States were exchangeable 
free of duty. Outside the Gulf an Arab Common Market was established in January 1965, 
involving Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Sudan and Yemen, and providing for the gradual 
dismantlement of tariffs and quantitative restrictions on trade. Within the Gulf , the 
arguments for the establishment of a Gulf Free Trade Area have been examined by R. El 
Mallakh (1968). Essentially, El Mallakh feels that Regional Economic Co-operation would 
be assisted by the elimination of tariffs between the Gulf states. Such a Free Trade Area 
would doubtless cut down on smuggling, but equally it would undermine the free trade 
economics of Kuwait, Bahrain and Dubai. 
Spatial Consequences 
Figure 4.19 is an attempt to illustrate in map form, the trading dynamic inherent in 
the existing tariff structure within the Gulf (see Table 4.20). It makes its point that 
without a common tariff policy, imports to the Gulf can arrive through the lower tariff 
nations, and from there filter throughout the region. Given the differential pattern of 
tariffs in the Gulf , the merchants of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates 
are well placed to act as middlemen for the re-export and transit trade to Iran, Saudi 
Arabia and Oman - as well as to the Indian sub-continent where a similar differential arises.. 
Iraq carries on only small scale trade with the other Gulf States. 
111 The Merchants' Perception of Tariff Barriers 
Perception of the Iranian Tariff 
Iran's protective tar i ff , together with its coastline of over 1,000 miles length, makes 
it a natural business target for merchants in the low tariff shaikhdoms across the Gulf. 
Increasing vigilance by Iranian customs officials (using hovercraft) together with the issuing 
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of licenses permitting villages to import small quantities of basic necessities in Arab 
ports ( i . e . 50 - 100 k . g . of rice a month) have failed to stop the illegal entry of 
certain high tariff items. W . J . Towell in Kuwait, imported 250,000 cases of cigarettes 
in 1972 (1 case = 10,000 cigarettes or 10.84 kg, i . e . 2,500,000,000 million cigarettes 
or 2710 tons) of which 30% were consumed locally and 60% and 10% respectively were 
're-exported* to Iran and Iraq). 'Sharif and Hatiam (Bahrain) estimated that a total 
of 120,000 cases of Winston cigarettes a month were being shipped to Iran in 1973. A 
Kuwaiti firm who acted as agents for a branch of Japanese radios, admitted 're-exporting' 
80% of their stock to Iran in 1973: pocket two-ways transistor radios were smuggled in 
jute bags mixed with genuine products ( i . e . toys) which were declared and liable to a 
low duty. 
Perception of Saudi and Omani Tariffs 
Saudi Arabia and Oman have land borders with Mow ta r i f f Kuwait and the United 
Arab Emirates. Untraceable lorries and other vehicles can travel at night avoiding main 
roads and customs posts. An admitted practice in Dubai for merchants shipping goods by 
road into Oman through recognized existing posts is the 'under valueing' of manifests. 
One Dubai firm admitted declaring only 60 -70% of the correct value of textiles shipped 
to Muscat in order to save duty for the merchant concerned. Also unsubstantiated is the claim 
by Bahrain merchants, that although • Bahraini Government statistics of re-exports to Saudi 
Arabia are correct, the 'second copy* is often altered to a figure lower than the real 
value for Saudi Customs. 
Perception of Indian Tariff 
Before 1961, Portuguese Goa, only three hours from Bombay was the centre of smuggling 
into India. Kuwait up to 1966, and Dubai after that date, took over that mantle as the only 
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'free port" within the Indian Ocean maritime system. For one Dubai firm the inducement to 
smuggle is clear cut: Cloth in India is expensive due to a 500% duty on yarn imports, and 
finished textiles are banned from importation. Hence the inducement to smuggle to satisfy 
demand. This firm reported the unprovable claim that in 1973, 2 - 4 boats a day left Dubai 
for India (except in the monsoon seasons) carrying between 200 - 300 rolls of nylon textiles 
(each roll weighs 50 kilos and contains 1,000 yards of cloth). 
4.6.3 SMUGGLING 
Smuggling is endemic within the Gulf and its wider maritime trading system. It is a 
form of adaptive specialization geared to the survival of sailors and merchants alike. It is 
likely to have been practiced in minor forms for centuries. Villiers (1940) likens the 
activity as carried on by nakhodas, crewmen, passengers and merchants, as a way of life? 
a habitual supplement to the precarious financial position of sailors in the yoke of their 
merchant masters. It is a f i t fu l activity, wavering in regard to changes in the demand for 
certain commodities, in the availability of those commodities, and in the external raising 
and lowering of customs tariffs. It has derivative activity on which it is founded - that 
of bureaucratic corruption. 
From a Eurocentric perspective, the activity known as smuggling has a clear, unseemly, 
criminal label attached to i t . Smugglers are considered, circumscribers, deviationists, 
from the usual ordered bureaucratically controlled system of trade and movement between 
nations. The word smuggling, in its European usage, is to be used ill-advisedly. In a 
Gulf context, such irregular flows of goods and people are not thought of by the peoples 
of the Arabian littoral as shadowy, illegal acts, which indeed are not even considered to be 
'smuggling'. Such activity falls under the umbrella of every day activity of making a living 
through the carrying or transit trade. 
The character of smuggling has changed and contracted in a similar manner to the 
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small-scale, widespread activity, practiced the length and breadth of the dhow system 
from the Gulf , across the South Arabian coast to East Africa, leading Villiers (1940) 
to conclude that some sailors were inveterate smugglers, into a highly organized activity 
to exploit the regional demands and inequalities resulting from tariff differentials between 
the Gulf Shaikhdoms and 'customers* in Iran, Pakistan and India. In short, smuggling 
by dhow became during the 1950's, 1960*s and 1970's, became a highly organized form 
of specialization, for 'group* profit, as opposed to former small-scale operations. 
The geography of smuggling (by dhow) in the Gulf , is by definition, d i f f icu l t , i f 
not impossible, to measure, though its explanation is possible. Data related to regular 
trade is at best sketchy and often unreliable; data on 'irregular' trade has to be arrived 
at via indirect sources. In some cases statistical anomalies revealed in official statistics 
are a clue to the geographical pattern of smuggling activity. 
Two spatial patterns emerge from the study of smuggling in a Gulf context; both 
involve the circumscription of tariff barriers (see Section 4 .6 .2) . The first involves the 
smuggling activities within the Gulf , principally between Mow ta r i f f Arabian entrepots 
and 'high tariff* Iran. The second pattern links the Gulf (principally represented by Dubai) 
to the Indian sub-continents. 
The Arabian - Iran Trade 
Tables 4 .21 , 4.22 and 4.23 is a compendium of unpublished statistics obtained from 
Kuwait customs officials at Sief Harbour (Table 4.21 and 4.22) and the Bureau of Statistics 
(Table 4.23) as examples of the spatial extent of smuggling. Table 4.23 is compiled from a 
specially prepared computer breakdown of foreign trade by mode of transport obtained by the 
author for the year 1971 (Sea, Dhow, Air and Road). Tea, •cigarettes, nylon textiles, 
electrical goods from the bulk of the commodities smuggled in the sample (see Table 4.21 ) . 
Overt smuggling to small Iranian ports such as Rig, Ganaveh and Dilwa, is seemingly more 
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significant- in comparison to 'smuggling' to the lower Gulf states of Bahrain, Doha and 
Dubai (see Table 4.22). This is misleading. Fear of arrest by vigilant Iranian customs 
officials, despite the long coastline, has forced nakhodas to prepare a second, or bogus, 
manifest, itemizing the carriage of goods to some Arab state rather than to Iran. Hence, 
in Table 4.22 some 11,529 kg of goods manifested to Bahrain are likely to have been 
smuggled to Iran, as well as 3,040 kg 'manifested' to Doha and 7,970 to Dubai. The 
official trade figures are therefore wrong. Table 4.23 reveals official statistics denoting 
heavy re-exports of cigarettes and transistor radios to Qatar, Dubai and Bahrain. Cross-
checking with the Gulf states concerned revealed that no such cargoes ever arrived ( i . e . 
they do not show on customs statistics) with the conclusion being that they were smuggled 
to Iran. 
The Gulf - India Trade 
Dubai is the centre of the more specialized, highly organ?2ed 're-export' trades to 
India. Three main cargoes dominated the trade through the late 1960's and early 1970's 
- gold, watches, textiles. Section 4 .2 .4 . has commented on the construction and use of 
specialist dhows on this route. An example of how dhow transport nakhodas and merchants 
carved themselves a commercial niche was the exploitation of the so-called 'gold-trade*. 
Gold Trade 
"Get Gold", wrote King Ferdinand of Spain to his men in South America in 1511, 
"humanely if you can, but against all hazards get gold". Prof. R. Tiffen (T. Green, 1971) 
has not ed that, "nobody could have ever conceived of a more absurd waste of human 
resource than to dig gold in distant corners of the earth for the sole purpose of transporting 
it and re-burying it immediately afterwards in deep holes . . . . " . The dhow system of the 
Gulf was uniquely adaptable to the conveyance of this specialist commodity once Portuguese 
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TABLE 4.24 : Dubai : Gold Imports I965 - 1972 
Metric Tons (QDR m i l l i o n ) 
1965 118.1 -
1966 126.8 -
1967 104.5 16.1 
1968 167.3 26.1 
1969 138.5 26.7 
1970 259.0 30.5 
1971 215.5 28.0 
1972 * 225.O 
Source : W.R. Duff (1971) 
* C. Dennett (1972) 
175 
Goa had ceased as the major supplier of the Indian market. 
"Gold", wrote T. Green (1971) "to the Indian is like an 'American Express Card* 
and his life insurance policy to an American. It is as much a part of l ife as the caste 
system and sacred cows". It is a hoarded commodity,' symbol of 'Lakshmi', the Hindu 
goddess of wealth, used as a wedding dowry ('strindhana'), and is the principal female 
status symbol. An Indian Law of 1947 forbad its importation, forcing the trade underground, 
initially to Goa, then to Kuwait in early I950*s, and to Dubai in the mid 1960's until 
economic inflation cut the margins of profitability in the early 1970%s. 
In 1968, the Middle East market absorbed just of 90 tons of gold bullion (Smets, 1971) 
in addition to conveyancing a further quantity of almost 200 tons onwards, principally 
to the Indian market. Dubai, its merchants, sailors and its dhows were chief engineers 
and beneficiaries of this trade. Table 4.24 charts the rapid rise in the tonnage of gold 
imported for shipment by dhow In the preiod 1965—1972. Imports of gold rose from an 
average in Dubai of QDR 300,000 per month in 1960 to QDR 2,600,000 in 1972, the 
profits from carriage to India forming the backbone of the initial economic and urban 
growth of the emirate prior to the beginning of oil revenue in 1972. A fleet of dhows 
was built or adapted to serve Dubai as the third largest gold market in the world. 
At its height up to 40 of the dhows described in Section 4 .2 .4 . were used to carry 
the golden cargo. The 22 - 24 carat gold was carried by the crew, hidden in corsets designed 
to carry small 10 tola bars' weighing 3.72 ounces (116.00 gm) each. The sailors, as 
such, were merely a small part in a well run system, in which merchants, foreign banks, 
middlemen and receivers took their cut, although it was the sailors who bore the 
risks of arrest and imprisonment. A round tr ip, weather dependent, took an average between 
9 - 1 2 days to complete from Dubai to Bombay's outskirts, from which a Dubai investor was 
lucky i f he made 8 or 9% profit on a voyage (Bennett, 1973). The downturn in the trade 
(post 1972) again illustrates the force of external (economic) influence on the dhow transport 
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system, together with the constant need for merchants and sailors to adapt to new 
commercial circumstances. 
4 .6 .4 . MERCHANT PERSPECTIVES : MICRO-SCALE CASE STUDIES 
The following section consists of a set of micro - scale case studies of the methods 
used by 12 merchants (8 from Bahrain, 4 from Dubai) in the conduct of their trading 
operations which involve dhow transport. The first 8 merchant (all Bahraini) studies 
include supporting data obtained by sifting through customs manifests lodged in the 
Customs warehouse atManama dhow harbour,. In each case the data (taken from transit 
and re-export shipping bills) provides evidence of the destination of re-exported cargoes 
(by weight) through an aggregration of a two week sample of manifests taken from the first 
calendar week in the months of September and December 1971. 
1. H.E. MUFTAH (Bahrain) 
(in Kilograms - Kg) 
Destination Textiles Clothes and Shoes Spices Household goods Total 

















Muftah is a clearing agent whose main business lies in dispatching small lots of textiles 
clothes, shoes and household items (suitcases, sheets and pharmaceuticals) to Saudi 
customers through the ports of Dammam, Al Khobar and Qateef. He is also an agent for 
imported cardomon seeds and ginger which he re-exports to Al Khobar. 
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In 1971 the Saudi port of Dammam was afflicted by delays caused by insufficient 
berthing capacity and problems associated with discharge and clearance of cargoes by the 
port and customs authorities. In this context, the majority of Saudi customers who use 
Muftah as a supplying agent do so because of the time factor advantages offered by 
importing cargoes through the Bahraini port of Mina Sulman. Bahrain is attractive 
because of the faster handling rates in the port (as opposed to those at Dammam) and faster 
clearing times through customs and the Bahraini banks. On average, in 1971 i t took 3 
days to clear a cargo in Bahrain as against 2 weeks in Saudi Arabia. A further factor in 
favour of Bahrain is that use of the short-sea transit route to the Saudi mainland affords 
an opportunity to alter the amount of the value of a cargo shown on a 'second copy' 
of a customs manifest, thereby defrauding Saudi customs of a portion of the duty which 
would be levied. 
On arrival in Bahrain merchandise destined for Saudi customers in transferred to Muftah's 
care on the instructions of a Bahraini bank. He then clears the cargo and arranges for its 
transhipment by dhow through the dhow harbour at Manama to Saudi mainland ports. The 
cargoes are usually transferred by Muftah's staff of five men (three in the port of Mina Sulman, 
one clearing agent and one man who arranges dhow transport at Manama) who divide cargoes 
up into small lots of about 10 cases for shipment. 
2. AKUND AWAZI (Bahrain) 
(Kg) 
Destination Textiles Clothes/Shoes General Household Items Total 
Dammam - 19657 29329 48986 
Qateef 3000 - - 3000 
Doha - 774 491 1265 
Dubai . 7 4 3 - 743 
(50 Manifests) 
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Similarly, Akund Awazi dispatches most of his re-export cargoes through to the port 
of Dammarn. The firm is the Gulf agent for a number of brands of Chinese, Japanese and 
Taiwanese shoes and items of clothing, together with suitcases imported from China, 
Taiwan and Singapore. He estimates that 85 - 95% of his re-export trade is with Saudi 
customers who visit his agency In Bahrain to place orders in bulk. In the case of Chinese 
goods, a Saudi government ban on direct sailings of Chinese, Soviet and other 'socialist* 
vessels into Dammam forces Saudi merchants to import merchandise indirectly through a 
third party. Chinese goods are sometimes transhipped in Hong King and arrive in the Gulf 
aboard Maersk, Johnson or * W . I . L . ' line vessels. The cost of transporting items by dhow 
between Bahrain and Dammam averaged 300 - 400 fils a package (depending on the size) 
in 1973. 
Akund Awazi tends to import large quantities of goods at one time and stores them in 
warehouses in the port area of Mina Sulman for periods ranging from 2 days to 4 months 
before moving his cargoes in response to seasonal demand. He also re-exports smaller 
quantities to Doha and Dubai, (where he supplies 3 and 4 retail outlets respectively). It 
is sometimes the case that Qatar and Dubai merchants find it cheaper to import via large 
wholesalers like Akund Awazi than to import directly themselves in smaller amounts. 
3. AMEEN TRADING (Bahrain) 
(Kg) 
Destination Textiles Clothes and Shoes Household Items Foodstuffs Total 
Dammam 6870 31349 55953 12091 110263 
Qateef 796 3536 4110 - 8432 
Al Khobar 1111 2105 - - 3216 
Dubai 900 _ - 900 
(46 manifests) 
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Ameen is both an importer and clearing agent for a wide range of items most of 
which emanate from the Far East. Again, his major re-export trade involves supplying 
Saudi customers with blankets, suitcases, sheets, umbrellas, dusters, needles, padlocks, 
hindges, biscuits and toilet paper, together with large quantities of Hong Kong, Japanese 
and Chinese made clothes and shoes. The same trading factors apply to Ameen as for Muftah 
and Akund Awazi. 
4 . MOHAMMAD AL KAZI (Bahrain) 
(Kg) 
Destination Textiles Clothes and Shoes Household Items Total 
Dammam 11989 41551 26835 80375 
Al Khobar 3990 210 34938 39138 
Qateef 5501 16339 12827 34667 
Kuwait 12777 1630 2558 16965 
Doha 469 469 
(123 manifests) 
Al Kazi is another one of the group of about 25 key agents who supply Saudi Arabian 
merchants from Bahrain. He himself is Saudi born but has been resident in Bahrain for 40 
years during which time he has built up an agency which supplies a range of clothes, shoes, 
perfumes, toys, towels, rugs, blankets, mosquito nets, haberdashery and suitcases to the 
mainland. In business terms he feels that the cost advantages offered by Bahraini agents ( i . e . 
items are cheaper because they are purchased in bulk) outweighs any problems witrt the relative 
slowness of Saudi ports and customs. 
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5. KEWALRAM (Bahrain) 
(Kg) 
Destination Textiles Household Items Total 
Dammam 6445 - 6445 
Dubai 284 382 666 
Muscat 214 - 214 
(7 manifests) 
6. DANAWELLA (Bahrain) 
(Kg) 
Destination Clothes Household Items Total 
Dubai 15179 690 15869 
Qateef 1003 - 1003 
Dammam 432 - 432 
Doha 8 9 - 8 9 
(53 Manifests) 
Kewalram and Dana we I la are two examples of Indian firms with head-quarters in 
Bahrain whose main re-export trade involves supplying their branch retail outlets 
elsewhere in ffie Gulf through warehouses in Mina Sulman. Kewalram use Bahrain's 
'free zone' to import textiles (mostly Japanese), while Danawella do the same in the 
context of Far Eastern items of clothing. In 1971, the 'free zone' at the port of Bahrain 
offered advantages in terms of nil import charges on stored cargoes ( i . e . that do not leave 
the port area), and the generally low level of storage charges ( 6 fils per package or 50 fTIs 
per cu. foot or B.D. 2 per ton for 14 days; after which the rate rises to 240 fils per ton). 
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7. SHUKRALLA (Bahrain) 
(Kg) 
Destination Rice Tea Ghee Clothing Total 
Kangan 16195 225 - - 16420 
Ginawa - - 8000 - 8000 
Dilwa 5490 - - - 5490 
Dayyer 4500 225 - - 4725 
Bolkheyr 3915 720 - - 4635 
Bush ire 2250 - - - 2250 
Doha 1848 1848 
(17 manifests) 
8. YOUSSEF AKBAR ALI REZA (Bahrain) 
(Kg) 
Destination Rice Sugar Total 
Bush ire 135000 - 135000 
Al Khobar 16340 - 16340 
Dayyer 5965 6000 11965 
Doha 4200 - 4200 
Kangan 3500 - 3500 
Khor Fakkan - 2050 2050 
Bolkheyr 1400 - 1400 
Dilwa 700 _ 700 
(21 manifests) i 
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Shukrolla and Youssef Akbar A l i Reza are both merchants of Iranian descent who 
conduct the bulk of their re-export trade with Iran emphasizing the part played by ethnic 
links in trading patterns. In fact most of the villagers and merchants who visit ports on 
the Arabian coast tend to do business, where possible, with resident Farsi speakers. The 
core of the trade with Iranian coastal villages and towns consists of food cargoes. Shukralla 
specialises in importing Thai rice and Sri Lanka tea, while Al? Reza specialises in sugar, 
Burmese and Thai rice. Both merchants storelheir supplies in the warehouses of Mina Sulman 
laregly for sale to visiting Iranians who- purchase small quantities of rice, tea, sugar, turmeric 
margarine and other basic food items either for themselves or on behalf of others in Iran. 
9. MOHAMMAD AL FOTHAIM (Dubai) 
In trading terms the majority of merchants based in Dubai look either northwards to 
Iran or eastwards to Oman and the Indian subcontinent for external markets. Al Fothaim 
is the agent for Honda and Yamaha marine engines in the lower Gulf , servicing sub-agencies 
in the U . A . E . , Qatar and Oman. Ironically, although the firm supplies engines for use in 
dhows, i t is aware that markets in the U.A.E . and Oman are threatened as road transport 
grows at the expense of dhow routes. The trend throughout the 1970's has been for increasing 
praportion s of cargoes destined for Oman to travel by road (in "taxi' lorries or private 
lorries and half-trucks) rather than by dhow. Road vehicles are faster, safer, less 
susceptible to bad weather and offer possibilities for avoiding customs duty payable on entry 
to Oman (e.g. by circumventing customs posts). Set against these points, dhow transport 
is cheaper (e.g. in 1973 dhows transported cement from Dubai to Muscat at 2 Rials a bag, 
whereas the road freight was close to 12 Rials a bag) and can accommodate larger loads than 
lorries (200 tons for dhows, 5 tons for most lorries). 
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10. MOHAMMAD AND AHMAD HA JI YOUSSEF RAHMAN! (Dubai) 
This firm supplies timber to customers in Oman. It gains its commercial advantage 
by importing large quantities of timber into Dubai and offering supplies at prices that 
smaller firms cannot match. A significant quantity of timber was re-exported to Oman 
prior to the opening of the deep-water port at Matrah. Timber is a cargo which in the 
past has been carried by dhows. However, most of Rahmani's trade is carried on by 
road because of the fact that a lorry or half-truck can complete the journey to Muscat 
or Matrah (door to door) in a few hours, whereas a dhow may take 1 0 - 1 5 days to ful ly 
load its cargoes plus 3 - 4 days transit time to Muscat. Seasonal factors also affect cargoes 
of timber dispatched from Dubai to Salala in Dhofar, where rough seas in summer restrict 
landings of cargo. 
11 . YOUSSEF AKBAR ALI REZA (Dubo?) 
Youssef Akbar A l i Reza (Dubai) is a branch of the Bahrain-based company but operates 
over a different marketing area. The Dubai agency stocks rice, sugar, and ghee and sells 
quantities to visiting Iranian businessmen and private citizens who visit Dubai to 
'stock up'. The commercial sphere of influence of this company stretches from Qais to 
Jask along the Iranian coast, a distance of over 360 miles. The basic commodity of rice is 
transported by dhow back to the Iranian island and coastal communities in a time period 
which averages 15 hours (compared with 4 - 5 days taken to transport a cargo of Iranian 
produced Gilan rice from Rasht in northern Iran). In general, Dubai offers merchants from 
Iranian coastal settlements a wider range of commodities, in greater quantities at a cheaper 
price than those obtainable from distant Iranian higher-order centres such as Shiraz, 
Bushire, Isfahan and Bandar Abbas. 
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12 REGAL TRADERS (Dubai) 
Regal Traders is an example cf an Indian-owned firm (with 60 years experience in the 
U.A.E. - it was previously based in Sharjah) which devotes a considerable proportion of 
its business activity to re-exporting cargoes to customers in India and Pakistan. During 
the 1970's, the low import duties levied by the government of Dubai (see section 4.6.2) 
permitted the firm to import large quantities of Japanese textiles into Dubai for subsequent 
re-export by dhow to markers behind the high import tariff walls of hdia. 
4 .7 . FUTURE FUNCTION OF DHOWS 
The question as to whether the Gulf dhow transport system wi l l survive in its present 
form, if at a l l , is linked to two sets of factors. Firstly, i t is related to whether or not 
trade routes of suitable type and intensity wi l l perpetuate; and secondly whether or not 
dhows can resist competition from other forms of transport. Sectias 4.3 - 4.6 have 
analysed the nature of cargo trades presently functioning. In this section the nature of 
developments in competitive sea, road and air transport systems is considered in relation 
to the survival of dhow transport. 
4 . 7 . 1 . COMPETITION FROM ALTERNATIVE TRANSPORT MODES 
Kuwait was the only Gulf state for which a mode of transport breakdown of trade 
figures could be obtained. The proportion of trade Imported and exported through Kuwait 
by each means of transport in 1971 is indicated in Table 4.25. These statistics show a trend 
generally found within the Gulf Shaikhdoms: namely, that their imports (by weight) arrive 
overwhelmingly by sea (96% in Kuwait) , although some higher value commodities arrive by 
air or road. The mode of carriage of exports and re-exports depicts a more balanced 
distribution among transport alternatives. In reality, exports are usually shipped by sea, but 
re-exports are shipped by dhow, or road vehicle or aircraft. The significance of road 
transport is clearly apparent from these figures, both in terms of value (44.10%) and weight 
(44.48%). However, tables 4.26 and 4.27 illustrate that the pattern of Kuwaiti road and 
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T a b l e 4 . 2 5 
K U W A I T : F O R E I G N T R A D E B Y MODE O F T R A N S P O R T , 1971 
Imports E x p o r t s 
V a l u e ( K D ) Weight ( K i l o s ) V a l u e ( K D ) Weight ( K i l o s ) 
















R O A D 37468620 484260174 15182535 211895579 
(16.19%) (3.24%) (44.16%) (42.48%) 
S E A 
( S T E A M E R ) 
168341467 14322981744 8029905 223325151 
(72.75%) (95.83%J (23.38%) (44 . 78%) 
S o u r c e : 
C e n t r a l S t a t i s t i c s Of f i ce 
P l a n n i n g B o a r d 
K u w a i t 
( u n p u b l i s h e d ) 
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TABLE 4.26 : Kuwait ; Trade by Mode of Transport, 1971 
By Value (KD) % of Total Trade 
Dhow Road Air Sea 
Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. 
Iraq 1.90 O.36 96.78 97.41 1.31 2.21 0.01 0.01 
Syria 0.04 0.93 95.46 93.10 3.90 5.96 O.52 0 
Lebanon 0 . 0 8 0 8 3 . 0 6 89.30 16.73 IO.69 0.08 0 
Jordan 0.03 0 99.30 91.94 O.65 8.O5 0 0 
Saudi Arabia 0 1.73 97-17 96.82 1.23 0.87 1-59 0.49 
Bahrain 8O.95 51.12 O.98 3.48 15.43 17.86 2.49 27.52 
Qatar 0 28.76 66.12 53.95 33.88 12.06 0 5-73 
Dem.Yemen 48.61 33.72 0.33 0.97 51.04 23.79 0 26.47 
Yemen 0 0 46.IO 19.03 53.90 36.12 0 44.84 
Shar jah 0 88.94 0 0 0 6.02 0 5.02 
Muscat 99.00 85.54 0 0.12 0.99 3.67 0 IO.65 
Oman 94-47 69.2O 0 0 5-53 7.19 0 23.60 
Dubai 29.28 65.26 0.06 O.64 68.23 14.71 2.01 19.39 
Abu Dhabi 0 71-23 0 0.13 0 12.56 0 16.02 
Ras al Khaimah 93.19 97.55 6.80 0.28 0 O.64 0 1.52 
Umm al Qawam 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ajman 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 
Fujairah 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 
India 1-33 0.68 0.70 0.20 4-59 41.06 92.92 58.04 
Iran 91-93 92.19 1.11 0.71 2.80 4.36 4.15 2.71 
Kenya 0.47 0 0.01 0 0.21 0 99.30 100 





TABLE 4 . 2 7 : K u w a i t ; T rade by Mode o f T r a n s p o r t , 1971 
(By W e i g h t ) % o f T o t a l T rade 
Dhow Road A i r Sea 
Imp . Exp . Imp. Exp . Imp. Exp . Imp . Exp . 
I r a q 0 . 7 9 0.10 99.03 9 9 . 8 1 0 . 16 0 . 07 0 0 
S y r i a 0 .16 0 .15 92 . 21 99 -43 0 . 40 0 . 41 0 . 2 2 0 
Lebanon 0 . 1 4 0 99-77 99 -57 2 . 01 0 . 42 0 . 0 5 0 
J o r d a n 0 .05 0.01 99-65 9 9 - 9 4 0 . 28 0 . 04 0 0 
Saud i A r a b i a 0 5 .65 96 .93 93 .02 0 . 43 0 . 04 2 . 62 1 .21 
B a h r a i n 91 .25 56.9O 1-94 6 . 39 4- 75 1 . 37 2 . 03 3 5 - 3 3 
Qa ta r 0 26.99 99 -17 69.65 0 . 82 1 . 26 0 2 . 10 
Dem.Yem 92.80 29 . 12 0 . 1 2 0 . 1 1 7- 08 1 . 79 0 6 8 . 9 7 
Yemen 0 0 95 -54 9.16 6 . 46 2 . 43 0 8 8 . 3 9 
Shar j a h 0 97 .78 0 0 0 0 . 06 0 1.16 
Muscat 99 .13 94 .23 0 0 .07 0 . 86 0 . 35 0 5 - 3 3 
Oman 99.46 95 .23 0 0 0 . 54 0 . 16 0 4 . 5 9 
Dubai 72 .19 87 .83 0 0 .59 6 . 93 0 . 90 20 . 78 1 0 . 6 8 
Abu Dhabi 0 92 .09 0 0 . 1 1 0 1 . 07 0 6 . 6 2 
Ras a l Khaimah 6 8 . 0 8 98 .94 31.92 0 .09 0 0 . 02 0 0 . 9 3 
Umm a l Qawam 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ajman 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 
F u j a i r a h 0 100 ° 0 0 0 
0 0 
I n d i a 2 .32 0 .09 0.66 0 . 0 0 0 . 5 1 0 . 90 96 .48 9 8 . 9 9 
I r a n 97-57 98.10 0 .66 0 .48 0 . 07 0 . 26 1.67 1 .14 
Kenya 0 .28 0 0 0 0 0 99.30 100 




T a b l e 4 .28 
O R I G I N S O F DHOWS A R R I V I N G A T T H E P O R T O F D U B A I 
1967 - 1978 
( N u m b e r of d h o w s a r r i v i n g ) 
i 
] 
O r i g i n 1967 1969 1971 1972 1977 1978 
I r a n 1912 1475 2720 2394 2942 4474 
U . A . E . 732 724 582 469 100 302 
Ind ia 588 474 1208 1121 356 3895 
P a k i s t a n 39 72 84 151 146 2560 
Q a t a r 216 194 274 210 74 102 
B a h r a i n 165 159 271 254 94 380 
Oman 156 154 267 495 85 49 
S a u d i A r a b i a 115 111 124 159 31 53 
K u w a i t 82 123 151 47 83 80 
Dem Y e m e n 80 0 46 0 56 10 
I r a q 21 68 45 69 14 10 




dhow re-exports is confined to specific routes. The principle dhow routes ran from 
Kuwait to Iran, Bahrain, the U.A.E. and South Arabia (Oman and Democratic Yemen), 
while road routes focus on northerly states (Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and Iraq) and the 
Arabian states of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the Yemen Arab Republic. Although the sea 
link to Iran will remain important, the clearest threat to dhow transport is the construction 
of the road network running from Kuwait along the Gulf littoral to Oman. 
Recent published figures of dhow movements through the port of Dubai, although 
inconclusive, tend to confirm the threat posed by road development (see table 4.28). 
Statistics for the late 1970's show a growth trend on routes linking Dubai with Iran, 
India and Pakistan, a slower rise on the Bahrain route, but a clear downturn in the 
level of movements on routes from Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia Iraq and other Shaikhdoms of 
the U.A.E. (all of which are linked to Dubai by the main road system which runs the 
length of the Gulf from Basra to Muscat. It is unlikely that chance alone will explain 
why dhow flows have declined fastest on routes where they face direct competition from 
road transport. 
4 . 7 . 2 . THE INTRUSION OF NEW SHIPPING TECHNOLOGY 
In a situation where the operators of dhows are finding that the number of 'exclusive' 
dhow routes are being reduced through competition from road transport, they are unlikely 
to welcome a further direct challenge from the maritime industry itself. The present system 
liner routes offers little in the way of a threat to short-sea dhow routes since there is little 
competition for cargoes. However, developments in the sphere of containerization, roll on-
roll off (Ro-Ro) and lighter aboard ship (LASH) systems do pose a real threat in terms of 
compeition for cargoes. 
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In the late 1970's conventional and containerized liner services to the Gulf 
focus on the major deep-water ports but carry a minimum of cargoes between these 
ports (except in the case of regional liner companies - e.g. United Arab Shipping 
Company and Arya Line, Iran). However, the linked container feeder service based on 
Sharjah and Khor Fakkan (with a through road service along the road system of the eastern 
Arabian littoral), and through Ro-Ro and LASH feeder systems do directly duplicate some 
existing dhow routes. 
Perhaps the most significant development has been the opening up of Ro-Ro feeder 
routes in the Gulf by the FOSS Shipping Consortium (Fred Olsen Seaspead Svedel) and 
the Meredith Shipping Company (UK) in the late 1970's (North, 1977). FOSS brought 
four feeder vessels into service in 1977 each with an ability to carry 22 (12 metre) 
trailers or 94 (22 foot TEUs.) These craft have a laden draught of only 3.2 metres and 
have the potential to carry cargoes virtually anywhere in the Gulf where there are deep-
water jetties or beaches to run up. Each ship has a range of 1200 miles from the base ports 
at Dammam, Kuwait, Dubai and Bandar Shahpour (Barrett, 1977). In August 1977, 
Meredith Shipping launched a Ro-Ro service to Sharjah (from Felixstowe, LeHavre, Antwerp 
and Marseilles) with land and sea feeder services to all ports in the Gulf, including the 
use of a 750 TEU feeder barge. 
LASH represents the development of an alternative system as a means of loading barges 
onto deep-sea ships and transporting items across oceans, before dropping them off into 
riverine or shallow water regimes such as the Short Al Arab and much of the coastline 
along the Gulf. These craft which can consist of a mother ship (of 46,000 dwt) and 89 
barges (each requiring only 3.5 metres draught) were developed originally by Gulf Cenrral 
Line of the U.S.A. , for use along the Mississippi River. Gulf Cenrral presently operate 
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routes from the U .S .A . , U.K. , and European continent to Dammam, Bandar Shahpour, 
Doha, Abu Dhabi and Kuwait. As yet they are weakly developed in the Gulf though 
they do possess the capability of servicing coastal settlements which lack formal port 
facilities either by using the original LASH system, or by using derivative systems 
such as FLASH (shallow draught vessels that carry 8 - 1 5 barges towed by deep-sea tugs) 
or SPLASH (self-propelled feeder LASH craft) systems. 
The extent of competition from these systems is difficult to predict. It seems likely 
that will be used with increasing economic efficiency to distribute full (return) loads 
between the major deep-water ports, (e.g. Dubai-Bandar Abbas; Bahrain-Bushire). 
However, even given their technical capability of servicing 'beach' ports such as 
* 
Dayyer, Puhul and Tiab, and riverine ports such as Gosbar, Hendijan and Minab, it 
seems questionable whether they can prove economic enough, or suitable, to carry the 
irregular, mixed and 'native' cargoes that have been discussed in Section 4.4. 
4.7.3 DHOWS AS SPECIALIST FEEDERS 
Overall, the analysis presented in Chapter 4 adds up to a picture of contraction, 
but not the total eclipse of dhow transport in the 1970's. It appears that competition from 
road transport and new shipping systems is gradually eroding the proportion of trade 
available to be carried by dhows. It seems likely that the 'new' cargoes of the twentieth 
century (steel, cars, cement, electrical1 goods) will be 'taken away' by alternative 
transport modes, leaving the 'traditional' cargoes of foodstuffs, building materials and 
household items as staple cargoes. 
A future scenario would probably include the incursion of modern shipping technology 
on interrdeep water port routes in the Gulf, leaving the dhows a niche as specialist 
feeders linking together deep water ports with smaller ports and coastal villages to complete 
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the distribution chain. It is difficult to predict hSe speed of the march of new technology 
but it seems likely that three specialist feeder functions will persist into the 1980's. 
Firstly, the true cross-trades linking the Arabian entrepots with Iranian ports, coastal 
and riverine villages appears to be the strongest area of trade potential. Secondly, it 
seems very possible that Dubai will continue to send re-exported cargoes to the Indian 
sub-continent. Thirdly, it is unlikely that 'through' dhow trades linking the Arabian ports 
from Sur to Basra will cease altogether, but they may only continue to exist at an 
increasingly low ebb. Overall, the survival of the network of dhow routes is very desirable 
if the better developed corners of the Gulf littoral are to be connected with those areas 
where the waves of modernization and development have yet to lap. 
CHAPTER 5 
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND BEHAVIOURAL RESPONSE 
INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING AND PORT DEVELOPMENT 
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James Bird (1971, p. 195) has described the interconnection between shipping 
development and port development as being essentially a "master-servant" relationship 
in which the vessels function as masters, and ports as servants. The corollary of this 
relationship is that states (as the initiators of port development projects) are the 
servants of shipping operators (who act as agents of change in the way in which they 
adopt new designs and technologies for vessels) . A miss-match in the relationship 
between the sizes and types of vessels and the adequacy of port facilities to receive 
them can have "profound repercussions, not only upon port layouts but also on the 
ability of a port to retain or advance its relative position in a national (or regional) 
league table" (Bird, op at, page 195). 
Accordingly the first part of this chapter considers the nature of port congestion in 
the Gulf and the role of the 'masters' (i .e. vessels) in contributing to the problem. Part 
5.1 considers the growth of international shipping in the Gulf and the contribution it 
makes towards pressurizing governments to invest in new or expanded port facilities 
because of a tendency on the part of some shipping lines to overtonnage. Part 5.2 examines 
the responses that can be made by shipping conferences when faced with slow turn-around 
times caused by inadequate or congested ports. Part 5.3 discusses the responses open to 
the "servants" (i .e. governments) in the way they adapt their ports to changes in shipping 
technology and levels of trade within the overall context of the desire of all the Gulf 
states to promote rapid social and economic development. Direct investment in port 
facilities is considered, together with the option of incorporating new technology into the 
design of ports. A further option discussed relates to the decision of some of the Gulf states 
to enter the international shipping industry (either independently or in some form of joint 
project) as a means of both improving the shipping service to the Gulf, and as a method of 
industrial diversification. 
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The second part of this chapter ( i .e. 5.4) examines the spatial and locational 
implications of port development particularly in the context of the widespread construction 
of new facilities in the 1970's; In particular the question of the current hierarchy of 
ports in the Gulf and the nature of overlapping hinterlands and forelands is considered 
in relation to what some observers believe will be a tendency towards an over-
provision of conventional berths during the 1980's. 
5.1 THE CONTRIBUTION OF INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING TO PORT CONGESTION 
IN THE GULF 
5..1.1 PORT CONGESTION IN THE GULF 
"But Nejdi could only recognise three kinds of steamers. 
They were markobs gaz, markobs strides and fastmail." 
(Villiers, 1940, p. 226) 
"I knew no mistake in his identification of Arab ships. " 
(Villiers, 1940, p. 226) 
In 1971, the Persian Gulf was served by a total of 88 individual shipping lines, each 
with a different schedule, routing pattern, frequency-of-call, and level of trade. Clearly, 
it is to the advantage of states, particularly in the so-called Developing World, to be well 
served with a variety of sh ipping networks. However, In the case of the Gulf, circumstances 
of spatial imbalance both in the rate of port development, and in the adequacy of port 
facilities, cause problems which have a tendency to be aggravated by the multitude of 
shipping services. 
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A common theme has been the spectacle of port congestion, represented by cargoes 
piling up on docksides and ships lying at an anchor waiting for berths. In such 
circumstances, it is not surprising that shippers, traders and governments tend to put 
the blame for port congestion on the physical inadequacies of specific ports in 
relation to the size and range of port facilities, and the efficiency of port operations. 
This view, however, may be only a partial explanation. 
Barhurst (1973) acting in his capacity as United Nations Inter-regional adviser on 
ports and shipping has noted in a "Report on a Mission to the State of Qatar" (UNCTAD 
INT/69/718(1) ) a tendency towards "overtonnaging" in the Gulf as a result of the 
policies of individual shipping lines with regard to their trading patterns. Bathurst regards 
"overtonnaging" as a serious contributory factor to the port congestion problem in the Gulf: 
indeed, he considers this phenomenon to be the major factor, rather than the issue of 
port size. 
A tendency exists in the Gulf to view port development problems from an essentially 
'nationalistic' view,a perspective that may be misguided, for the reason that external 
influence on present shipping patterns in the Gulf will always have a strong interacting 
affect. It seems that port developers in the Gulf sometimes appear blind to the external 
characteristics of port operation. Bathurst considers that it is all too easy to interpret the 
present visual and statistical evidence of port congestion by the bland assertion that 
ports are necessarily too small or are inadequately run. Something more fundamental appears 
to be wrong. Bathurst comments that, "something is drastically wrong concerning the 
situation regarding shipping services in the whole Gulf area as is evidenced by the fact 
that severe delays are occurring in several of the ports" (1973, p . l ) . 
Shipping services appear to be seriously 'overtonnaged', that is, with regard to a 
particular company or shipping route, the total volume of cargo presently handled, could 
be handled by fewer ships if services could in some way be rationalised. A close scrutiny 
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of port shipping data reveals that on several occasions, two, three or even four ships 
on the same company route are at berth at the same port simultaneously, or also follow 
one another very closely. 
Allowing for the fact that this 'bunching' is sometimes caused by strikes, delays, 
or even religious holidays, the phenomenon is nonetheless of cause for concern. 
Interpreted nationally, an excessive number of sailings not only increases congestion, 
but it adds substantially to the total freight charges incurred by the recipient nation. 
Preliminary work on S . E . Asian ports (Bathurst, 1973) illustrates that this problem is not 
unique to the Persian Gulf, since shipping conferences in this theatre of world shipping 
provide 190 sailings per annum, "because it suits their convenience" (p.l) , whereas 
only a maximum of 130 sailings on a rationalised basis are needed for adequate trade. 
The cost of these 60 excessive sailings has been calculated to amount to "approximately 
U.S. dollars 1.7 million per annum, or about 20% of the total freight charges of the 
countries concerned", (p. l ) . 
The reality of the port congestion situation appears to be a combination of linked internally 
and externally derived shortcomings. Section 5.3 points to the fact that some ports have, or 
had, insufficient facilities, space,berths and equipment to handle certain levels of tonnage, 
and that throughput in some ports is less than could reasonably be expected for the equipment 
and facilities that are available. All these factors however, together with the problem of 
'overtonnaging' have an interacting effect, leading to a distortion of the 'actual' situation 
wherein the 'apparent' situation is quite misleading. The essential problem here is to 
differentiate between 'causes' and 'symptoms'. In reality, there appear to be more ships 
on certain of the sea routes than is warranted by the level of trade. This situation has led 
to a lack of berths available for vessels, leading to a point where ports are apparently 
causing delays, the result of which is that shipping conferences are forced to increase 
197 
surcharges and freight rates to cover the costs of detay. In this particular vicious 
circle, the 'apparent symptom' appears to be a lack of berthing space. However, in fact f 
the 'actual cause' may be a general overtonnaging of routes and a lack of rationalisation 
of shipping services. The actual fault may lie with the shipping lines and conferences 
rather than the ports themselves. Decision-making and control of policy with regard 
to shipping lines and conferences lies mostly outside the control of internal port planners 
within the Gulf. This problem seems to point to the need for some form of co-ordinating 
'Shipping Council' with sitting members from all the Gulf ports as well as the representatives 
of shipping lines meeting to resolve issues of rationalisation and congestion. 
5.1.2 The Growth of the Ocean Shipping Network 
Section 3.4.1 outlined the early growth of steamship services in the Gulf. This 
section analyses the modern pattern of shipping by reference to the individual named 
companies. Data relating to the recent growth and relative commercial success of individual 
shipping lines in competing for traffic at each of the major deep-water ports of the Gulf is 
impossible to procure, at least in a detailed form, embracing a good 'run* of data. Comparative 
data has been processed far a five-port comparative study of 'overtonnaging' for the year 
19711 but data prior to that date was found to be generally unobtainable. 
The State of Kuwait, however, does furnish in its published 'Customsand Ports Annual 
Reports', a reliable dossier on shipping line activity in that port for the period 1959-1971 
(see appendix Table 'J') . Since during this period Kuwait has functioned as a major seaport 
in the Gulf, served by the majority, if not a l l , the lines linking the Gulf with its external 
trading environment, the statistics tabulated in appendix Table *J* serve as an accurate 
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response to a number of factors. The large number of links (174) that have served Kuwait 
at some time during this period is a feature of these statistics. Each shipping line is 
annotated by a letter denoting which of the six major shipping routes vessels operate 
(N.W. Europe, Medit. Europe, U .S .A . , Far East, India-Pakistan, AustraIia-New Zealand). 
Three main features are apparent with regard to these figures. Firstly, there is a group 
of 15 'core' liner routes that have been operational throughout the period 1959-71, and in 
some cases, for many years beforehand. As such, they are the lines with the largest trading 
tradition and expertise, and In most cases, though not al l , are the most successful tonnage 
carriers of cargo to the Gulf. This group consists of Hansa Line, Strick and Ellerman 
(now P. & O . ) , Lauro, Holland-Persian Gulf Line, Swedish East Asia/'WIL' Line, Novelle 
Companie Peninsula Havraise, Compagnie Maritime Beige, Yugolinja, Lombarda Li gore, 
Concordia, Hellenic, Maersk, Nippon Yusen Kaisha, 'K' Line, Mitsui Line, British India 
Steamship Line, and the 'tramp', or 'charter' vessels. Figure 5.1 illustrates contrasting 
patterns of tonnage carried by 'core' Shipping lines. Figure 5.1 (a) (Hansa Line) is 
characteristic of a line with a significant, though falling % volume of total trade. The very 
large actual and relative volumes of cargo carried by lines such as the Hansa, Strick and Lauro 
Lines in the early period 1959 - 60 are indicative of the reliance upon Europe for building 
materials and consumer durables in the Initial period of Kiwait's investment In urban and 
economic development projects. Links with the Indian sub-continent and Far East were 
limited in the period 1959 - 63. Mitsui (Graph 5.1 (b) ) is an example of Japanese 'core' 
shipping line which has grown rapidly in tonnage carried during the period under review, in 
contrast to the low dispersion, medium tonnage levels carried by the Campagnie Maritime 
Beige (Figure 5.1 (c) ) . 
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The second trend to be noticed is the increasing number of shipping lines calling 
at Kuwait. In fact, the network in 1971 is double that of 1959. One should 
distinguish here between shipping lines and shipping routes. A feature in this context 
is that the names of the shipping lines often appear several times in appendix Table 
' J ' . This phenomenon is a function of the fact that many of the shipping lines have 
diversified and increased the number of routes they operate in-and-out of the Gulf. 
For example, the Kuwait Shipping Comapny had by 1971, four routes to-and-from 
N.W. Europe, East-coast U .S .A . , Japan and Australia. Other lines with regular multiple 
routes by 1971 included Arya, P & O . , Nedlloyd, Hansa. In the following analysis 
of overtonnaging this distinction between a shipping line and its world routes is retained: 
each route is treated as a separate link in the network. In other words, in for example 
the case of the West German Line, Hansa, its routes between the East coast U.S.A.-Gulf 
and N.W. Europe-Gulf, are treated as two separate shipping company links. This 
essential practice of the separation of lines by world links is often a problem for the 
researcher. In this research, the author was obliged to familiarise himself in such a way 
that he could recognise the shipping line and route of a ship from the name of a vessel. 
None of the five ports studied in depth rendered a tabulation of statistics which differentiated 
between shipping line, name of vessel and route. The process of checking the name and 
route of every ship calling at a port in a given year is tedious, but the end result produces 
a more satisfactory situation whereby in any subsequent analysis the true pattern of the 
shipping network can be obtained rather than the present situation of either a lack of statistics 
differentiating between name and line, or an obscured position wherein statistics for 
individual lines are recorded (e.g. in Bahrain) but which do not distinguish between 
different routes. Unfortunately, mere recognitive ability is not enough, because month in 
and year out, shipping lines will switch their vessels to alternative routes both inside and 
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outside the Gulf network. Hence, the author had to consult Llo/ds Register of Shipping 
for the relevant months in question to cross-check that the named vessel in question was 
pl/ing on its 'usual* route, or not. The author would urge that in future, agencies 
keeping statistics of port movements will tabulate them in such a way to denote name of 
vessels, shipping line and route. The increase in administrative book-keeping would be 
offset by very real gains in statistical analysis with a spatial element. 
Thirdly, the Kuwaiti statistics reveal a real increase in the number of shipping lines 
and routes operating on the Far Eastern run, linking the Gulf with Pakistan, India, S . E . 
Asia, China and Japan. Apart from the main world shipping lines with operational links 
into the Gulf, appendix Table ' J * also illustrates the large number of small-scale (often 
tramp steamer) lines, often operating only 1 or 2 ships which appear on the network. The 
tendency for these small lines is to 'fade out* after a short period of time. 
Table 5.1 compares the major route networks between the Gulf and its external 
environment for the period 1959 - 71. Time is measured against the number of shipping 
lines operating on each of seven major routes (N.W. Europe, Medit. Europe, U.S.A. 
(East Coast), U.S.A. (West Coast), India-Pakistan, Far East and Australia-New Zealand). 
The table depicts the fundamental nature of a changed situation in this 13 year period. 
In 1959 the spread between the 'highest' and 'lowest' number of companies carrying on 
trade on any one route is low ( 7 - 3 range). By 1971, the situation has altered to a 
23 - 1 range. 
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T a b l e 5.1 
K U W A I T : T H E N U M B E R O F S H I P P I N G R O U T E S 
P E R MAJOR S H I P P I N G N E T W O R K , 1959 - 1971 
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The pattern over the last few years in the period is indicative of an increasing 
number of shipping lines using the Far Eastern and India-Pakistan networks. In a 
sense this 'duo' is really one linear network since many 'slow service' lines from 
Japan and S.E. Asia in fact call at Indian and Pakistani ports en route for the Gulf, 
picking up and discharging cargo in the process. Again, for some lines, it is statistically 
impossible to extract this distinction between the 2 routes ( i . e . Far Eastern and India-
Pakistan) by dividing the cargo between the 2 routes. Hence the India-Pakistan figures 
for the number of services using the route is a little inflated due to the 'doubling up* of 
shipping lines in which some ships originating and terminating in the Far East also pick 
up cargo for the Gulf at Indian and Pakistani ports. 
However, as a first approximation to the problem of overtonnaging, Table 5.1 
suggests that Far-Eastern and India-Pakistan routes might be most in need of rationalization 
by reducing the number of ships voyaging on these 2 routes. The question to be asked is 
whether this sharp increase in the number of shipping lines using the Far-Eastern and India-
Pakistan routes, especially since 1968, has been accompanied by a complimentary increase 
in the total tonnage of cargo carried on these two routes? The suspicion appears to be, 
that the number of ships, and volumes of tonnage, have not increased in parallel. 
The analysis is now broadened to consider the total network of shipping lines operating 
throughout the Persian Gulf . Table 5.2 lists the names of all the shipping lines which visited 
the Gulf ports during 1971. The lines are numbered 1 -88 : a means of identification that 
is retained for subsequent Regression analyses. Each line is denoted according to the 
route on which is operates: as such, some lines appear more than once by virtue of their 
operation of multiple routes. 
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Broadly, a group of base ports is common to each route network, with the 
addition of some optional ports used by particular shipping I Dies. Carriers on the 
North-West Europe - Persian Gulf route (e.g. P. & O. Hansa, Nedlloyd, CMB, Arya 
and Kuwait S.C.) pick up cargoes at London, Hamburg, Bremen, Rotterdam and Antwerp, 
as well as at subsidiary ports in the British Isles, Northern France and Scandinavia. On 
the Mediterranean-Gulf route (the carriers include NCHP, Yugolinja and DSR) the loading 
ports include Barcelona, Marseilles, Genoa, Leghorn, Naples, Venice, Trieste and 
Rijeka. Terminal ports of the East/South Coast U.S.A. - Gulf route (whose major 
carriers are Nedlloyd, Barber, Kuwait S.C., Concordia, Hansa, Hellenic and States 
Marine Isthmian) are Houston, New Orleans, Norfolk^ Baltimore, Philadelphia and 
New York, while on the West Coast U .S .A . -Gul f route (Nedlloyd and Hoegh Line) 
the major loading ports are Vancouver, San Francisco and Los Angeles. 
Although clearly divisible into two route networks by virtue of the pattern of base 
ports, the Far East - South and South East Asia - Gulf route, is in a spatial sense one 
linear network, with vessels loading at either the major Japanese ports (Moj i , Nagoya, Kobe 
Yokohama), or ports en route in China (Shanghai, Whampoa,) Taiwan (Keelung), South 
Korea (Pusan), Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand (Bangkok), India (Bombay) and Pakistan 
(Karachi). The major carriers on this 'route' include P. &.O., Maersk, Kuwait S.C., W i l , 
Mitsui, Yamashita Shinonin, Johnson, Pacific International, Showa, K, NYK, Hinode, 
Hong Kong Island, Seiwa, China National, China Ocean, and Evergreen. The intermediate 
ports on the Far East-Gulf run themselves from a distinctive group of base ports in South 
Asia (Calcutta, Madras, Bombay, Colombo, Karachi) served by 'local* shipping lines 
(e.g. Pan Islamic, S . C . I . , Damoder, National Shipping of Pakistan, Maldive and Malabar). 
Australia and New Zealand, by virtue of their geographical locations off the major Far 
East - Gulf route, form a separate route network whose carriers (P. & O . , Kuwait S.C., 
S . C . I . , Clausen, Sagar) link the ports of Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide, Freemantle, 
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Wellington and Auckland to the Gulf . 
The 'other* shipping routes denoted in Table 5.2 embrace the East European routes 
of the Polish Ocean Line (base ports - Gydnia and Gdansk) and the Soviet Black Sea 
Line (base port - Nicoliave), together with the South and East Africa route (major 
carriers - Royal Inter Ocean and Mercury) linking Durban, Beria, Maputo, 
Dar es Salaam and Mombasa with the Gulf . 
Internally, the rotation of ports-of-call between the Gulf of Oman and the Shatt al 
Arab varies between individual shipping lines. Not all lines call at all the major Gulf 
ports. Nor is the 'order-of-call ' of ports linear, or regular. Indeed, only the regular 
passenger-mail steamers linking Bombay with Basra (Damoder, B . I . and Pan Islamic Lines) 
run up and down the Gulf in a regular East-West, West-East pattern ( i . e . Muscat-Dubai-
Doha-Bahrain-Dammam-Kuwait-rttjrramshahr-Basra). As one might expect, there is a 
tendency for ports at the 'extremities' of the Gulf to act as initial or final ports of discharge 
(notwithstanding Muscat, outside the Gulf) to minimise the amount of 'doubling back' the 
Gulf( e.g. Dubai, Kuwait) whereas ports in the centre of the Gulf (Dammam, Bahrain, Doha) 
tend to be preferenoed as ports of discharge in the middle of the discharge rota. However, 
there is no clear pattern apart from the fact that Dubai is definitely favoured as a first 
port-of-call by virtue of its geographical position, and its large size of 15 berths, rendering 
it very rarely f u l l , at least in the early 1970's. 
A contributory factor to the level of congestion in the Gulf is a lack of co-ordination 
between shipping lines, Port authorities and shipping agencies, in adjusting the scheduled 
routing patterns of shipping lines to stave off the congestion which frequently occurred (in 
the 1970's)) at well known bottlenecks such as Dammam and Khorramshahr. It appears that a 
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'Central Traffic Control Mechanism' needs to be created in a location such as Muscat 
or Dubai, to maximise the traffic pattern in the Gulf , both to reduce congestion in 
ports, and to reduce the waiting time for vessels. Such a control system would require 
basic data from each port and each individual vessel as i t enters the Gulf . The vessel 
would need to supply information as to the tonnage and nature of cargo to be discharged, 
or loaded, at each Gulf port. The ports would furnish data as to current berthing 
capacity and 'turnaround times', together with certain variable types of data such as 
the 'urgency of the oargo', 'delay times', closures due to public holidays or labour 
disputes. Given proper co-ordination via an efficient telecommunications system, a 
specified rotation of Musoat-Kuwait-Abu Dhabi-Bahrain-Doha-Dubai-Dammam, which 
on the face of i t seems unrealistic because of the amount of deviation involved, might 
become an economic proposition for port and shipping line alike, given the high costs 
of congestion and delay in waiting for a berth. Unfortunately, ideal though this may 
appear, the problem, especially in the eyes of shipping agents and stevedores, begins at 
the loading ports, since cargo is loaded at the point of origin in a specific 'reverse order' 
designed to f i t a specified schedule of discharge ('first in , last out' principle). Given 
a sudden change of plan by a shipping controller, oargo stowed deep in a hold is often 
diff icult to unload in the instance of a changed order of discharge. A great deal of time, 
effort and money is wasted by shifting oargo to get at the oargo 'underneath'. 
5 J .3 Overtonnaging 
The theme of this section is that shipping in the Gulf is 'overtonnaged' and that 
decisions wi l l have to be made to rectify the situation. As yet, no statistical analysis 
has been presented to illustrate the spatial variation of the problem In the Gulf. A 
comparative study of five major seaports on the Arabian side of hSe Gulf is presented below 
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T A B L E 5.3 
Kuu-iit Shipping Flovs - Residuals from Regression Analysis 
l ine Actual Ton.iagc Expected Tonnage Residual Residual per Ship 
1. Mitsui 55633 29512 + 26121 * 669.77 
22. Lauro 140557 19953 + 20601* + 763.11 
10. KW. Europe 33337 17378 • 15959 + 661*.96 
2 . China National U*7l*l 1581*9 + 28892 + 1313.27 
51. Black Sea 1*31*73 11*791 + 28682 + 1365.81 
11*. Hansa Europe 22969 1581*9 + 7120 + 323.6k 
19. Arya Europe 18913 131*90 + 52*23 + 285.1*2 
6. P. & 0. Aust. 13557 131*90 + 67 3.53 
1*2. Evergreen 71291 B710 + 62 581 + 1*813.92 
33. Maersk 21*267 8710 + 15557 + 1196.69 
7. Yugo 10579 9772 + 807 • 57.61* 
11. Kuwait F E . 57975 6128 + 1*981*7 - 1*153.92 
9. Po l i sh 22236 8128 + 11*108 + 1175.67 
1*5. DSR 11003 8128 + 2875 * 239.58 
51*. Seiwa 971*2 8128 + 1611* + 131*. 50 
62. SCI 12393 6607 + 5786 + 578.60 
61. P a c i f i c I n t e r n a t i o n a l 11997 6607 - 5390 + 539.00 
1*6. W i l 17723 5B88 + 11835 + 1315.00 
67. HMEL 11*816 5888 + 8930 + 992.22 
32. Showa 6920 6607 + 313 + 31.30 
58. CMB 7993 5129 + 2861* + 358.00 
13. Pakistan National 251*2 231*1* • 198 - 1*9.50 
714. Sagar 31*27 1778 + 1659 + 553.00 
17. Malabar 3697 1122 * 2575 + 1287.50 
75. Rosewell 1588 513 + 1075 + 1075.00 
18. Arya Razie 589 513 + 76 + 76.00 
3. P. i 0. Bomb. 7560 521*81 - kk921 - 680.62 
26. P. & 0. Europe 28750 36308 - 7558 - 160.81 
314. Johnson 10628 25119 - 11*1*91 - 1*39.12 
16. NIK 11023 16596 - 5573 - 21*0.71* 
6b. Concordia 8517 16596 - 8079 - 351.26 
15- Hansa USA 9092 11*791 - 5699 - 271.38 
1*. P. & 0 FE 86S3 12589 - 3906 - 217.00 
8. Barber 8537 12882 - 21*28 - 131*.89 
35. HKI 9091 10965 - 1871* - 117.13 
36. Maldike 8766 10965 - 2199 - 137.1*1* 
59. Yamashita Shinonin 8032 10965 - 2933 - 183.31 
21. R . I . I . 5609 101*71 - 1*862 - 321*. 13 
73. Damader 8016 8128 - 112 9.33 
29. Ned USA W. 1*615 71*13 - 2598 - 236.18 
52. I r a n 1097 8128 - 7031 - 585.92 
31. K 31*88 6607 - 3119 - 311.90 
1*9. States Marine 2878 6607 - 3729 - 372.90 
21.. NCHP 1*632 5129 - 1*97 - 62.13 
66. Hel lenic 3695 5129 - 11*31* - 179.25 
53. S . E . A . 21*23 1*1*67 - 201*1* - 292.00 
20. I r a q i 3302 3715 - 1*13 - 68.83 
80. S C I . Aust. 1851 3715 - 1861; - 310.67 
76. Lombards La gure 697 3715 - 3018 - 503.00 
12. Kuwait USA 1193 23L1* - 1151 - 287.75 
5. P. {, 0. NZ. 1*93 231*1* - 1851 - 1*62.75 
7?. C o l l i s 958 1768 - 830 - 276.67 
77. S r i Lanka 1*55 513 58 50.00 
79. Arya I r a n 1*26 513 87 87.00 
23. Dubai National 300 513 - 21; - 213.00 
7P. Arya E^-ypt ? : i 513 - 25? - 292.00 
L 
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T A B L E 5 . 4 
Bahrair Shipping Flows - Residuals f j urn Re^-rei-sion Analys is 
Line Actual Tonnage Expected Tom.are Reeldua] hesidual per Ship 
2b. P. 4 0. Europe 43173 25704 -f 17469 + 371.68 
33- Maersk • 24440 18197 + 6243 + I 8 9 . I 8 
27- Ned Europe 23664 13804 + 986O + 394.40 
35- H . K . I . 8621 8511 + 110 + 6.86 
14. Hansa Europe 20605 6918 + 13687 + 1052.85 
6. P. 4 0. Aust. 7596 6457 + 1141 + 95.O8 
61. P a c i f i c Internat ional 9901 5886 + 4013 + 364.82 
22. Lauro 89IO 5370 + 3540 + 354.00 
7. Jugo 7572 5370 + 2202 + 220.20 
29- Ned USA W. 7397 5370 + 2027 + 202.70 
31. K 7864 4786 + 3076 + 342.00 
24. NCHP 6237 4266 + 1971 + 246.38 
20. I r a n 7450 3802 + 3648 + 521-14 
58. CMB 6253 380 2 + 2451 + 350.14 
53. S . E . A . 5161 3236 + 1925 + 320.83 
9- Po l i sh 3274 3236 i + 38 + 6.33 
40. Raj 5827 2692 i + 3135 + 627.00 
56. China Ocean 4747 2692 + 2055 + 411.00 
11. Kuwait PE 2396 2138 • 258 • 21.50 
47. Mai abar 2497 1622 + 875 + 291.67 
54. Seiwa 1968 1622 + 346 + 115-33 
66. Hel len ic 1660 1622 + 38 + 12.67 
2. China National 2228 1072 + 1156 + 578.00 
69- NTH 1704 537 + 1167 + H67.OO 
16. NYK 1091 537 + 554 + 554.00 
65 • Pan Islam 892 537 355 + 355-00 
57. Universe 556 537 + 19 + 19.00 
5- P. 4 0. NZ. 573 537 36 + 36.00 
13. Fakis tan National j 569 537 + 32 
• 
+ 32.00 
3- P. 4 0. Bombay I 
1 
6012 35481 29469 - 453-37 
! 34. Johnson [ 11537 J 13864 2267 - 87.19 
I £4 , 
1 
Concordia ' 8419 9550 1131 - 62.83 
1C. Kuwait Europe ' 8935 9120 185 10.88 
21. H . I . L . 1 6515 7943 1423 - 79-33 
59- y-s 3409 7586 - 4177 - 296.36 
62. S . C . I . 1871 j 8511 - 6640 ! - 415-00 
36. Haldive | 5040 J 5370 330 ; - 33.00 
46. Wil ! 3773 ; 5370 - 1597 - 159.70 
18. Arya Razie j 3397 J 5370 1973 ! - 197.30 
42. Evergreen 2734 i 5888 3154 ; - 286.73 
4. P. 4 0. FE 3084 6457 3373 i - 281.08 
28. Ned USA E . ; 3874 | 4786 - 912 j - 101.33 
15. Hans a USA 1562 ! 3240 - 1678 ! - 279-67 
17. j 
Arya USA ; 1710 j 2692 - 982 j - 196.40 
12. Kuwait USA 1781 ; 2138 357 - 89.25 
49. States Marine ' 1372 ! 2138 - 766 ! - 191.50 
70. Colden 1560 ! 1622 62 ! - 1 5 - 5 ° 
1. Mltaui 1530 j 1622 92 j - 30.67 
19. Arya Europe 969 16?2 - 653 : - 217-67 
72. C c l l i s 958 16?2 - 664 - 221-33 
52. Iran 657 16?? 965 j - 321-67 
68. Pakistani Shipping 921 1202 281 : - 140.50 ' 
71. vte.imtrar.s. 497 ;-37 40 40.00 
67-
1 
151 537 jS6 ' - 386.00 
1 
Ho v t" ' ' . 1 0 1 t ^' j - I ' ^ l i /or'. ( >n to-i , l ^ , 1. , I ' . x r u uJn ' . 
/ 1 U 
T A B L E 5.5 
Dch-, Shipping Flows - R e s i d u i l s from Regression Analysis 
Li ne Actual Tonnage Expected Tcr.r.are hecidMnl I Res. dual 1 per Shic 
! 26. F . i 0. Europe 31534 19493 + 12036 + 308.62 
1 
! 
- a 0. Far East 32478 12589 + 19889 + 864.74 
i 
i I C . i | 
Kuwait Europe 15685 10715 + 4970 + 261.58 
1 22. 
I 
Lauro 19&71 9120 + 10551 + 659.44 
1 Ked Europe 206CO 9120 + 11480 + 717.50 
i 
hansa Europe 18137 8710 + 9427 + 628.47 
1 
I ^ 
Yugo 8559 6607 + 1952 + 177.45 
! 6 ] . 
j 
F a c i f i c Internat ional 6855 6607 + 248 + 22.55 
1 54. 
I 
Se; ria 9479 5495 + 4232 + 470.2? 
! 60. Kinode 20012 4467 + 15545 + 2220.71 
9- Pol i sh 5284 5012 + 272 + 30.22 
24. h . C . H . P . 8298 3388 + 4910 + 982.00 
«. KYK 9110 2754 + 6356 + 1589.00 
31. K 4596 2138 + 2456 + 619.33 
55. v_e 1279 834 + 4^5 + 445-00 
82. } . S . Kisen 980 834 + 146 + 146.00 
P. i 0. Eon/bay 4486 20417 - 15929 398.23 
65- c a r I s l a n i c 4686 I6982 - 12296 - 384.25 
6. P. & 0. Aust. 7390 8318 928 66.29 
£. Earner 5539 6607 - 1068 97.09 
1=, r.arsa USA 4334 708O - 2746 249-64 
17- A-, a USA 4048 70&0 - 3032 - 252-67 
20. I r a q i 3466 3981 - 515 85-83 
21. R . I . L . 2411 3981 - 1570 261.66 
26. Leo. USA E . 2019 3388 - 1369 273-80 
73. Darnader 1017 3981 - 2964 494.OO 
81. Kercury 1178 2754 - 1576 - 394-00 
76 Lcnoaraa Ligure 1231 2138 - 907 - 302.33 
83. ( 'jhait Aust . 1211 1906 - 695 - 347.50 
62. S C . I . 1122 1906 - 784 392-00 
60. S.C 1 Aust 683 1906 - 1223 6 I I . 5 0 
11. furfait FE 517 834 - 317 3i7-00 
CS : Q-tar l .a'iona] Navigation arid Transport Co. L t d . , Doha. 
T A B L E 5.6 
Bubai Shipping Flows - Reciduals from Regrets ion Analysis 
1 Li ne Actual '] oarage Expected lorn afe Reeiaun! Residual per Ship 
1 
P. & 0 . Europe 19474 19055 419 + 11.97 
! 1C. t uk a 1 Europe 19094 14454 + 464c + 178 .46 
1 M 1 f & 0 . FE 13530 13183 + 347 + 15.09 
Nea Ear ope 22150 11482 + 10666 + 533-40 
-1 i- • u a i E . I Europe 13365 10000 + 3365 • 197.94 
Hi tsui 9991 9988 + 3 + 0.18 
H . K . I . 13802 8511 + 5291 + 377-93 
4 0. Aust. 11585 7763 + 3822 + 294.OO 
P - c i - a c Internat ional 16782 7244 + 9538 + 794 . 83 
Kuwait FE 16977 660? + 10370 + 942.73 
36. Maldiv e 7527 7244 + 283 + 23.56 
7- Jugo 7260 7244 + 16 + 1.33 
AO. Raj 6101 5495 + 606 + 67.33 
46. Wil 5646 5495 + 151 + 16.77 
2 2 . Lauro 5922 5012 + 9 1 0 + 113.75 
3 1 . K 5558 5012 + 5 4 6 + 68.25 
Zi. I/ut=ii National 9429 3891 + 5 5 3 8 + 923 . 00 
16. NiK 4271 2692 + 1579 + 394-75 
So • China Ocean 2619 2692 + 127 + 31-75 
i ; . r ^ i s t a n National 12601 2089 + 10512 + 3504.OO 
3,-. Sc;-mia 10930 2089 + 8 8 4 1 + 2947 . 00 
C v i n a National 9250 2089 7 1 6 1 + 2387.OO 
6c! hi node 5345 2089 * 3256 + 1065.33 
5 J . « Black Sea 3149 2089 + 1060 + 353-33 
29. t.ed USA W. 2579 2089 + 4 9 0 + 163 . 33 
4^- Evergreen 2223 2089 131 + 43 .66 
47- Valab^r 7527 1445 + 6 0 8 2 + 3041 .OO 
F . k 0 . NZ. 2391 1445 946 + 473 -00 
6 v. C c l l m Navigation 1618 776 + 842 + 842.OO 
L . j ai j a 1450 776 + 674 + 674.OO 
/ _/ LSou-t nern 1398 776 + 6 2 2 + 622.00 
c 7 Universe 844 776 68 + 68 .00 
•J T F . & 0 . Bombay 7701 34581 - 26880 - 4 0 1 . 1 9 
3-- Johrson 10385 13183 - 2798 - 1 2 1 . 6 5 « a . E E USA 8022 12023 - 4 0 0 1 - 190 . 52 
6 2 . S . C . I . 4782 13490 - 8708 - 362 . 83 2 1 . R . I . L . 5922 10715 - 4793 - 266 . 28 
33. Paersk 5617 8913 - 3296 - 219-73 
9- Pol i sh 7135 7244 - 109 9.06 
25« SKEL 5877 6166 - 289 28.90 
&t>. DSR 5216 6166 - 9 5 0 - 95.OO 
• l.'ChP 4074 5495 - 1 4 2 1 - 157.69 6. Bai ber 2310 5495 - 3185 - 353.89 2 - . Ned LISA E . 3073 5012 - 1939 - 2 4 2 . 3 8 11. fr.va R az J e 2107 4467 - 2360 - 337 -H 
i 2C. Iraq i 4109 4467 - 358 - 51-14 
5?. Y-S 2149 3891 - 1742 - 2 9 0 . 3 3 
I S - Arya Europe 1964 2692 - 728 - 180 . 00 
• 5<"- Seiwa 1948 2089 - 1 4 1 47.OO 1 2 . Kuwait USA 1717 2O89 - 3 7 2 - 124.00 
53- S . E . A . 1228 2089 - 861 - 287.OO 5C. American Eastern 720 2089 - 1 3 6 9 - 463.OO 
5 2 . Iran 1414 1445 - 3 1 - 15.50 
55- Guar Guan 1348 1445 - 97 - 48.50 
32- Showa 1155 1445 - 290 - 145.OO 49. States Marine 376 1445 - I O 6 9 - 534 . 50 
j 5 . Pj l s h i p 668 ! 776 - 108 - 108 . 00 
n . Arva USA 636 i 776 - 140 - 140 . 00 
37. US/PH 62C 776 - 156 - I56 .OO 
46. Qatar 530 776 - 246 - 246 . 00 3 0 . E i c a 500 ! 776 - 276 - 276.00 Soecea 205 776 - 5 7 1 - 571 . 00 
1 5 8 - CMi 179 776 - 597 - 597 -00 ; 64. Concordia 85 \ 776 691 - 691.OO 
Source . Cray, MacKenzie ard Co. L t d . , Duia i . 
T A B L E 5.7 
Dirnnan S t e p p i n g Flows - Residuaie from hegreDsioi; Analys is 
Li ne f Actual Torr C^L- E>pectt?a T oi 'lore Residupj Rt s i dual prr Ship 
1. K i t s u i 56431 25119 - 3)31? + 1204.31 
14. Hansa Europe 40479 20893 + 19586 + 1030.84 
27. Ned Europe 34179 21878 + 96OI + 480.05 
10. Kuwait Europe 29448 2187s + 7570 + 378.50 
46. Wil 31957 23442 + 8515 + 387.05 
31. K 25192 17783 + 7409 + 463.06 
34. Johnson 23562 16982 + 6600 + 440.00 
35- H . K . I . 19159 15849 + 3310 + 236.43 
51- Black Sea 23280 15849 + 7433 + 530.93 
60. Hinode 35342 13804 + 21538 + 1794-83 
29. Ned USA W. 18919 11749 + 7170 + 717.00 
20. I r a q i 14895 10471 + 4424 + 4 9 L 5 6 
59- Y-S 20367 8511 + II856 + 1693.71 
24. NCHP 18066 7244 + 10822 • + 1803.67 
58. CMB 23510 6166 + 17344 1 + 3468.80 
22. Lauro 4045 3891 + 154 j + 51-33 
12. Kuwait USA 3968 3891 + 107 1 + 35-67 
86. Tok Yok 8027 2692 + 5335 1 + 2667.50 
72- C o l l i s 6087 2692 - 3395 I + I697.50 
56. China Ocean 3178 2692 + 486 J + 243-00 
65. Miy as hi 5753 1479 + 4274 1 + 4274.00 
64. Nippon 4555 1479 + 3076 + 3076.00 
25. SMEL 3358 1479 - 1879 ! + 1879.00 
26. P. 4 0. Europe 28807 31623 - 2816 j - 93.87 
36. Mai dine 26565 27542 - 977 l - 37.58 
4- P. 4 0. FE 27718 26915 + 803 I + 32.12 
64. Concordia 21378 24547 - 316° - 137.78 
Jugo 15704 17763 - 2079 - 129.94 
15- Hansa USA 14047 14791 - 774 1 - 59.54 
66. he l l en ic 12561 15849 - 3288 - 234.36 
16. N/K 1207 7 14791 - 2714 i - 167.23 
0 
y ' 
Pol ish 10453 14791 - 4338 - 333-69 
33- MaersK 12474 14791 - 23)7 - 178.23 
28. Led USA E . 11935 12682 - 947 - 86.09 
83- Arya FE 6937 9333 - 2396 - 299-50 
19- Arya E . 6099 8511 - 2412 - 344-57 
42- Evergreen 5389 8511 - 3122 - 446.OO 
5- P. 4 0. NZ. 4499 9333 j - 4834 - 604 - 25 
81. Mercury 5933 8511 j - 2578 - 368.29 
8. Barber 4499 7244 i - 2745 - 457-50 
6. P. 4 0. Aust. 6077 7244 - I I 6 7 - 194.50 
32. Showa 4902 7244 | - 2342 - 390.33 
62. S . C . I . 3785 7244 1 - 3459 - 576.50 
65. Pan Islam 2610 7244 - 4634 - 772.33 
16. Arya Razie 1483 8511 | - 7028 - 1004.00 
1 ] . Kuwait F E ' 4759 5012 - 253 - 63 .25 
17. Arya USA 4124 5012 - 886 - 222.00 
45. DSR 3901 5012 - 1111 - 277.75 
53. S . E . A . 2993 5012 - 2C19 - 504.75 
44- Southern 1104 j 5012 1 - 390S - 977.00 
i 3 - PrtVistar National 1851 1 3P91 i - 2040 - 660.on 
88. KJwait Au=,t. 1172 2691 | - 1520 - 76O.OO 
87. Elko 3?4 1479 ! - ; - 1155.00 
39- £2T • ! m c 5645 cice 64. 20 
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Kuwait, Dubai, Bahrain, Doha and Dammam. Data is presented in Tables 5.3 - 5.7 
represents the total number of vessels calling at each port, distinguished by the volume 
of ships and tonnage discharged per shipping route. The time period of this analysis 
relates, with the exception of Dammam, to January Ist - December 31st, 1971. The 
author was unable to obtain data for Damrrnm for the same period, but the data obtained, 
although not strictly comparable in terms of time period (it relates to the period 1.7.72 -
30.6.73) is nonetheless identical in format and useful as a general comparison. 
The purpose of this analysis was to test the hypothesis that the Gulf ports suffer from 
'overtonnaging' as a contributory factor to the phenomenon of port congestion. Further, 
it tests the hypothesis suggested in Section 5.1.2 that Far Eastern, Indian and Pakistani 
Shipping Lines are the major candidates for rationalization. The particular relationship 
to be examined was the ratio between the number of vessels calling at a port during a 
one year time period, and the total tonnage of general cargo discharged during that same 
time period.The quantitative technique adopted was the standard Regression Analysis. The 
decision as to which of the two variables to make 'dependent' or 'independent' was diff icult 
since the relationship between the actual number of vessels and actual tonnage discharged 
is a two-way process. To have made 'vessels' the dependent variable would have meant 
that one would be dealing with resultant residuals denoting vessels as fractions, or decimals 
- an unsatisfactory situation. Therefore it was decided to make the number of vessels the 
'independent variables' (the ' X ' axis), and the tonnages discharged the 'dependent variables 
(the ' Y ' axis). Thus structured, the aim of the Regression Analysis was to determine through 
analysis of 'residuals' whether each shipping line was discharging 'more' or 'less' tonnage 
of cargo than would be expected given the number of vessel arrivals. Thus achieved, the 
intention was to highlight those lines with discharge rates less than would be expected 
2m 
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(t.e a situation in which in a given time period a relatively large number of vessels 
on a particular route call at a port and discharge a correspondingly low level of tonnage 
- overtonnaging), at which point i t is possible to measure the specific nature of the problem. 
Results of Regression Analysis 
The results of the regression analysis for each of the five ports under study are 
illustrated both In graphical and tabular form in Figures 5.2 - 5.6 and Tables 5.3 - 5.7 
respectively. After calculation of the Regression equations, residuals (of the level of tonnage 
discharged per shipping route) were calculated for each case. The resultant Regression 
2 
equations, correlation coefficients and values of r , are tabulated below: 
Regression Equations 
Kuwait Log Y = 2.71 + 1.11 Log X 
Bahrain Log Y = 2.73 + 1.00 Log X 
Doha Log Y = 2.93 + 0.87 Log X 
Dubai Log Y = 2.89 + 0.90 Log X 
Dammam Log Y = 3.17 + 0.90 Log X 
r (Correlation coefficient) r {% of explained variance) 
Kuwait 0.9506 90 
Bahrain 0.9120 83 
Doha 0.9260 86 
Dubai 0.8819 78 
Dammam 0.9395 88 
The regression equations, correlation coefficients and r values are similar. The lower 
2 
level r for Dubai is possibly explained by the significant number of large tonnages 
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discharged at that port in 1971, particularly of building materials for both industrial, 
infrastructure and urban development, which distorts the pattern . The performance of 
the shipping lines is now analysed separately, before comparative conclusions are drawn 
about the nature of overtonnaging. 
Kuwait 
The Kuwaitis have themselves been successful in operating as carriers of cargo to 
the Gulf , particularly on the Far Eastern and European routes. The Kuwait Shipping 
Company has the second highest positive residual ( i . e . a greater tonnage carried per 
shipping route than might be expected given the number of ships operating on that route) 
of all the lines calling at Kuwait. A feature of positive Kuwaiti residuals is the prominence 
of certain non-conference lines - Evergreen, Black Sea, China National Chartering 
Corporation, Lauro and Polish Ocean Line, wrich chalk up high residuals per vessel by 
virtue of the large tonnages, chiefly building materials, they convey to Kuwait. Hansa 
and HMEL, and Mitsui, Wil and Maersk Companies, are the most successful lines 
operating on the major N . W . European and Far Eastern routes respectively. 
On the deficit side, the negative residuals ( i . e . those routes depositing a smaller 
tonnage than might be expected for a given frequency of calls and which are therefore 
possible targets for rationalization) are dominated by the 'British India' passenger-general 
cargo link between Bombay, Karachi, and the Gulf ports (-44921), and the disappointing 
performance of the Johnson Line (=14991) on the Far Eastern run. A feature of port 
congestion is the occupancy of berths by these passenger ships on the Bombay-Gulf run, 
which, although embarking and disembarking passengers, and loading and unloading small 
amounts of cargo, in a short space of time, nonetheless occupied 'scarce' berths until 
the demise of the service in the mid- 1970's. N . Y . K . , the ' K ' Line, and P.& O . on the 
221 
Far East route, Concordia, Hansa and States Marine Isthmian on the U.S.A. (East Coast) 
route, P. & O . and the Iran Line on the N . W . European route, Lombarda Ligure 
(Mediterranean) and R. I .L . (East Africa) have high negative residuals (see Table 5.3). 
Bahrain 
Bahrain has close economic and political links with Europe, particularly with the 
U . K . , together with an important transhipment trade of Far Eastern products (principally 
Chinese and Taiwanese) between Manama and Al Khobar/ Dammam in Saudi Arabia 
(see Chapter 4) . In such circumstances, it is not surprising to find high positive residuals 
among European and Far Eastern carriers. Foremost among these carriers are P. & O. (+17469), 
Hansa (+13687) and Nedlloyd (+9860) on the N . W . European route, and Maersk, Pacific 
International and 'K* on the Far Eastern route. In passing, one should mention that the 
success, or otherwise, of securing cargo on a particular Gulf sea route is quite often a 
function of the energy expended by an individual agent representing a shipping line in 
securing cargoes at each Gulf port. 
A major negative residual is again a characteristic Bombay-Gulf passenger run. The 
poor performance of the Shipping Corporation of India, running on the same route, renders 
the Bahrain-India run singularly overtonnaged (see Table 5.4). 
Doha 
Doha is the smallest port of the five studied, and is served by the fewest number 
of Lines, due to the smaller size of the state (circa 130,000 in 1971) and the lack of any 
significant re-export trades except the road-based trade with Saudi Arabia. Like Bahrain, 
its political and economic links were traditionally with Britain, until independence in 1971 f 
The major carriers are mostly on the European (P. & O . +12036; Nedlloyd +11480; Hansa +9427; 
Kuwait S.C. +4970) or Japanese runs (Hinode +15545; P. & O. +19889; and NYK +6356), 
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together with the two successful "Mediterranean" Europe operators, N . C . H . P . and Lauro. 
The negative residuals isolate the recurring feature of the Bombay-Gulf service, whose 
operators are rivalled in the level of overtonnaging by the competing Pan Islamic Line 
which operates on the same route when its ships are not employed on the Hajj (Pilgrim) 
trade to Jeddah (bound for Mecca) on the Red Sea. 
Dubai 
Dubai, the largest port, is served by the greatest number of lines, though many call 
infrequently, discharging (by weight) chiefly building materials. Pacific International 
(+9538), and K.S.C. (+10370) are strong Far Eastern carriers, complimented by the success 
of Nedlloyd on the N . W . European run (+10668). The usual high negative residuals in 
the Bombay-Gulf run (-26880) is at least partly counterbalanced by the Pakistan National 
Line (+10512) on the same route). Unfortunately, S .C. I , is again disappointing, (-8708) 
on this particular channel of trade. 
Dammam 
Although not strictly comparable in time scale, Dammam's results are interesting, 
because this is the first of the ports where the passenger liners do not cal l , and therefore 
the negative residuals are spread more widely through the various companies. In this 
regard no clear candidate emerges as a major overtonnaged route, but i t is noticeable that 
al l except two of the U.S.A. - Gulf shipping companies have negative residuals (Concordia 
-3165; Hansa-774; Hellenic-3288; Nedlloyd-947; Barber-2745; Arya -888). The 
major positive residuals accrue to Hansa, C . M . B . (mostly cargoes of steel products) and 
Nedlloyd on the N . W . Europe run, N . C . H . P . on the Mediterranean run, and Mitsui 
(+31312), Hinode (+21538) and Yamashlta Shinonin on the Far East-Gulf route. 
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T o r i Coj c e n t r a l ! ( lo r ra / ; e hecinualc pe- , 'pt : Line Tal>}es 5 . I O - 5 . I 4 ) 
w.Ill n w " -
Li} e Nu'nt'or * I » h a 
r ••• 
Initial ' Dv.'i iin (l r l i ! ' e ~ ut* . 'it 5 c>" in-i 1 T">i t c ) 
1 
1 
I * 660.7? _ 30.67 _ + 0.18 4 1201.31 4 4bO.&9 
2 i + 1613.27 4 578.00 - 4 2387.00 - j + 1426.09 3 1 _ 680.62 453-37 - 393-23 - 401.19 - 1 483.35 4 1 _ 2:7.00 281.05 4 864.74 4- 15.09 - 32.12 | 413-67 
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23 - 213.00 - - 4 923.00 - -24 - 62.13 4 246.38 4 982.00 - 157.89 4 1803.67 j + 237.60 25 - - - - 28.9c 4 1879.00 1 -26 - 160.81 , 4- 371-68 + 308.62 4 11.97 _ 93.87 ! 87.51 27 - + 394-40 + 717-50 + 503.40 4&C.05 1 + 531.33 26 - - 101.33 - 273-80 - 242.38 - 86.09 - 175-90 29 - 236.18 , + 202.70 - + 163.33 4 717.00 - 211.71 30 1 - - - 276.00 - -31 - 311.90 + 342.00 s 4 ei9 .33 4 68.25 4 463.06 ; + 276.14 32 + 31-30 _ | - - 145.00 - 39C33 1 ~" 188.87 33 + 1196.69 ' + 169.18 - - 219-73 - 178.23 1 246.97 34 - 439-12 - 87.15 - - 121.65 + 440.00 - 51-99 35 - 117.13 + 6.86 - 4 377-93 4 236.43 + 126.02 36 - 137.44 - 33-00 ; - 4 23-58 - 37.58 - 44.86 37 - : - - 156.00 - -
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49 372.90 - 191.50 < - 534.50 - - 366.30 50 - - - - 463.00 j - -51 + 1365.811 i - 353-33' + 530.93 + 750.02 52 - 585.92 ' - 321.67 ' - - 15.50; - - 307.69 53 - 292.0c + 320.83 - - 267.00 1 - 504.75 - 190.73 54 4- 134-50 + 115.33 + 470.22 , - 47.00; - + 166.26 55 ! - - 48.50 1 - -56 - + 411.00 - + 31-75 ' 4- 243.00 4- 228.58 57 - + 19.00 - + 68.00, - _ 58 4 3S8.OO + 350.14 - - 597-00 + 3466.80 + 894.99 
59 183.31 - 298.36 + 445.00 - 290.33, 4 1693.71 + 273.40 60 - - 4 2220.71 + 1035.33 + 1794.83 4 1700.29 61 4- 539-00 , + 364.82 , + 22.55 + 794-83! - + 430.30 62 + 578.60 - 415.00 ' - 392.00 - 362.83; - 576.50 - 233.54 63 - - - + 842.00; - -64 - 351.26 - 62.83 - - 691.00; - 137-78 - 310.71 65 - + 355-00 - 384.25 - 772.33 - 267.19 66 179.25 + 12.67 1 l - - 234-86 - 133.81 67 4 992.22 - 386.00; - - -68 - - 140.50 - - - -69 - + 1167.001 1 - - -70 - 15.50 ' - - -71 - - 40.00 • - j - -72 - 276.67 - 221.33, - 1 4 1697.50 -73 - 9-33 - - 494.00' i 1 - -74 + 553.00 _ 1 l - -75 + 1075.00 — 1 : 1 
! - -/6 - 503.OC - - 302.33 1 - -77 - 58.00 ' - - ' - -78 - 292.00 - - 1 _ -
79 - 87.00 ' - - ! - -60 - 310.67 : - - 611.50 i - -61 - - - 394.00 _ - 368.29 -82 - 4 I46.OC - _ -83 - - - - - 29;.50 -84 - - - - + 307c0& -e, - - - - + 4,74.00 -86 - - _ - 4 2067.50 -87 - - - - - :155.00 -8- - - - 347-50 - - 7oc/>o -
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Conclusions: Company Performonce 
Broadly, the comparative performance of shipping lines with referen ce to 'ship-
tonnage ratios' varies between ports. At the outset, one must stress that this analysis 
is only partial in terms of a Gulf 'overview' and care must be taken not to draw conclusions 
which relate to those ports not specifically analysed. The data is limited, and hence 
so are the conclusions. There is no analysis of the major Iranian ports of Khorramshahr, 
Bandar Shahpour, Bush ire and Bandar Abbas, nor of Basra or Abu Dhabi. Shipping lines 
which fare poorly in tonnage performance at the five ports analysed, may, in fact, fare 
better at the other ports. Hence conclusions may only properly be made with reference 
to these five ports, though certain general points may also be considered. 
Table 5.8 is a comparative tabulation of the performance of each of the 88 shipping 
routes which focus on the group of five ports. Some shipping lines call at all five ports, 
some at only one. In the light of this fact i t is only fair to judge a Line i f i t calls at, 
at least three of the ports studied. Table 5.8 isolates the theme of 'port concentration' 
in the sense of denoting the apparent success of a shipping line in concentrating its 
trade at one, or a limited number of ports in the Gulf . Table 5.8 has been annotated 
to illustrate 'concentration' by indicating the dominant port ( i , e . largest positive) 
residual for every line calling at three, or more, Gulf ports. The groupings are illustrated 
below : -
Doha 
P. & O . (Bombay-Gulf) Nedlloyd (E) 
P. & O . (FE) NO (FE) 





Mitsui (FE) Nedlloyd (USA) East 
Kuwait S.C. (USA) East Johnson (FE) 
Hansa (USA) East CMB (E) 
S.M.E.L. (E) Yamashita (FE) 
Nedlloyd (USA) West Collis (I) 
Dubai 
China National (FE) 
P. & O. N . Z . (A) 
P. & O . Aust. (A) 
Pakistan National (I) 
Arya 
Malabar 






Iron Line (E) 
Pacific International (FE) 
Bahrain 
Jugolinja (M) States Marine (USA) East Hellenic (USA) East 
Hansa (E) S.E.A. (I) 
Iraqi (E) China Ocean (FE) 
R . I .L . (O) Concordia (USA) East 
P. & O. (E) Pan Islamic (I) 
Kuwait 
Kuwait S.C. (E) Lauro (M) Wil (FE) 
Kuwait S.C. (FE) Showa (FE) Black Sea (0) 
Polish Ocean (O) Maersk (FE) Seiwa (FE) 
Arya (E) Evergreen (FE) S .C.I . (0 
Arya (O) DSR (M) 
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KEY: 
USA.E - U.S.A. East/South Coast 
USA.W - U.S.A. West Coast 
E - N . W . Europe 
M - Medit. Europe 
A -Australasia 
FE - Far East 
I - India-Pakistan 
O - Other 
An extension of this analysis is the calculation of the 'mean residual* of each Line 
(positive or negative) for all Lines calling at three or more ports. The following table 
arranges into rank order those Lines displaying the highest positive residual 'means' -
i . e . undertonnaged Lines. 
Rank Order - Top TO 
1. Hinode (FE) 
2. Malabar (FE) 
3. China National (FE)* 
4 . Evergreen (FE)* 
5. Kuwait S.C. (FE) 
6. CMB (E) 
7. Black Sea (O)* 
8. Pakistan National (E) 
9. Hansa (E) 
10. Nedlloyd (E) 
* = Non-Conference 
(See Table 5.8) 
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It Is significant to note that in this list the 'weight' of cargo normally carried 
portrays a significant bias. The top eight Lines have a tendency to carry bulky 
cargoes such as building materials (timber, steel or foodstuffs (rice). Only Nedlloyd 
and Hansa have broader-based general cargoes. 
Finally, the following table sets out those lines (calling at three or more ports) 
with negative residuals ( i . e . with a tendency to overtonnage). 
Rank Order 
1. P/O/Damodor (0 - 483.55 
2. States Marine (US) - 366.30 
3. Arya (O) - 365.61 
4 . Concordia (US) - 310.71 
5. Iran Line (US) - 307.69 
6. Pan Islamic (!) - 267.19 
7. Barber (US) - 26o.84 
8. S .C . I . (0 - 233.54 
9. R . I .L . (O) - 232.85 
10. Nedlloyd USA (W) (US) - 211.71 
11 . Hansa (US) - 210.15 
12. Arya (US) - 202.76 
13. S.E.A. a.) - 190.73 
14. Showa (FE) - 188.87 
15. Nedlloyd U.S.A. (E) (US) - 175.90 
16. K.S .C. (US) - 170.14 
17. Hellenic (US) - 133.81 
18. Arya (E) - 114.20 
19. P.O. NZ (A) - 95.75 
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20. Johnson (FE) - 51.99 
2 1 . Maldive (FE) - 44.86 
22. DSR (M) - 44.39 (see Table 5.8) 
Conclusions with Reference to Decision Making 
Again, i t should be stressed that those lines identified above as being susceptible 
to overtonnaging, have done so only in a partial study of the Gulf based on the statistics 
of a one year sample. One is on safer ground to identify the problem rather than to point 
the finger at certain lines. The dilemma is that in a 'Third World' situation where data 
is limited or unavailable, whether or not to analyse the data available, or to have no 
analysis of a problem is the choice. Clearly, the former option should be taken. Given 
these limitations, i t is possible, however, to identify a number of points in connection 
with the phenomenon of overtonnaging. 
Two main patterns emerge from the analysis. Firstly, there is a contrast between the 
'irregular', chartered vessels (e.g. those of China National and Evergreen Lines) which 
tend to dispatch a few, fully-laden vessels to the Gulf, and a number of 'regular' liners 
(e.g. Barber, Concordia), who perhaps because of intense competition for cargoes on 
certain routes seem unable to sustain high levels of cargo (tonnages) for each trip at each 
port. Secondly, the low tonnage performance of the P. & O. and Pan Islamic passenger 
services to the Gulf makes them a drain on berthing space in ports where space is at a 
premium (e.g. Bahrain). 
In Tables 5.9 and 5.10 the results of the analysis of overtonnaging are carried a stage 
further in order to relate the results to the processes of decision-making. The residual for 
each Line was allocated to its operational route and aggregated. Table 5.9 tabulates 
the aggregated results, by routes, for each of the five ports examined - Kuwait, Bahrain, 
Dubai, Dammam and Dohaf The comparative results are consistently favourable in terms of 
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TABLE 5.9 : Tonnage Residuals per Shipping Route 
(Aggregate of residuals per Shipping Line operating 
on each route) 
Route Kuwait Bahrain Dubai Dammam Doha 
N.W. Europe + 2&9h + kh926 + 17089 + 55176 + 37398 
Medit. Europe + 20771 + 7713 + 7396 + 7ii65 + 16506 
Far East +170630 + 5195 + 361+16 + 90215 + 1J9002 
India/Pakis tan - U219U - U2912 - 20606 - 97 3h - 31973 
USA-East/South Coast - - 5828 - 10775 - 15612 - 8215 
USA-West Coast - 2598 + 2027 + h90 + 7170 N i l 
Australasia - 1989 + 1177 + U768 - 7580 - 28U6 
Other + 37625 - 1973 - 1018 - 6511 - 287U 
TABLE 5.10 : Aggregate Tonnage Residuals per Shipping Route 
(Aggregate of residuals per Shipping Line operating 
on each route) 
Route 
N.W. Europe + 179,883 
Medit. Europe + 59,851 
Far East + 351,1*58 
India/Pakis tan - Hi7,lil9 
USA-East/South Coast - 61,875 
USA-West Coast + 7,089 
Australasia - 6,1*70 
Others + 25,2h9 
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performance ( i . e . positive residuals) for the N . W . European, Mediterranean, and Far 
Eastern routes. A mixed trend (both positive and negative residuals) is a feature of 
the Australasian, West Coast U .S .A . , and 'Other* routes, while both the East Coast 
U.S.A. and Indian - Pakistani routes show consistent evidence of route overtonnaging, 
with the exception of 'residuals per vessel' on the India/Pakistan route with reference 
to the ports of Bahrain and Dubai. 
Finally, these figures are again collated in Table 5.10 which aggregates the scores 
for each of the five ports studied. The evidence of overtonnaging at least as far as 
the aggregate results for these five ports is concerned, shows overtonnaging to be most 
serious on the East Coast U.S.A. , India/Pakistan and Australasia routes (with total 
aggregate residuals of -61,875; -147419, and -6470 respectively. 
In conclusion, having analysed the results of the performance of both individual 
shipping Iinesandindividual shipping routes, it appears that development control must 
subsequently take the form of co-ordinating decision-making at two levels: linking 
the operators of seaports within the Gulf , and the conferences without. This analysis 
presents results for one year only; a similar analysis needs to be repeated by port 
authorities and shipping conferences through succeeding years in order to establish 
significant trends. As far as shipping conferences are concerned, the results above 
indicate that in particular those conferences operating on the East Coast U.S.A. and 
India-Pakistani routes, namely the'8900' Conference, and Karachi/Indian/Straits/ 
Japanese Conferences respectively, might consider rationalizing their shipping services 
to the Gulf in order both to reduce port congestion and reduce competition within their 
own conference structures. 
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5.2 THE RESPONSE BY SHIPPING CONFERENCES TO PORT CONGESTION 
5.2.1 CONFERENCE STRUCTURES 
Shipping conferences are organizations "under which freight rates, schedules and 
other matters are agreed on between ship carriers in respect of particular routes" 
(Couper, 1972 p. 15). Each conference is made up of a group of shippers operating on 
a route connecting a group of ports at the origin with a group of ports at the destination. 
In the context of the Persian Gulf , the conferences define the major trading systems that 
are linked with the Gulf Maritime Trading System. There are five ma}or trading systems 
connecting major industrial zones of the World with the Gulf . Figure 5.7 illustrates 
the structural relationship between shipping conference organization and inter-system 
maritime routes to the Gulf . The major trading systems are the American (split between 
east and west coast maritime links), the European (split between the N . W . European and 
Mediterranean links), and the Japanese. Much of the 'developing world' serves as a 
zone of intervening opportunity between the Gulf and the major industrial regions. To 
the west and south of the Gulf lies the African 'zone', to the east the Asian 'zone* 
subdivided into Far Eastern (China) south-east Asian (including Indonesia) and South Asian 
zones. The re-opening of the Suez Canal in June 1975 had the effect of detaching the 
south, east and west Africa 'zone', leaving North Africa as a zone of intervening opportunity 
along the major European and East U.S.A. links with the Gulf . The thick lines (in Figure 
5.7) linking the major industrial regions with the gulf define the basic route network. 
Carriers linking major industrial regions with the Gulf usually, unless they are express 
carriers, (eg. Kuwait Shipping Co.) pick up and discharge cargoes 'on-line' through the 
zones of intervening opportunity defined on the map. Seven 'tributqry* or minor 
conferences, flow into the major networks. Tables 5.11 - 5.13 list the major and minor 










Austral asi a 
Major Conference Minor Conference 
1 . '8900 Rate Agreement' 
1 . Constellation (U.S. West 
Coast-Pacif ic-Gulf) 
1 . ACMEL (Associated Conti-
nental Middle East Liner) 
2. U.K. - Gulf Conference 
1 . Medmecon (Mediterranean-
Middle East Conference) 
1. Japan (Jap an-Arab 1 an 
Gulf Conference) 
1 . A.M.I.M.O. (Accordo Merci 
I tal ia-Medio Oriente) 
1 . Hong Kong (West Bound 
T a r i f f No: 6) 
2. Taiwan-Gulf 
3- Karachi-Gulf 
4. Straits-Persian Gulf 
T a r i f f No: 3 
5. India-Gulf 
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5.2.2. FREIGHT RATES AND SURCHARGES 
The action of shipping conferences in varying both freight rates and surcharges 
levied on individual ports does have an influential effect both on the level of trade 
passing through ports and the pattern of port development in the region. In practice, 
transport costs rarely reflect an unmodified distance principle. In the Gulf, maritime 
transportation rates are related to a number of processes including the 'grouping' of 
commodity rates (into a class rate system) the tapering of freight rates, and various 
measures of freight rate discrimination which favour a particular cargo, route, or port. 
In the operation of ocean transport, freight rates are related directly to ocean freight 
carrying costs. Only a part of the cost of a liner operation can be attributed to the 
commodities themselves (i.e. through the calculation of the class rate system). The 
remainder are attributed to individual voyage costs and the overall operational costs of 
running a shipping enterprise. Costs attributable to a voyage are related directly to 
the amount of time it takes to complete a shipment. Chapter 1.2 has commented on the 
widespread nature of port congestion in the Gulf during the last decade caused in part 
by an under-provision of deep-water berths and slow turn-around (i.e. rates of discharge) 
in port. In such circumstances delays in waiting for a berth or in discharging cargo add 
considerably to the expensive daily operating costs of running a cargo vessel (averaging 
approximately $8,000 a day in 1977). In these conditions shipping conferences reserve 
the right to respond to delays caused by problems in ports by levying additional cargo rates 
and surcharges on offending ports in order to cover the unallocable costs incurred by 
delay. 
In effect, the categorization of commodities and ports inot 'groups' is a form of 
discrimination practiced by shipping conferences which may have consequences both for the 
level of trade handled by a port, and the progress of social and economic development in 
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TABLE 5 * 1 4 : C o n f e r e n c e A d d i t i o n a l s and S u r c h a r g e s i n t h e 
P e r s i a n G u l f , 1973 
C o n f e r e n c e s 
M a j o r 14 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 T o t a l * I n - p o r t s ' T o t a l S u r c h a r g e s Rank 
B a h r a i n I I I I I I I I I 9 0 1 
K u w a i t I I I I I s I s I I I 9 H. 2 
Duba i I I I I I I 0 I I 8 0 3 
B a s r a I I 0 I I s I I I I s 8 2 4 = 
Dammam I I 0 I s ! I I I I s 8 2 4 = 
Khorrarashahr I I 0 I I s I s I I I s 8 3 6 
B u s h i r e I I I I I s I s 0 I 0 7 2 7 
Bandar Shahpour I I 0 I S I S I s I I 0 7 3 8 
Doha I I I I 0 0 0 I 0 5 0 9 
Bandar Abbas I I 0 I 0 s 0 s 0 I 0 4 2 10 
Muscat 0 0 I 0 I s I s 0 0 0 s 3 3 11 
Abu Dhab i 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 12 
S h a r j a h 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 = 
Ras a l Khaimah 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 = 
Othe r 
Abadan I I 0 I 0 0 I I 0 5 
Umm S a i d 0 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Ras T a n u r a I I 0 0 0 0 I I 0 4 
Shualbah I I 0 I 0 0 0 I 0 4 
Umm Qasr I 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 2 
I = I n - p o r t 
0 = O u t - p o r t 
s = S u r c h a r g e d 
Source : P u b l i s h e d T a r i f f s f o r 
R e s p e c t i v e C o n f e r e n c e s , 1971 
KEY : 1 Medmecon 
2 Amimo 
3 K a r a c h i - G u l f 
4 ' 89OO• 
5 J a p a n - G u l f 
6 Hong K o n g - G u l f 
7 C o n s t e l l a t i o n 
8 ACMEL 
9 S t r a i t s 
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a state. Leubuscher's (1963) work in West Africcnports suggested that certain shipping 
conferences may be accused of 'influencing the economic growth of countries by their 
rates and discriminatory policies" (Couper, 1972, p. 102) which have the effect of 
favouring certain ports against others. In more recent times 'UNCTAD' has been 
alerted to the detrimental effects of freight rate discrimination In the so-called Third 
World (The Liner Conference System, 1970, p. 87). 
The base ports at the Gulf end of a conference trading system are subdivided into 
'in-ports' and 'out-ports' thereby creating a hierarchical system of seaports. Cargoes 
discharged at in-ports are charged freight on the normal scale of published charges . 
However, an 'additional' charge is levied on cargo delivered to those ports labelled as 
'out-?ports' (by virtue of their facilities, size and level of trade). Table 5.14 is a 
synthesis of the 'in-port/out-port' balance for each of the 14 major seaports of the Gulf 
with reference to 9 of the 13 conference tariffs (for which data was available in 1973). 
The table is arranged in a rank order based upon the number of 'in-port' categorkations 
for each port. Bahrain, Kuwait and Dubai head the list of rankings for in-ports. The 
ports of the lower Gulf (Bandar Abbas, Muscat, Abu Dhabi, Sharjah and Ras al Khaimah) 
are a spatial backwater in terms of port development measured with reference to their 
out—port status. The scale of additional charges foroutports per conference is tabulated 
in Table 5.15. 
Conferences levy, where appropriate, surcharges relating to the level of turn-around 
time in port, currency devaluation, and route deviation costs (e.g. around the Cape of 
Good Hope, Jjne 1968 - June 1975). Table 5.16 indicates the level of individual 
surcharges levied upon a port by virtue of the congested conditions in that port which 
could add (in 1972) an extra £300 - £500 per day operating costs on ships delayed in 


































(in U.S. dollars 
3.75 or % levied per 
10% ton discharged). 
3.75 
2.75 
The significance of ocean freight rates in relation to port development in the Gulf 
is the manner in which conference rates are either an incentive for port development 
(either involving the construction of deep-water facilities, or the extension of existing 
facilities), or act as a disincentive to development and are therefore detrimental to the 
level of economic growth of a state. In order to check the rather over-simplified 
hierarchy in Table 5.14, a further hierarchy has been calculated using real commodity 
class rates, additional and surcharges levied on each of the major seaports of the Gulf. 
Using data from published conference rates, eght common commodities were selected 
for comparison across a sample of five major conferences. A ton of rice, a ton of cement, 
a ton of steel bars, a ton of timber, 40 cu. feet of air conditioners, 40 cu feet of shoes, 
was aggregated for delivery at each port across each of the five conferences. The results 
are tabulated in appendix Table "I" , where an aggregate of results across commodities 
and conferences is tabulated in dollars. This result was then converted into index form 
using the formula 
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Total aggregate Freight Rates per Port 
Index = * 1 0 0 
Lowest total aggregate Freight Rate within the Group of Gulf Ports 
and the index rank order tabulated in Table 5.17. The rank order bears an approximate 
resemblance to the order in Table 5.14, but statistically the significant breakpoint appears 
to be the 104-110 line separating Abu Dhabi, Sharjah, Ras al Khaimah and Muscat from 
the remainder of the ports. The results in Table 5.17 are represented in isopleth map form in 
Figure 5.8. The map reveals a pattern in which the lower Gulf ports (on the Arabian 
peninsula) appear to be at a disadvantage in terms of the level freight rates when compared 
to the remainder of the Gulf ports. Dubai stands alone in an advantageous position in 
relation to rates at neighbouring ports in the lower Gulf region, perhaps partially explaining 
the port's dominance of the entrepot trade in this region. 
TABLE 5.17: Index: Comparative Conference 'Base Freight Rates' to 
Persian Gulf Ports, for selected commodities, 1971 
Index 
1 = Bahrain 100 
1 = Dubai 100 
3 Kuwait 100 
4 Bush ire 101 
5 Basra 102 
6 Dammam 102 
7 Bandar Abbas 103 
8 Doha 104 
9 = Bandar Shahpour 104 
9 = Khorramshahr 104 
11 Abu Dhabi 110 
12 = Sharjah 111 
12c Ras al Khaimah 111 
243 
14 = Muscat 114 
5.3 SOLUTIONS TO PORT CONGESTION 
5.3.1 RESPONSE BY GOVERNMENTS I - INVESTMENT IN HARBOUR FACILITIES 
The most compulsive response by governments in the Gulf to serious port congestion 
has been to finance the construction of new or expanded port facilities in an effort to 
match the provision of berths with demand for additional port capacity. This response 
has involved two basic difficulties: firstly, not all the Gulf states have oil revenues 
large enough to finance expensive projects; and secondly, few of the states possess the 
necessary engineering know-how, technology, or skilled labour to undertake construction 
projects without overseas assistance. 
Notwithstanding the high cost of building harbours, table 5.18 illustrates the large 
sums recently invested in a range of port development projects. As estimated $4,671 million 
has been invested in new or expanded port facilities, with a further $ 2,972 million 
invested in the construction of harbours which incorporate linked industrial development 
schemes. In both cases, the two most wealthy oil-producing states, Saudi Arabia and Iran, 
have invested the largest sums (amounting to 72% and 52% of the total costs respectively). 
Other states for whom oil-revenues have come on-stream only comparatively recently (e.g. 
U .A .E . ) , or who have relatively scarce financial resources (e.g. Oman) have had to be 
prudent with investment allocations. However, if it is clear that Saudi Arabia and Iran are 
intent on providing an appropriate scale of port facilities to match their ambitious programmes 
of national development, the same can be said for each of the Gulf states, for they are 
all currently constructing new harbour facilities. 
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T A B L E 5.18 
EST IMATED C O S T S OF PORT INVESTMENT P R O J E C T S 
IN THE G U L F , 1973 - 1980 
1. C O S T S OF DEVELOPING COMMERCIAL HARBOURS 
Millions of $ 
DamiTiam 1700 
Jubai l , commercial harbour 885 
Bandar Abbas 800 
Khor Al Zubair , I r a q . 500 
Port Sulman, Bahrain 203 
Port R a s h i d , D u b a i \ 200 
Port Khal id , Shasjah 100 
Port Raysout , Oman 76 
Shuwaikh , Kuwa i t 5 _ 65 
Port S a q r , Ras Al Khaimah 52 
Port Qaboos, Oman 6 44 
Khor F a k k a n 2 32 
Umm Al Qaiwan^ 14 
T O T A L 4671 *no data for Basra 
or Bandar Shahpour 
2 C O S T S OF DEVELOPING I N D U S T R I A L HARBOURS 
Jubai l , industrial harbour 1 944 
Jebel A l i , 1 industrial harbour 769 
Bandar A b b a s , shipyard2 600 
Dubai , dry dock complexS _ 464 
Bahra in , Arab Ship Repair Yard 140 
Umm Sa id , industrial harbour** 55 *no data for Shuaiba 
T O T A L 2972 
S o u r c e s : 
1. Smith (1978) 
2. Sucharov MEED, March 25, 1977 
3. M . E . E . D . March 1978 
4. M . E . E . D . July 1977 
5. M . E . E . D . A u g . 77 
6. Shipping World and Shipbui lder: J a n . 1976 
7. Civi l Engineer ing, Oct. 1977 
8. Civi l Engineer ing, Oct. 1978 
9. M . E . E . D . Apri l 1977 
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T A B L E 5.19 
GROWTH IN NUMBER OF D E E P - W A T E R B E R T H S 
IN G U L F P O R T S 1940 - 1980 
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 
Basra 6 6 6 10 16 
Khorramshahr 1 6 7 9 13 
Abadan 3 3 3 3 4 
Umm Qasr 3 6 
Bandar Shahpour 2 2 6 6 28 
Khor Al Zubara 5 
Port Shuwaikh - - 5 7 20 
Port Shuaiba - - - 5 13 
Bushire 2 
Dammam - 2 7 7 40 
Bahrain 6 16 
Doha 4 9 
Port Zayed - - - 3 17 
Port Rashid 5 37 
Port Khalid 2 7 
Port Saqr 7 
Khor Fakkan 2 
Bandar Abbas 1 1 1 6 26 
Matrah 8 
Jebel Ali 5 
Jubail 14 
T O T A L 13 20 35 76 295 
% Distribution of Berths 
Upper Gulf 92 85 77 57 36 
Mid Gulf 0 10 20 22 27 
Lower Gulf 8 5 3 21 37 
The very high costs of these projects appertaining in the late 1970's and early 1980's 
made contracts that seemed expensive at the time such as Dubai's original 15 berth Port 
RasHid (operational in 1973 at a total cost of $50 million) and Matrah's 8 berth Port 
Qaboos (operational in 1974 at a total cost of $44 million) seem relatively inexpensive. 
Unfortunately, during the inflationary period preceding the rise in oil prices in 1973/74, 
the Gulf states have been unable to make much headway in solving the problem of their 
shortfall in technology and labour. Hence a large proportion of the costs arrayed in Table 
5.18 is made up of consultancy, labour and plant costs occrrued on harbour development 
contracts. 
Table 5.19 reveals that the growth in the number of deep-water berths (conventional 
and non-conventional) is uneven in both time and space. Measurements taken at the 
beginning of each decade during the period 1940 - 1980 show a dramatic surge in the 
total number of berths in the 1970's, when almost a four-fold increase was achieved. 
Spatially, the most pronounced change of the era is the evening out of berth provision 
between the 'upper' (Basra, Khorramshahr, Abadan, Bandar Shahpour, Umm Qasr, Khor Al 
Zubair, Shuwaikh and Shuaiba), 'middle (Dammam, Bahrain, Bushire, Jubail, Doha and 
Umm Said) and 'lower' Gulf (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjal) Ras al Kaimah, Bandar Abbas, 
and including Khor Fokkan and Matrah). Over the fort/ year period the dominance of the 
'upper' Gulf has slowly been eroded, firstly by the 'middle' Gulf region, and dramatically 
during the 1970's by the 'lower Gulf, which, if Khor Fakkan and Matrthare included, 
actually aggregates the largest number of berths by 1980. 
5.3.2 NEW TECHNOLOGY IN PORTS AND SHIPPING 
Port development in the Gulf is complicated by technological changes in transport 
systems. During the 1970's the handling of general cargo in particular had become polareed 
between the through transport use of containers and the improved, but conventional, break-
bulk techniques. On a world scale the rapid shift to unitized methods of handling cargo 
247 
presented the governments of the Gulf states with the dilemma as to whether to invest 
in conventional general cargo berths, or to invest in more advanced and costly container 
berths and handling facilities (Sucharov, 1977). 
Containerization offers certain advantages which are particularly applicable to 
trade flows between more developed countries where a steady two-way flow of cargo is 
backed up by comprehensive road and rail systems . In particular container!zation offers 
ease of handling, greater security and flexibility when it comes to forwarding cargoes 
to inland destinations. However, in the context of the Gulf possible gains in terms of 
faster vessel turn-around times are offset by weakly developed inland transport systems, 
together with the fact that still in the late 1970's a large proportion of incoming cargoes 
are made up of heavy equipment for the construction industry (Barrett, 1977, estimated 
between 50 - 60% ) which it is not always possible to confine in a 40 foot or 20 foot 
standardized box. 
Pressure to develop container handling berths in the Gulf initially came from outside 
sources. Faced with increasingly congested ports many shipping companies opted to 
transfer cargoes to container or Ro-Ro vessels to ease delay on their vessels. By the end 
of the 1970's an impressive array of shipping lines offered a regular container service to 
the Gulf - Arabian Peninsula Container Line ( a joint venture between U.A.S .C . and 
P. & O/Straith-EHerman), Barber Middle East Line, Maersk, Concordia, Hoegh, Hansa-
Nedlloyd - C . M . B . , Medtainer, Seaspeed, N . C . H . P . , Cunard Arabian Middle East 
Line, Blue Star Line, Associated Container Transportation, Arya-Seatrain, Gulf Shipping 
Line and Beaufort Gulf Services. The number of container services grew so rapidly that 
it became apparent that too many vessels were operating the service as many container 
ships entered the Gulf with less than full loads, triggering off a prias-cutting war in 1977. 
-', 1 QT7' 
By the end of the 1970's the LASH (lighter aboard ship) system had been little 
exploited in the Gulf, although the ports of Bandar Abbas and Bandar Shahpour include 
the provision of LASH terminals in their current development programmes. The system will 
probably expand in the 1980's given the nature of the Gulfs coastline, but it may not 
match the rate at which Ro-Ro services are introduced into the Gulf. 
Ro-Ro vessels came into their own during the peak period of congestion (1975-77) 
because they made no special demand on port facilities (berthing stern to quay), and 
required only 25 metres of water frontage and a small labour force to unload them . These 
vessels proved attractive both in terms of rapid turn-around time (a typical Ro-Ro ship can 
discharge 5000 tons of cargo in 8 hours) and favourable insurance policies from the rare 
incidence of damage to cargo. However, time saved has to be offset against generally 
higher freight rates on Ro-Ro trades relative to container services. It is not easy to 
compare the two rating systems as container rates are levied on each container according to 
the value of the cargo (which is designed to encourage the carriage of low value cargoes), 
whereas Ro-Ro shipping involves a two-tier price system with cargo on wheels being charged 
per linear metre and other cargoes per 1000 Kgms or l i cu. Metres, whichever is the 
greater (ME.E.D 5th Nov, 1976). The main cost disadvantage of Ro-Ro is that it does 
not always make the most economical use of a vessel's available space. Nevertheless, in 
the sense that Ro-Ro and standard container ships are competitive systems Smith (1978) reports 
that Ro-Ro rates were holding steady in 1978 (e.g. $500 per linear metre on the U.K. -
Gulf run), whereas container rates (on the same route) fell from a maximum of $2600 per 
20 foot containers in 1977 to $2000 in 1978 (reflecting the over-provision of services to 
the Gulf at that time). While most observers feel that the future for shipping operations 
to the Gulf lies in the increasing use of containers (in the belief that the Ro-Ro system was 
essentially a means to help solve the short term problem of port congestion), they also point 
to the fact that Ro-Ro rates have steadied indicating that demand should continue over the 
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medium term. One line, Seaspeed Ferries which operates a Japan - Dammam, Bandar 
Shahpour, Dubai service has ordered giant versions of Ro-Ro ships to operate on this 
route because of the relatively low operating costs (Smith, 1978, p.66). 
Seaspeed is one of the major operators of Ro-Ro ships to the Gulf. The shipping 
consortium 'FOSS' (Fred Olsen Seaspeed Svedel) started operations in 1976 when the 
Greek owned seaspeed services joined Fred Olsen of Norway with the intention of 
operating on the Northern Europe - Gulf route. In March 1977, the group was joined 
by the Swedish operator Svedel. The consortium operate a service to Dubai and Dammam 
from Felixstowe, Antwerp, Rotterdam and Hamburg, and from Genoa, Trieste and 
Marseilles, with connecting services to Kuwait, Bandar Abbas and Bandar-Shahpour using 
shallow-draught feeder Ro-Ro vessels. Other services using Ro-Ro vessels include the 
Meredith Shipping Company which began operating a service from Felixstowe, Antwerp 
Le Havre and Marseilles to the new Ro-Ro terminal at Sharjah in 1977. Maritime Transport 
Overseas Services commenced a two vessel Ro-Ro service from the UK/North Continent to 
Dubai and Bandar Abbas in 1975. Arghiris Line serves Dubai, Dammam and Sharjah with 
a service from Felixstowe, and in 1978 Hoegh Ugland Auto Lines began to import cars into 
the Sharjah Ro-Ro terminal (Civil Engineering, Oct. 1978). 
It is apparent that at the beginning of the 1980's the resolution of the dilemma concernii 
conventional versus container berths has been resolved in favour of conventional berths. 
It remains to be seen whether pressure to accept containers will overtake some of these 
facilities, and in fact tender them obsolete. Table 5.20 lists the extent to which container 
and Ro-Ro berths, container gantries and LASH terminals have been incorporated into 
current port expansion schemes. For the most part, even though some ports have Included 
substantial investment in modern handling methods - Dammam, Port Rashid, Bandar Abbas, 
Bandar Shahpour, Shuaiba and Jubail - the degree of conversion to non-conventional 
general cargo berths remains under 20% for each port. The exception is Sharjah which 
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T A B L E 5.20 
E X T E N T OF INCORPORATION OF NEW HANDLING TECHNIQUES 
INTO HARBOUR D E S I G N S , 1980 
Container,, . . 
Berths C ° n t a , n e r Gantries 
R O - R O 
Ber ths 
Dam mam 5 4 1 
Port Rash id , Dubai 5 2 2 
Jebel AM, Dubai 5* 
Bandar Abbas 4 4 2 
Bandar Shahpour 4 4 
Port Shuaiba , Kuwait 4 1 
Port Zayed, Abu Dhabi 3 
Jubail 2 7 
Shuwaikh, Kuwait 2 2 
Port Khal id , Shar jah 2 2 1 
Khor Fakkan 2 2 
Port S a q r , Ras Al Khaimah 2 
B a s r a , 1 1 
Umm Gasr 1 






















No facilities planned at Doha, B u s h i r e , Khor Al Zubair and Umm Said 
Source: Owen (1978) p. 167 
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has taken the bold step of developing two container ports at Sharjah and Khor Fakkan 
in effort to establish a linked, specialist container function capable of servicing a wide 
area of the Gulf region. 
RESPONSE BY GOVERNMENTS 11: 
5.3.3 INVESTMENT IN NATIONAL SHIPPING LINES 
The dilemma over the extent of incorporation of modern shipping and handling 
technology into the design of ports carries over into the sphere of investment in 
national shipping lines. In this case decisions have to be made as to which type of 
vessel would represent the most profitable investment. The case for and against state 
participation in international shipping in the Gulf has been stated in Chapter 1.5. 
Despite doubts as to the wis dom of participation in the shipping industry, it is apparent 
that the 1960's and 1970's have witnessed an increasing involvement of some of the 
Gulf states in this sector. 
On a national basis the extent of state involvement in shipping, although modest, has 
involved all the Gulf states except Bahrain, Qatar and Oman. Kuwait and Iran have been 1 
two most active states involved in the industry. The Kuwait Shipping Company ( K . S . C . ) , 
founded in 1966, had built up a fleet of 13 conventional liners by 1972 before it 
subsequently formed the basis of the United Arab Shipping Company which was founded in 
1976 (see Section 5.3.4.) The Kuwait Oil Tanker Company (in which the state had a 49% 
stake) had acquired a fleet of 19 tankers totalling 2125956 dwt by 1978, of which 7 vessels 
were supertankers of over 200,000 dwt. The Iranian Arya National Shipping Line (founded 
in 1967) owned 36 vessels by 1976 and carried 3 million tons of cargo to Iranian ports during 
that year (Smith, 1978, p.69). In the late 1970's, Arya introduced container ships on its 
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services between Iran and Europe in co-operation with Seatrain Lines of the U.S.A. It 
also ordered 5 19,000 dwt semi-containerized vessels from Japanese yards and purchased 
5 landing craft costing $1.2 million to service ports without conventional berthing 
facilities. The state sector has been supplemented by two private Iranian companies: 
Iran Express Line of Teheran ordered two multi-purpose cargo ships of 15,000 dwt each, and the 
Shahyad Shipping and Trading Company operates a monthly service between Japanese ports 
and Khorramshahr using 4 14,000 dwt Japanese-built container ships of 213 TEU capacity. 
In 1978, the National Iranian Tanker Company operated a fleet of three vessels totalling 
148742 dwt. 
Iraq founded its national shipping line, Iraqi Line, in 1959, increasing the size of 
its fleet to 15 conventional vessels (totalling 80898 dwt) by 1977 (EIU, 1978). The 
parallel Iraqi National Oil Company fleet comprised 15 tankers in 1978 totalling 1366285 
dwt, nontof which were in the supertanker class. Jn contrast, the Saudi government has 
been reluctant to commit state funds into large-scale shipping investment and has left the 
operation of vessels carrying the Saudi flag largely to private companies or joint enterprises. 
It does have a minority shareholding in the National Saudi Shipping Line, whose majority 
shareholders are the Al Quraishi family. In January 1978 this line announced that it was raising 
its authorized capital from $4 million to $120 million with the aim of capturing 40 - 50% 
of Saudi Arabia's seabourne trade via the purchase of a fleet of container ships (Smith, 1978). 
Similarly the participation of the U.A.E. in state-run shipping lines has been modest, 
limited to the operation of the Abu Dhabi National Oil Companies 3 tankers (totalling 
655949 dwt in 1978) and a small fleet of cargo ships operated by the Dubai-based Gulf 
National Navigation Company. 
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However, this apparently limited involvement of the state In shipping is misleading. 
In an era of rapid technological change and financial inflation, the Gulf states have 
reacted cautiously to the temptation to invest in large fleets. There is some doubt in 
government circles about the appropriate scale of participation in financial and 
operational terms, together with type of vessels and trade routes to be operated. A way 
around this hesitancy has been to spread the risks involved by entering into joint shipping 
ventures between the states themselves, and between other states and private companies. 
5.3.4 JOINT VENTURES IN SHIPPING 
It seems likely that co-operative projects involving Gulf states and outside interests 
will prove the cornerstone of the region's shipping policy into the foreseeable future (Beckett 
1976). By 1980, three levels of joint enterprise were in evidence. Possibly the most significant 
are multi-national ventures involving Middle-Eastern states; second in promlnance are 
a group of bi-lateral agreements between Gulf states and outside governments or private 
companies; finally, the second half of the 1970's witnessed the growth of small-scale 
arrangements between private companies in the Gulf and outside interests. 
The establishment of the Arab Maritime Petroleum Company (A.M.P.T.C.) in 1973 
by the seven founder members of O . A . P . E . C . was a pioneer venture. By 1977, each of 
the member states contributed one tanker to the Compary (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, 
U . A . E . , Libya and Algeria) except for Iraq which contributed two. The fleet of eight 
ships totalled 2085497 dwt in 1977 (Smith, 1978 p.39). Each of the founder members holds 
a 13.57% shareholding, together with two additional members, Bahrain and Egypt, who 
hold 5% and a nominal share respectively. This project clearly represents a political 
as well as economic venture, designed to increase the influence of the Arab states in world 
affairs through O . A . P . E . C . Unfortunately the scheme was launched at an inappropriate 
J 
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period embracing the steep rise in oil prices and the subsequent slump in the demand for 
tankers in 1976-1977. Consequently in the first full year of operation AMPTC lost 
KD 276,167 ($952,000) in 1975 (O'Byrne, 1977) . In common with other national 
oil tanker companies, except the Kuwait Oil Tanker Company, AMPTC found difficulty 
in securing cargoes when faced, it is alleged, by a siege mentality among the existing 
world oil tanker companies who sought to deny cargoes to the consortium and in so 
doing stifle its birth and development (O'Byrne, 1977). In mid 1977 two of AMPTC 
supertankers were laid up in Norway, two were placed on one-year time charters, and two 
further vessels were also placed on charter. Nonetheless, although the overall intention 
of AMPTC is to carry a certain proportion of Arab oil in its vessels (10%) it is apparently 
willing to suffer a certain level of financial loss in the short term during which time it is 
training Arab crews in the skills of seamanship as a basis for the future. 
Parallel to the birth of AMPTC is the formation of the United Arab Shipping Company 
(U.A.S.C. ) in 1976, owned jointly by the governments of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain 
Iraq, Qatar and the U.A.E. In a short space of time this Kuwait-based company has 
emerged as a significant force on liner trades linking the Gulf with Europe, North America 
and Japan. UASC was formed by merging the nucleus of the K . S . C . fleet with ships of 
member states and had achieved a fleet size of 58 vessels(with 4 additional, 19000 dwt container 
ships, on order from Hyundai's yard in South Korea) totalling over I million dwt by 1979 
(Arab Economist, 1979). Member states have agreed to restrict their national fleet to a 
maximum of a total of 120,000 dwt each. The reason for the creation of the company 
was as much concerned with laying a foundation for a solid base in the field of non-hydrocarbon 
shipping as part of the downstream industrialization favoured by OA PEC, as it was with 
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capturing a major share of Gulf liner trade. In fact the first eighteen months of 
trading yielded a modest net profit of KD 9.1 million, a level which might have been 
higher were it not for the down-turn in liner trades associated with port congestion in 
the period 1975-77. UASC's prime objective is to win a 40% share in the total seabourne 
trade of member states. By 1979 it has been calculated that UASC carried well under 
20% of this trade (Arab Economist, 1979), though performance on some routes exceeded this 
level. UASC transported almost 28% of the tonnage carried on the Japan-Gulf route in 
1978 (O'Byrne, 1978). 
The creation of UASC offers a number of advantages for member states. Firstly, 
the fusion of national fleets has created a company of sufficient size and financial strength 
(it has authorised capital of $1.65 billion, of which $600 million was paid up by 1978 -
Smith, 1978) to compete with existing international companies. This financial strength 
gives it the confidence to rake the risk of investing in new technology, although in fact 
the present fleet composition includes mostly conventional ships, 50 of which are multi-
purpose, including 30 with an average container capacity of 288 TEUs. However, doubts 
remain as to the wisdom of heavy investment in container vessels which have led to the . 
company's interim decision to set up a joint venture of its own by establishing the Arabian 
Peninsula Container Line (APCL) h association with Straith-EHerman in 1978. A further 
development involving UASC has been the expansion of a sister company - ARATRANS-
which acts as a ground handling organization with agents and equipment in member states 
designed to offer door to door service to inland destinations. 
Although partners in UASC, member states are still free to set up bi-lateral shipping 
grouping outside the consortium. In 1977, for example, Kuwait established joint ventures 
with India and Egypt to transport key bulk commodities such as wheat. Iran, a non-
member of UASC, has also been active in the field of bilateral arrangements. In its oil 
sector the state-owned National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC) signed an agreement in 
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1977 to purchase 3 VLCC's and 2 product tinkers from B.P. (worth $60.5 million) in 
a deal in which B.P. contributed a further 5 tankers to make up a joint fleet of 10 
tankers to form the Irano-British Shipping Company (O'Byrne, 1977). 
Outside the public sector private investors have also been involved in a number of 
joint ventures. This trend is perhaps most evident in Saudi Arabia where an example 
is the businessman Adnan Khashogi whose company 'Triad' formed a joint shipping 
company with an interested party in Argentina with a vew to transporting fresh meat 
and livestock to the Gulf (Smith, 1978, p. 70). 'Triad' was also involved in the late 
1970*s with setting up a joint Saudi Arabia - Finnish Shipping Company - Saudi 
International Shipping (SIS) - in co-operation with Finnlines and Valmet of Finland. Two 
other ventures in 1977 were the formation of the Saudi Arabian Maritime Company (SAMARCO), 
a joint venture with Mobil and Fairfield Maxwell of the U.S.A. , for the operation of 5 
tankers totalling 984907 dwt, and the creation of the Saudi Shipping Company (SASCO) 
in co-operation with Mitsui O . S . K . of Japan which operates 4 tankers totalling 779793 
dwt (O'Byrne, 1977). Some Iranian companies are following suit. Hirsch (Iran) and the 
As Iron International Company (UK) formed a joint container-rail-road-air freight service 
from Western Europe to the Gulf in 1978 (Smith, 1978). Similarly, Austiran' - a joint 
Aushalian-lranian Shipping Company - has been formed to transport frozen mutton to Iran 
in two chartered container ships. 
The majority of such joint ventures have been in operation in the past half-decade 1975-
1980. It is therefore a little premature to evaluate their future prospects. However, It 
seems that for both state and private interests in the Gulf they offer a means of entering 
an international industry in furtherance of a general policy of industrialization, and at the 
same time spreading the risks involved in participation. In contrast, however, co-operation 
in the field of port development in the Gulf has been less marked, except in the 
context of port management and engineering consultancy. This fact means that the 
spatial and locational implications of port development have a sharp, competitive 
edge. 
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5.4. SPATIAL AND LOCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF PORT DEVELOPMENT 
5.4.1 A HIERARCHY OF GULF PORTS 
The situation at the beginning of the 1980's with respect to the development of 
existing and entirely new harbour facilities in the Gulf is fluid. This fluidity is the 
result of the transitional stage reached by Gulf states in their port expansion schemes, 
many of which are still under construction or subject to uncertain plans for figure 
development. Amid the current spate of port development projects lies the worry that 
ultimately the escalation in the number of berths, of all types, will intensify port 
competition to a point where in the future some ports will suffer a marked down-turn in 
trade because of a general over-provision of berths in the region. In this context a 
study by the Shipping agent 'Gray Mackenzie' has predicted that by 1982 all the Gulf 
states - except Kuwait and Bahrain - will show a surplus of conventional berths. In 
the case of the U . A . E . , that surplus may well be unacceptibly high rising it is predicted 
to a level of 70% excess capacity of conventional and container berths (Grainge, 1980). 
Set against this possibility, the war between Iraq and Iran, currently unresolved at the 
time of writing, has already inflicted damage to port installations at Khorramshahr and 
Aba dan, a situation that would place a strain on Iranian ports without recourse to assistance 
from neighbouring Gulf states . 
The relevant theory relating to the development of a port hierarchy suggests that fears 
about over-expansion in port facilities are justified. The 'typical' sequence of development 
of seaport: md their inland route connections in former colonial seaboard regions was first 
explained by Taaffe, Morrill and Gould in their 'ideal - typical sequence model' based on 
research in Ghana and Nigeria in 1963. This model attempted to demonstrate that a system 
of seaports will develop into a hierarchy of more or less important ports as ports gain certain 
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commercial advantages in relation to the penetration of inland transport systems. The model 
is represented by a series of four 'phases' through which a set of ports in a 'port system' will 
pass during the process of port development. These phases emanate from a set of scattered 
ports with weak inland and coastal connections (Phase 1 . ) , a few of which subsequently 
develop major lines of inland penetration which leads to the growth of inland centres and 
the differential growth of coastal ports which possess these penetration lines (phase 2.) . The 
initial development of port hinterlands is intensified in phase 3 as feeder routes and lateral 
inter-connections between ports and inland urban centres develop. Finally the process of 
inter-linkage of routes develops to a point where a stabilized hierarchy of ports and inland 
centres is linked together by a network of high priority routes (phase 4. ) . The overall 
conclusion of Taaffe, Morrill and Gould's historical analysis of the development of a transport 
system is that within a regional set of ports a hierarchy will develop based on the differential 
ability of a few ports to grow with respect to the level of trade they handle through a process 
of 'capturing' port hinterlands at the expense of neighbouring ports. 
This model has been shown to have a wider applicability than just the West African 
region. Haggett (1965) has suggested that the development of the railway network in South 
East Brazil has contributed to the focusing of economic activity on the cites of Rio de Janeiro 
and Sao Paulo. Rimmer (1967) applied the model in a general discussion of the evolution of 
the Australian seaport hierarchy, refining the model somewhat to demonstrate the contribution 
of maritime and coastal routes to the concentration of trade in the more successful seaports. 
Other studies including those of Ward (1969) on Malaysia, Stanley (1970) on Liberia, and 
Riddel I (1970) on Sierra Leone used the 'idea I-typical sequence model' to describe the pattern 
of transport development associated with the era of colonial penetration and exploitation. 
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However, in the context of the Gulf there are difficulties in applying this model 
directly as an aid to the prediction of the likely hierarchy of seaports in the 1980's. In 
contrast to conventional applications of the model to individual states bordering on 
ocean, the Gulf ports represent a set of national ports representing eight states facing one 
another across a relatively narrow maritime cul-de-sac. It is possible to study each state 
in isolation but in practice, given the nature of the physical geography of interior Arabia 
and Iran and the distribution of population, it is more realistic to treat the Gulf ports as a 
regional set of ports arranged in a port hierarchy, irrespective of national boundaries. The 
process of port concentration in the Gulf is influenced by the fact that several of its major 
seaports are 'regional' as well as 'national' ports. As such the development of a port 
hierarchy via a process of the differential ability of ports to command 'market areas' 
is often as much influenced by short-sea foreland penetration as it is by hinterland 
penetration. Given this regional situation of a set of closely-spaced national seaports in 
a confined space, the normal process of the development of a port hierarchy via the economic 
benefits of hinterland penetration is complicated by the process of political competition 
between the T5 deep-water commercial ports (including Matrah and Khor Fakkan) and 4 
industrial ports that had been developed by 1980. 
Taken as a whole, the regional set of Gulf ports in 1980 fits uneasily into phase 2 
of the 'idea I-typical sequence model', represented by only a few major lines of inland 
penetration to a relatively small number of major inland centres which has contributed to 
the growth of Basra, Khorramshahr, Bandar Shahpour and Dammam as major ports serving 
their respective inland capital cities. The development of feeder routes and lateral inter-
connections in land (phase 3) is in general weakly developed and is likely to remain so 
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T A B L E 5.21 
THE P A T T E R N OF SEAPORT EVOLUTION IN THE GULF 
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for sometime given the uneven distribution of population in the region. Ironically, 
lateral connections are perhaps most developed in the U .A .E . , a factor which 
contributes to port competition in this state. 
Whereas, within the national framework in which the 'ideal typical' model is set 
it is possible to speak of the concentration of trade in certain national ports, in a 
regional sense the pattern of seaport evolution in the Gulf during the past three decades 
is more representative of the process of the diffusion of trade between ports. The 
distinction between an era of 'port diffusion' and an era of 'port concentration' is made 
on the basis of the distribution of the region's total trade between the ports. In an era 
of 'port concentration' only a few of the many ports in a port 'complex' are of 
disproportionate significance; whereas during an era of 'port diffusion' an absolute or 
relative increase in the number of functioning ports brought about by the increasing 
significance of new or expanding (previously smaller) ports leads to a redistribution of the 
region's trade between a larger number of ports with the subsequent relative decline of 
higher-order ports (Ogundana, 1970, p.169). 
The port hierarchy of 1980 is in a state of flux. In the first half of the present century 
seabourne trade in the Gulf had tended to concentrate in the small number of ports that 
had proved most successful in attracting and developing steamer trades with the outside 
world (Basra, Bahrain, Khorramshahr and Kuwait) - see Table 5 .2 l . Post 1950, trade 
had been diffused through an increasing number of ports as each state in the region has 
sought to underpin its national development programmes via the construction of ports 
commensurate with the size and nature of their foreign trade. Some of these port development 
projects involve the construction of entirely new ports - Shuaiba, Jubail, Jebel Ali - others 
involve the resurgance of exist! ng ports - Sharjah, Ras Al Khaimah, Bandar Abbas, Doha, 
FUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS 





Abu Dhabi and Muscat-Matrah. Ultimately, if the pattern of port concentration - diffusion 
-concentration etc. , is to hold good for the Gulf the present pattern of port diffusion will 
be resolved by a concentration of trade in the most successful ports at some point in the 
future. However, the present increase in the number of ports Fn the Gulf need not necessarily 
be regarded as over-provision per se within the context of some future consolidation of 
trade in only a few of its ports. The key to the interpretation of the present and future port 
hierarchy lies in the nature of functional relationships between the ports. 
Figure 5.9 depicts the nature of port competition and port complimentarity in the Gulf 
in 1980. Broadly defined those ports exhibiting a complimentary functional relationship 
compliment each other by handling particular cargoes to and from a common hinterland or 
foreland (e.g. The Kuwait ports of Shuwaikh and Shuaiba). In contrast some ports can be 
held to be in a competitive relationship with other ports in the Gulf in the sense that they vie 
for cargoes in common, overlapping hinterlands and forelands. It is the phenominon of port 
competition that presents the most acute problem in the context of the contemporary spate 
of port development in the Gulf, and, as such, it turns on the issue of overlapping hinterlands 
and forelands. 
5.4.2 CARGO FLOWS 
The type of cargoes imported, exported and re-exported by Gulf ports have been 
discussed elsewhere in this thesis particularly in the context of dhow trades (Chapter 4.4) 
and there is no need for repetition here. However, the broad direction of cargo flows 
may briefly be examined to explain the physical limits of port hinterlands and forelands 
in the region (See Fig. 5.10). 
Most imports arrive in the Gulf by sea, although a proportion arrive by road from the 
Levant, Eastern and Western Europe along the road network which connects Iraq with 
Oman along the littoral of eastern Arabia or through the networks linking Turkey with 
Iran. During the 1970's very little trade passed by road from the Arabian states through 
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Iraq into Iron because of the nature of political relations in the region. A small 
proportion of high value-to-weight ratio commodities are imported into the Gulf by 
air- Iraq and Iran receive a proportion of their imports through their rail links into 
Eastern and Western Europe via Turkey. 
Exports consist of two basic types. Firstly, the bulk of locally-produced primary 
products and manufactured goods (ranging from petroleum, petroleum products, nitrogenous 
fertilisers, aluminium ingots to consumer goods) are mostly exported out of the region by 
sea through the Straits of Hormuz, with a much smaller population leaving by air, road or 
ra i l . Secondly, locally-produced agricultural products and industrial goods move between 
the Gulf states either by dhows, barge, Ro-Ro feeder vessels, road or air. 
Re-exports, and goods in transit, are moved mostly by sea (dhow, barge or Ro-Ro vessel) 
or road to destinations within the Gulf , except for the trades with the Indian subcontinent 
or 'through' transit trades across the 'land bridge' between Europe and Asia. However, it 
is the case that most of these flows emanate from the region's principle entrepots (Kuwait, 
Bahrain and Dubai) to destinations within each port's sphere of influence. 
5 .4 .3 OVERLAPPING HINTERLANDS 
The fieldwork for this research was centred on the ports of Kuwait, Bahrain and Dubai 
and as such it is not therefore possible to describe the exact cargo, hinterlands and forelands 
for each of the major Gulf ports because of a lack of data. However as each of these ports 
is in fact the major trading entrepot for the 'upper', 'middle' and 'lower' Gulf regions 
respectively, it Is possible using the flow data (utilised in Chapter 4) to accurately describe 
the hinterlands and short-sea forelands of the sea ports in so far as they impinge upon the 
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The phenominon of overlapping spheres of influence in the Gulf derives essentially 
from the shape of the region and the spacing of its national seaports. Until the last 
twenty years the dhow was the major medium of overlap, but in recent time road 
trasnport has been increasingly important in terms of hinterland overlap. Chapter 4 
has presented a detailed study of the direction of cargo flows by dhow and the reader 
should refer to it in this context. 
Although each seaport can be said to have its 'primary' hinterland within which 
it dominates the economic life of the area concerned (e .g. Dammam has been, until the 
construction of Jubail , the dominating Saudi seaport for eastern Saudi Arabia, including 
the capital Riyadh), the existing port hierarchy in the Gulf , regardless of national 
boundaries, gives rise to three areas of 'areal' overlap, and two areas of 'functional* 
overlap . 
"Areal" overlap, or competition between two ports of comparative size for cargo of the 
same type to and from the same area, can in a sense apply to the whole Gulf region, but 
a more detailed examination of export, re-export and transit flows reveals three sub-regions. 
In the 'upper' Gulf ('A' in Figure 5.11), the forelands of Iraqi and Kuwaiti ports and the 
Iranian ports of Khorramshahr, Bandar Shahpour and Bush ire overlap. In this set of ports 
Kuwait (Shuwaikh) dominates in the sense that it includes part of Iraq and Iran its trading 
area ( i . e . where it either receives or dispatches cargo), whereas trade between Iran and 
Iraq is minimal. In the 'middle' Gulf region ('B'), Bahrain is dominant with trading areas 
extending into Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Iran. In the 'lower' Gulf ( 'C ' ) , Dubai is the pivot 
of re-export and transit flows, extending its commercial influence along the S . E . Iranian 
coast, Indian and Pakistani coasts, into Oman and over the northern emirates region of the 
U . A . E . 
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T A B L E 5.22 
E S T I M A T E D PORT C A P A C I T Y FOR MAJOR G U L F P O R T S 
1980 
Millions tons per annum 
Bandar Shahpour 16 
2 
Bandar Abbas 16 
Dammam 10 
Port Rash id , D u b a i 3 9.25 
Basra/Umm Qasr 6 
S h u w a i k h , K u w a i t 5 6 
Khor Al Z u b a i r 5 5 
Port Zayed, Abu D h a b i 3 4. 25 
3 
Port Sulman, Bahrain H 
Port Khal id , S h a r j a h 3 3.75 
Khor ramshahr 5 2.3 
Doha 3 2 
3 
Port S a q r , Ras Al Khaimah 1.75 
Port Qaboos, Mat rah 5 1,5 
B u s h i r e 1 1 
Port R a y s o u t 5 1 
1. Owens, (1978) 
2 Sucharov (1977) 
3 Estimate at 250,000 tons per berth 
H Cockburn (1978) 
5 Economist Intelligence Unit ( 1978) 
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Two areas of marked 'functional' overlap where the hinterland of a large port over-
runs that of a smaller port for certain cargoes because of the greater number of ships 
sailing into the larger port (Couper, 1971, p. 125) focus on the U . A . E . and Bahrain. In 
the case of the U . A . E . , Dubai is the paramount port despite harbour developments elsewhere 
in its hinterland, and as such it dominates the economic life of the northememirates and 
part of northern Oman. In the 'middle' Gulf , the dominance of Bahrain as a centre of 
trading expertise and distribute on over an area extending into eastern Saudi Arabia and 
Qatar has been weakened by the extensive expansion of Dammam and the construction of 
the causeway to the Saudi mainland, but it still maintains its status as an entrepot. 
In general terms it can be said that the hinterlands of most of the major Gulf ports, 
with the exception of the overlaps - Basra/Umm Qasr, Khorramshahr/Bandar Shahpour, 
the northern emirates of the U . A . E . , and the incursion of Kuwait into the north-eastern 
corner of Saudi Arabia - cover discrete slices of national territory. However, the pattern 
in relation to coastal forelands is very inter-twined, but with the overall dominance of 
Kuwait, Bahrain and Dubai. 
5 .4 .4 PORT COMPLIMENTARITY 1: NATIONAL PORTS 
In five out of the eight Gulf states the development of seaports has been conceived 
in a national as opposed to a regional context. As such the function of the deep-water 
ports of Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Oman is primarily to serve their respective 
national hinterlands. In contrast, the ports of Kuwait and Bahrain, and some of the ports 
of the U . A . E . have a significant, sometimes over-riding role, in servicing hinterlands and 
forelands outside national boundaries. 
TABLE 5-25 : Iraqi Ports 
Number of Vessels calling at Port Tonnages (DWT) 
Basrah Imports ' Exports 
1962 730 97151*1 1*91776 
1963 710 8711*95 1*21*1*82 
1961; 723 1071729 1*73038 
• 
1965 823 973538 539298 , 
1966 8U5 106991*0 
i 
717286 
1967 79h 1088502 1*11391 | 
1968 751 870271 2701*20 
i 
1969 639 760990 392265 ! 
1970 1*91 91*5931 279911* ; 




1968 57 129388 
1969 36 120778 
1970 73 151*158 -
1971 89 270628 — 
Sources : ( i ) Basrah 1962-70, and Umm Qasr 1968-70 
Sta t i s t i ca l Pocket Book 1960-70, Central 
S ta t i s t i ca l Organisation, Baghdad, 1972. 
( i i ) Basrah 1971 and Umm Qasr 1971, Iraqi 
Ports Administrative Annual S ta t i s t i ca l 
Bulletin, 1971. 
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TABLE 5.23 (Continued) 
Iraqi Ports - Number of vessel arrivals and quantity of cargo discharged, 
1975 - 2977 
1975 1976 1977 
Number of vessels entering Iraqi ports 828 891 987 
Quantity of tonnage discharged 3466 3430 3772 
(thousands of tons) 
Source: Iraq Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1977, p. 1 9 4 - 1 9 5 
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At the head of the Gulf the Iraqi port of Basra is primarily a national port serving 
Iraq as its major import-export habour for general cargo. A certain amount of transit 
cargo is handled for onward shipment to and from Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, but little 
cargo is re-exported or transhipped through the port to other Gulf states. At the time 
of writing the military confrontation between Iraq and Iran had closed the Shatt Al 
Arab to shipping and hence had closed the port of Basra. 
During the past two decades the government of Iraq has steadily increased the capacity 
of Basra by building additional berths to cope with increased trade. The number of deep-
water berths has risen from 5 in the early 1960's, to 9 in 1965, 10 in 1973, 12 in 1976 and 
15 (plus a specialised container berth) in 1980. However, Iraq has the problem of the 
political vulnerability of Basra which in recent times has been caught up in the boundary 
disputes with Iran (1969, 1971, 1980) which have blocked off the disputed waterway. In 
order to offset Basra's isolated position 80 miles upstream from the Gulf , the government 
of Iraq took the step in 1968 of constructing the port of Umm Qasr which has unrestricted 
access to Gulf waters. This new port (consisting of 3 conventional and 1 container berth 
in 1978) which is situated at the confluence of the Khor Zubair and Khor Abdullah is 
presently conceived as the main port for expansion in the 1980's. The present 4 berths 
(which are equiped to handle bulk imports of sulphur, steel and grain, and to export liquid 
petroleum gas) are planned to be supplemented by up to 43 new berths during the 1980's. 
The capacity of Basra and Umm Qasr in 1980 was an estimated 6 million ton per annum 
(Cockburn, 1978) - see Tables 5.22 and 5.23. 
Iran has four deep-water parts each of which has a primary function of serving the 
Iranian National Economy. Before the revolution that overthrew the Shah in 1979, the 
capacity of these four ports was 9 million tons per annum, a figure that was to have been 





































OO \£) 1_A H C— O s H r ^ O 
« V O C O O W V \ W C J rH H 
rH H CM m ff| 4 I A I A 4 
n J Os 
O N - 4 CM 
U \ I A (J\ 
CM ON NO (*~\ (T\ n~\ o f~\ "LA .4/ m r^ N, 
CM CNJ O N <"°l <"A 
U \ w C O 4 w 
O N CM \ A rr\ f*~\ 
r-\ rH H H 
O 
C\J 
3 CM O N 
O N O N O 
CM O N CNJ 
O O N rr\ H 





J J t>- m O N r~- _4 CM - 4 T A 
O N \ A O V " \ \ A N O " I - A O O O C O 
C U l A \ A t ^ O r n c M r H t - - - _ c f r ' r N 
H i—I rH H H H CNJ 
UN NO C1- NO O ON O O N 
O N C O CM "LA N O O T - O C ^ - I ^ - O 
H rA rA H CA CM N O N O 3 
_4 GO UN H 
<?- rA O N 
CM CM CNJ I—1 
1A \ A CO U \ 
rH 
C O H 0 \ N O 
J -
CM 
O N CO O N N O C A 1A o~\ 
H H CNJ 
CM O N O N O S M C O i n n U N 
N O _4 O N H t— N O 
CM N O O N ("A <A "UN 
O ao CM O N CM CM CNI 
N I A \A 4 4 U \ 4 
O 1A rA H NO "LA r*-
O O N O N vO O N NO N O 
rH H ^ 4 0\ 
N O - C f r ^ c M C M O C O ^ f r A H N O H 
C- -Ct l>- H 
\ C w co 4 




_4 C A CN1 CM CM CO [•— _4 
CM CNJ H u\ 4 co H 
n 0 \ I A \ 0 C O C— CO 
U \ fA N O OO O N CA rA rA 
rA XA 1A O N \ 0 J \ 0 O N CM CO O 
NO fA H rA J _4 ON 1A NO vO 4 N 
H H C M C M C M C N j C N j c A r A C N J C M f A _ 4 
4 d \ N CO m c M H c o m v o t ^ ^ H ; 
C O O N O O r H t - - C O i r v C M C M H C M 
^ ( M O N N O f ^ l A O N H C ^ t ^ O O H 
VA CO f- CO N o r l 4 CA 
CO 
CNJ 
3 9 3 X rH1 
O N O H C N j f A _ 4 - l A N O r - - o O O N O H 
\ A N O v O N ^ \ £ \ O \ j p v < p v j j ) v 0 N ( j ) C-j- r j -
c O O \ O H c \ j r O - H / " L r s N O [ - - O O O N O 
" L A I A N O N O N O N O N O N O N O N O ^ O N O t^ -
O N O N O N O N O N O N O N O N O N O N O N O N O N 
r - i r H r H r H r H < - \ r H r H r H H H r - i r H 
r - -O 
<^ cd e 
H 13 O 
I k X! 
N O O cd 
rA J C T) 





N O - P > • 
N O x l \ A 
O N CO T ) O N 
rH Q) cd I 
X! CO - 4 
cp CD O N X> 
•5 TI 
cd a , 
E -
. . o ^ 
^ Xi ^ 
S * cd rH 
N - - XI T) C— 
rt cd O N 
1A H O H - ,H c 
Ci co cd ^ 
• H " O X ! CD 
-P jni co C 
H cd ^ 
H 'Q > ' 
(S cd TJ id 
cd S 
co — ' C 
cd ••> U t— TH l>-
H _ 4 I H 
r x: H 
- H N O <D 
N _ 4 fn T3 
cd O N cd pi 
^ E cd 
U " O 
^ XI N O 
S oo co H 
N O H 
,ij O N », 
B H E • 
cd o w 
PQ H X! O 
O ft 
<tH I I 
x ; H 
x ) o cd 
CD t-i CO 
cd 
r4 
•H S «.-P 
ft o d 
E -rl XA <D 
O 2 rr, E H 











TABLE 5.24 (Continued) 
imports into Ironion Ports, 1975 - 76 / 1977 - 78 
(thousands of tons) 
1975 - 76 1976 - 77 1977 - 78 
Khorramshahr 3,638 4,194 3,860 
BandarShahpour 3,563 4,694 5,640 
Bushire 614 844 864 
Bandar Abbas 1,796 2,508 3,220 
Abadan 932 946 925 
Source: Iran Almanac, 1978, p.325 - 326 
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having recovered by the late 1970's from the Gulf's most severe dose of port congestion, 
described by Owens (1978, p. 164) "as a good example of how a port system can crumble 
under a sudden influx of large amounts of traffic", Iran has suffered a new setback in 
the form of the capture (and damage to) the port of Khorramshahr by invading Iraqi 
forces. This situation of the closure of Khorramshahr means inevitably that Iran will 
have to rely more than usual on Arab entrepots across the Gulf (if it is politically possible) 
to tranship and re-export cargoes for Iranian markers. 
Iran's major port of Khorramshahr (see Table 5.24 ) suffers from similar strategic and site 
disadvantages to the Iraqi port of Basra. Prior to the present hostilities with Iraq, the 
Iranian government seems to have acknowledged this problem by taking the decision to 
concentrate the greater proportion of its port development on the ports of Bandar Abbas and 
Bandar Shahpour. Nonetheless, Khorramshahr still handled over half of Iranian imports 
by sea in the 1970's, though its relative position was being slowly eroded by Bandar Abbas 
and Bandar Shahpour. Khorramshahr's dominance is derived from the fact that it was the 
first Iranian port to accommodate a large deep-water commercial jetty in 1939. Subsequently, 
the number of berths has been increased from 3 in 1955, to 9 in 1973, and 13 in 1980 when 
its nominal capacity was 2.3 million tons per annum. 
The distribution of the Iranian population is uneven with a concentration of urban and 
rural settlements in the north and west of the state and relatively low population densities in 
the south and east. Accordingly, the decision to develop Khorramshahr's neighbouring port of 
Bandar Shahpour in Khuzistan as the state's major seaport for the 1980's reflects both its 
strategic and economic advantages vis a vis its hinterland. Since 1945 the port has been 
linked to its interior hinterland by a spur from rhe trans-Iranian Railway. The number of 
berths have been increased rapidly in the 1970's rising from 6 in 1970, to 14 in 1977, and 
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34 in 1980 (four of which are container berths, plus a LASH terminal), bringing the 
capacity to 16 million tons per annum. 
Bushire is the only deep-water port between Bandar Shahpour and Bandar Abbas, a 
distance of approximately 600 miles. Its facilities are limited to two conventional berths 
and one dolphin berth and it seems that at present the Iranian government have no plans 
either to extend the commercial port or to develop industry in the port area. Its present 
capacity (1980) is estimated at 1 million tons per annum. The weakly developed network 
of ports between the Khor Musa and the Straits of Hormuz partly explains the function 
of the Arabian entrepots of Kuwait, Bahrain and Dubai as suppliers of the smaller towns 
and villages along this long stretch of Iranian coast. 
In contrast to Bushire the port of Bandar Abbas has been developed during the 1970's 
as a major commercial, industrial and naval port for Iran's south east region which is 
over 1000 km from Teheran. In 1967, a new 6 berth port was opened on a site 6 miles 
west of the town, incorporating an ore-loading terminal for the export of chrome ore (from 
Kerman and Sirjan), copper ore (from Sar Cheshmeh) and iron ore (from Gol -e -Gohar ) . 
However during the 1970's the status of Bandar Abbas as a centre for regional development 
has been symbolised by the construction of a new commercial and industrial port (see 
the next section) which opened in 1979, 20 km. from the town. Aside from special berths 
linked to industrialization projects, the new port has a total of 14 conventional, 4 container 
and 2 Ro-Ro berths; together with a LASH terminal, giving it a capacity of 16 million tons 
in 1980. 
In many ways the development of Saudi Arabia's Gulf ports is a mirror image of the 
Iranian process, though with fewer ports involved. Lacking an entrepot function, the Saudi 
ports of Dammam and Jubail (see the next section) serve as both import centres and nodes for 
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Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ports Authority, p.38 
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export orientated industrialization schemes. The Saudi government has concentrated 
investment on Dammam and Jeddah (on the Red Sea) though it has fostered smaller-scale 
projects at J izan, Yenbo (both on the Red Sea) and Qateef. The development of the 
port of Dammam in the 1970's has been rapid. The 7 berths existing in 1973 have been 
increased to 32 conventional, 5 container and 3 Ro-Ro berths by 1980 (Seatrade, July 
1978). Its function is essentially national, serving a wide hinterland in eastern Saudi 
Arabia. 
Qatar and Oman are two small nations which have built new harbours to service 
their respective national hinterlands. In the case of the Qatari port of Doha it has played 
a limited role in the 1960's and 1970*s in transhipping and re-exporting cargoes to Saudi 
Arabia, the U.A . E . and the Iranian coast. However, as each of these states has developed 
its own port facilities this trade has slackened off ( e .g . see section 4 . 7 . 1 , table 4 .28) . 
The port of Doha (see Figure 5.12) has grown along with the rise in imports from 80,300 
tons in 1953, 271,000 tons in 1962, to 912,000 tons in 1979 (Times, Sept. 3 , 1980). The 
deep-water port was opened to traffic in 1970 with a four-berth jetty. This jetty was expanded b} 
an additional five berths in 1977 in the aftermath of the era of mid-decade port congestion 
in the Gulf . In the 1980's, plans to build a second port at Jazirat Alyah (15 km. from Doha) 
encompassing a possible 50 new berths seem questionable both in the light of the general 
drift towards possible berth overprovision in the region, and with regard to the fact that 
currently in excess of 35% (by value) of Qatars imports arrive by road through the Saudi 
customs port at Salwa ( M . E . E . D , April 1977). 
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Oman : Tonnage of cargo Imported into Port Qoboos ond Port Raysout, 
1975 - 1978 , in thousands of tons 
1975 1976 1977 1978 
PortQaboos 1035 1158 1239 1256 
Port Raysout 216 222 250 260 
Source: Oman: Statistical Yearbook, 1978 
p. 59, Table 45 
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Port Qaboos at Matrah (see Figure 5.13) is Oman's only national deep-water port 
save for a small development at Mina Rays out whose four general cargo berths (capacity 
1 million tons per annum in 1980) are disigned to service a hinterland in the southern 
province of Dhofar. The present port of Matrah came into operation in 1974, and was 
trading at slightly less than capacity (1 .5 million tons per annum) in 1977. Towards 
the end of the last decade containers were taking up to 25% of traffic (Owens, 1978) 
which prompted the Oman! government to consider either building a new container berth 
or adapting some of the existing 9 deep-water berths and 3 shallow-water berths for the 
purpose. 
5.4.5 PORT COMPLIMENTARITY 11: SEAPORTS AND INDUSTRIALIZATION IN THE 
GULF 
A general policy in the Gulf states is for government to invest an increasing proportion 
of their oil revenues in major industrialization schemes as part of an overall policy of 
economic diversification. The advantage of seaports as locations for these projects, apart 
from benefits derived from internal and economies of scale, is that they offer the most 
economic sites for developing spatial linkages between overseas commodity markets and 
raw materials, and locally produced energy inputs (Couper 1978). All the Gulf states, 
with the exception of Oman, have by 1980 developed large-scale industrial sites either 
adjacent to commercial ports or at new spatially separate locations with their 
integrated port facilities. Given the resource limitations of the region, the range of 
enterprises tends to be roughly common to most coastal industrial sites in each state - oil 
refining, petrochemicals, fertilisers, aluminium and steel making. Some, but not al l , 
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Specifically, three types of industrial port are present in the contemporary Gulf -
industrial complexes with their integrated port facilities, mixed commercial and industrial 
ports, and ports which include marginal wharves for handling industrial cargoes (e.g. Bandar 
Shahpour, Dammam, Umm Qasr and Sitra-'Alba jetty). 
One ot the earliest examples of an integrated industrial complex and seaport stemmed 
from the decision of the Kuwaiti government to found the Shuaiba Area Industrial Development 
Board in 1964. The industrial area adjacent to the port of Shuaiba consists of a 10 sq. mile 
zone of heavy and medium scale industrial plant, dominated by the Kuwait National 
Fertiliser Company plant and the Kuwait National Petroleum Company Refinery, both of 
which have marketing forelands of international proportions, particularly in the western 
Indian Ocean states. The capacity of the port has been increased in line with the 
development of the industrial area, rising from 900,000 tons per annum in 1967 (five 
conventional berths plus a two-berth oil pier - See figure 5.14) to 1.5 million tons per annum 
in 1973, to 3.5 million tons per annum in 1980 (14 conventional and 1 container berth -
owens, 1978). 
The Qatari port of Umm Said is similar in conception to Shuaiba. It is located 40 km. 
south of Doha and represents the state's industrial diversification programme based on a 
fertiliser and natural gas plant and a steel mill. The port consists of 9 berths, 2 of which are set 
aside for unloading iron ore, 3 for exporting petroleum, and 4 for general cargo (Sucharov, 
1977). In a similar vein, the Iraqi government has built a new industrial port of Khor Al 
Zubair to serve a new petrochemical, fertiliser and steel making complex, south of Basra. 
The port, begun in 1976, was scheduled for completion in 1981 with an operational capacity 
of 5 million tons per annum and consisting of 5 berths, one of which will be used to export 
phosphates {Cockburn 78). 
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On a much larger scale, the development of the Saudi port of Jubail, the Iranian 
port of Bandar Abbas, and the U.A.E. port of Jebel Ali represent the focus of ambitious, 
coastal industrialization projects. Barrett (1978) has described the Jubail s<r»mes as an 
excellent example of a 'macro-project' ( i .e. consisting of large single -purpose engineering 
projects, geographically confined to a designated site, utilising proven, state of the art 
technology). Under a scheme began in 1976. The Royal Commission for Jubail (and Yenbou 
on the Red Sea) is supervising the transformation of the small fishing village of Jubail 
(90 km. north of Dammam) into a major urban community of 200,000 people based upon 
the development of a large-scale port and industrial area. Under the direction of the 
General Petroleum and Minerals Organisation (PETROMIN) and the Saudi Basic Industries 
Corporation (SABIC) the new city will have 16 primary industries in its overall plan -
consisting of 2 export refineries, 4 petrochemical plants, 1 lube-oil refinery, 1 petroprotein 
plant, 1 polyisoprene plant, 2 methanol plants, 1 steel mill, 1 aluminium smelter (and bulk 
terminal) and 2 fertiliser plants. The major port development involved consists of both a 
commercial and an industrial port. The first two commercial berths were opened in 1978. By 
1980 the commercial harbour had an additional 14 berths (of which two are container berths). 
The industrial harbour will eventually consist of a further 14 berths for general use, a tanker 
terminal, and additional berths to handle bulk cargoes of iron-ore, sulphur, limestone, 
alumina and salt. 
At a smaller scale, the new industrial harbour of Bandar Abbas, adjacent to the commercial 
port, was opened in 1979. Planned as a focus for industrialization in south east Iran, its 
specialized berths can export iron ore, copper ore and chrome ore, and import bulk grain. 
The port also includes a tanker berth, shipyard, and 2 dry docks. 
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A parallel venture to the Juba il development is the creation of what is in effect a new 
planned city of 400,000 based on a new industrial complex at Jebel Ali in the U .A .E . , 20 
miles south west of Dubai. This project has been termed "controversial" (Halcrow, M.E.E.D. 
1978) and a "white elephant" (May, Middle East Construction, Sept, 1977) because of its 
scale and apparent audacity. On shore, a planned industrial free zone is scheduled to include 
by 1982, an aluminium smelter, steel mill, vehicle assembly plant, liquid petroleum gas 
plant and a desalinization plant (Smith 1978). A very large new port scheduled to include 
perhaps as many as 60 berths by 1982 ( 5 of which were operational by 1978) is planned to 
include specialized berths for bulk handling, transit cargoes, petroleum products and 
containers, as well as conventional berths. 
A further aspect of industrialization and port development in the Gulf relates to the 
establishment of national, Pan-Arab and joint venture shipping fleets (see Chapter 5.3.3 
and 5.3.4). The creation of such a shipping industry, if it is to be effective, requires 
the development of appropriate back-up schemes including "management, brokerage, 
marketing, surveying, insurance and legal services, ship repair services and maritime 
education" (Couper 1978, p. 110). In this regard the ports of Bahrain, Dubai and Bandar 
Abbas are the sites of ship repair docks. To date, the repair yard at Bahrain (Arab Ship 
Repair Yard - A . S . R . Y . ) is the most successful (E . I .U . 1978, p. 71). ASRY is financed 
by 7 constituent members of OAPEC - Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Qatar, Libya and 
the U.A.E. (Except Dubai) - and is a symbol of OAPEC's purpose of developing industry in 
the Gulf. Like the rival yard in Dubai, a major operational problem has been the hiring 
of foreign management and skilled labour, However, in ASRY's case it has been partially 
solved by the agreement of the Portuguese firm, LISNAVE to operate the yard for 10 years 
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from 1977 onwards. The yard is situated at the end of a 6 km. causeway south of Ras Al 
Hidd (Muharraq Island) and consists of one dry dock (maximum capacity 500,000 dwf), 
four wet repair docks, two marginal wharves and an import quay. 
Neither ASRY, or the facility at Dubai, are expected to be profitable yards in 
the near future (M .E .E .D . , April 1978) because of the high capital costs ( the cost of the 
Dubai project rose from £91 million in 1973 to £232 in 1978 because of inflation - Civil 
Engineering, Oct. 1978), high labour costs, the addition of two further dry docks at Bandar 
Abbas, and the state of the international shipping market. The Dubai project which, along 
with Port Rashid, symbolizes the advancement of the emirate from a dhow port to a major 
international shipping and ship repair centre in twenty years, Is planned to include 3 dry 
docks (one with a capacity of 1 million dwt), two of which were operational by 1980. 
5.4.6 PORT COMPETITION 1 - THE UPPER GULF 
KUWAIT 
As already mentioned, the Iraqi and Iranian deep-water ports are essentially 'national* 
in function, with trade between the two states presently stopped by military confrontation. 
"Competition in the context of the upper Gulf therefore involves the port of Kuwait as a 
harbour which handles cargoes destined from Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia. 
The main commercial port of Mina Shuwaikh lies to the west of the 'old city* of Kuwait. 
It has been expanded steadily over the last 30 years coincident with the most rapid change in 
the social and economic development of the state. In the period following World War Two 
it was apparent that a combination of a deep-water anchorage and a sprawling dhow harbour 
protected by two miles of rubble breakwaters was inadequate to cope with the build up of 
trade which rose from 50,000 tons of imports in 1947 to 450,000 tons by 1954 (Rendel, Palmer 






















Kuwait: Number of vessels entering the port of Shuwaikh and total tonnage 
discharged, 1973 - 1976 
Number of Vessels Tonnage discharged 
1973 1161 1304046 
1974 1167 1781857 
1975 1615 2003926 
1976 1804 4716000 
Source: Annual Statistical Abstract, 1977 
Ministry of Planning, State of Kuwait 
Tables 252 and 253. 
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Notwithstanding Kuwait's traditional role as an entrepot serving communities in the 
upper Gulf littoral, Mina Shuwaikh was developed essentially as a 'national' seaport. 
Tte first permanent deep-water berths were opened in 1959 (4 berths) by which time 
trade had risen to 1 million ton per annum. Subsequently the port was extended along 
the western shore (in 1968) and out to sea via a series of encompassing breakwaters in 
the period 1970 - 1980 - See Figure 5.15. The western extension provided an additional 
4 berths, increasing the port capacity to 2.5 million tons by 1973. In the latest period of 
development the port capacity has risen from 4.5 million tons per annum in 1976 to 6 million 
tons by 1980 via the addition of a further 10 conventional and 2 container berths. In 
1980, the port of Shuwaikh handled 4 million tons of cargo, 500,000 tons of which was 
transhipped to Iraq (Times, June 6, 1980). 
In reality, the function of Shuwaikh vis a vis neighbouring ports in Iraq, Iran and 
Saudi Arabia (specifically, Basra-Umm Qasr, Khorramshahr, Bandar Shahpour, Bushire 
and Dammam) is perhaps in a sense more complimentary than competitive. At the height 
of the universal period of port congestion In the mid 1970's the port of Kuwait helped 
neighbouring stares cope with the problem. It has been estimated that 35 - 40% of all 
Kuwaiti imports during this period were in fact transit cargoes for Iraq and Saudi Arabia 
(M.E .E .D. , April 1977) , a large proportion of which passed through the port of Kuwait. 
Clearly this proportion can be expected to fluctuate, even drop sharply, as the Saudi 
ports of Dammam and Jubail, and the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr reach their planned capacities. 
However, as recent events have shown, the closure of the ports of Basra, Khorramshahr 
and Abadan (because of the war between Iraq and Iran) is an invitation for the port of 
Kuwait to channel cargoes in transit by sea or road. Clearly therefore, this Kuwaiti 'help' 
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can also be construed as competition in the sense that these transit cargoes could, and should, 
have been imported directly by neighbouring ports. 
Chapter 4 has demonstrated that the relationship between Kuwaiti and Iranian ports 
is clearly competitive in the sense that the extent of dhow flows between Kuwait and the 
smaller ports and villages on the Iranian coast reveals that the dhows operating out of the port 
of Kuwait are channeling certain re-exported commodities which ought in theory to have 
arrived via seaward and landward distribution networks from the Iranian ports of Khorramshahr, 
Bandar Shahpour and Bushire. In the 1980's it is likely that this trading relationship will 
persist unless there are alterations in the tariff differentials between Kuwait and Iran (see 
Chapter 4.62), or changes In the Iranian Internal transport network, possibly including 
the development of Ro-Ro and LASH systems capable of serving the more remote Iranian 
coastal settlements. 
5.4.7 PORT COMPETITION 11 - THE MIDDLE GULF 
BAHRAIN 
Exploiting the island's central position in the Gulf has always been the crux of the 
commercial activity of Bahraini merchants and businessmen. As such, the economic health 
of the state has depended on the commercial vibrancy of its harbours through which pass 
important transit and re-export cargoes destined for the mainland. In the contemporary 
situation the deep-water port of Bahrain (Mina Sulman), and its associated dhow harbour 
at Manama, are placed in a competitive relationship with Dammam, Juball, Doha and Bushire. 
In this context Chapter 4 has demonstrated the spatial configuration of Bahraini dhow trades 
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The government annual report of 1958 gave a clear statement of the policy which 
underlay the development of the state's deep-water port facilities: "Our constant 
endeavour must therefore be to keep Bahrain in the eye of all industrialized countries and 
other Gulf countries as a storehouse of the Arabian Gulf, from which their goods can 
be delivered more speedily and cheaply than they can from the original source" (p.5). The 
storehouse policy was strengthened by the opening of Mina Sulman and its associated 
transit and storage warehouses in 1962. In 1973, the original 6 berths were estimated to 
have a total capacity of 450,000 tons per annum - see Figure 5.16. However, during the 
period of the mid-1970's Mina Sulman suffered from both a lack of berthing and warehousing 
space. In mid-1977 the Port Authority estimated that as much as 7QP/o of goods imported 
were being stored in the port for period in excess of 6 months. The extension of the port 
by an additional 2 conventional, 2 container and 1 Ro-Ro berths, and associated storage 
facilities (completed in 1979), has helped alleviate congestion. 
However, by 1980 the nature of Mina Sulman's competitive relationship with the mainland 
had changed markedly from the position ten years earlier. Chapter 4 has demonstrated 
that in volume terms (tonnage and value) by far the most significant entrepot trade links 
Bahrain with the Saudi ports of Dammam, Al Khobar and Qateef. A number of factors have 
now combined together to make it likely that the nature and volume of this trade will alter 
in the 1980's. Firstly, the Saudi government has developed the ports of Dammam and Jubail 
to a point where they now have adequate berthing space to accommodate incoming 
vessels under normal trading circumstances. Secondly, the construction of a causeway 
linking the main island of Bahrain to the Saudi mainland will largely curtail the need for the 
conveyance of transit cargoes by dhow. Thirdly, pressure from the Bahraini government placed 
on merchants to reduce the time they have traditionally stored cargoes in the port ( i .e. until 
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market conditions are favourable) has upset the operation of transit and re-export trades. 
In this regard the government has reduced the maximum storage time from 2 years to 2 months, 
and the banks of Bahrain have been squeezing merchants by refusing credit for companies 
with uncleared goods. The significance of goods stored in port warehouses can be guaged from 
the fact that in 1976 - 77 the government raised B.D. 1 million from the sale of uncleared 
goods. Added to these pressures, merchants have had to contend with a 65% increase in 
handling charges in the wake of the employment of the Korean firm Young Kim Enterprises 
in 1977 to help clear the quayside congestion. Taken together, these factors mean that 
Bahraini merchants in the 1980's will have to show all their commercial skill and enterprise 
if they are to hold onto traditional markets inside Saudi Arabia. 
Transit and re-export trades elsewhere in the Gulf are likewise threatened by port 
development programmes and the introduction of new shipping technology.. Qatar and the 
U.A.E. are now furnished with adequate deep-water harbours. Iran, however, has not 
expanded its small deep-water port of Bushire in the middle-Gulf and it is therefore likely 
that the dhow-based (possibly supplemented by feeder Ro-Ro and LASH systems) re-export trade 
from Bahrain to Iran will continue in the 1980's though with competition from other Gulf 
entrepots. In general however, it seems highly probable that the traditional entrepot trades 
carried on through Bahrain will be increasingly squeezed via a combination of port development 
and the application of new technology in transport elsewhere in the Gulf. 
5.4.8 PORT COMPETITION 111 - THE LOWER GULF 
THE EMIRATES 
The development of seaports in the United Arab Emirates is characterized by both its 
lateness and intensity. The U.A.E. was founded in 1971 by federating the existing seven 
emirates, some of which have a history inter-emirate political and economic rivalry. Despite 
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T A B L E 5.28 
S P A C I N C O F P O R T S IN T H E E M I R A T E S 
( A p p r o x i m a t e d i s t a n c e s on p a v e d r o a d s in mi les) 
D e s t i n a t i o n : 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
O r i g i n : 
1 A b u Dhab i - 90 98 102 118 144 168 186 
2 D u b a i 90 - 8 12 28 54 78 96 
3 S h a r j a h 98 8 - 4 20 46 70 88 
4 A jman 102 12 4 - 16 39 74 92 
5 Umm A l Q a i w a i n 118 28 20 16 - 32 90 108 
6 R a s al Kha imah 144 54 46 39 74 - 80 98 
7 F u j a i r a h 168 78 70 74 90 116 - 18 
8 K h o r F a k k a n 186 96 88 92 108 98 18 -
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the union, the co-ordination of economic planning in the first ten years of the state's 
existence has been fractured, and there evidence to suppose that each emirate is proceeding 
with a programme of economic development regardless of the greater degree of economic 
rationalisation and specialization that might have been expected to follow the creation of 
the state. 
Projects involving the development of seaports in the emirates exemplify this continuing 
spirit of inter-emirate rivalry. During the last decade Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah and Ras 
Al Khaimah have all embarked on the construction of major deep-water port facilities, 
while the remaining three emirates are either contemplating the construction of large-scale 
ports (Fujairah), or else have commissioned more modest projects (Ajman and Umm Al Qaiwain). 
The key question in this context is not so much the number of berths built (93 are due to be 
operational by 1982 - see Table 1.2) but whether the ports constructed constitute viable 
economic ventures, or whether some of them at least are essentially prestige projects which 
are liable to operate at a loss and represent a drain on the emirate's resources. 
At the base of the skeptism as to the viability of so many berths in the state lies 
the fact that the ports are closely spaced together (see Table 5.25) and that their common 
national hinterland outside each individual port city or town is limited (with the exception 
of Al Ain) to small, scattered rural communities in the desert and mountaineous interior. 
In 1978 the United Nations estimated the total population of the U.A.E. to be only 
558,000 (U.N. Commission for Western Asia.) In the south, the location of the port of 
Abu Dhabi is such that it commands a hinterland roughtly corresponding to the boundary 
of the emirate, though with some competition from Sharjah and particularly Dubai. In 
the northern Emirates however, the situation is more critical because two major seaports, 
Dubai and Sharjah, are only 8 miles apart and compete for trade in a hinterland which is 
complicated by both the political patchwork of non-contiguous enclaves belonging to 
different emirates, and by the addition of Ras Al Khaimah, Khor Fakkan and possibly 
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Fujairah, as new deep-water ports serving the same area. 
In terms of hinterlands, the ports of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah and Khor Fakkan 
(when and i f its container distribution service becomes firmly established) service markets 
inside Oman. However, the reverse trade of the Omani port of Matrah serving markets 
inside the U.A.E . is minimal. 
However, with respect to forelands, the port of Dubai has a different function from 
each of its fellow emirates. Dubai alone has developed a vigourous overseas re-export 
trade in the Gulf , Gulf of Oman and the western Indian sub-continent, in sharp contrast 
to all the other ports of the U.A.E. (with the exception of Sharjah - Khor Fakkan whose 
Imdward container distribution extends into Arabia) whose ports are primarily local ports 
serving national hinterlands in the emirates. 
Any assessment of the scale of port development in the emirates has to take into account 
the over-riding economic circumstances. The construction of deep-water harbours in the U.A.E. 
has for the most part been under taken in the 1970's. The first eight years (1970 - 77) were 
set in the context of a buoyant, oil-led U.A.E . economy, the last two saw the influence of the 
general world economic recession take effect. The majority of the port development projects 
were planned and built in the era 1970-77 and represented in part a response to business 
confidence reflected in the high level of ordering in the private and public sectors (and the 
consequent port congestion), in part a response to changes in shipping technology, and in 
part political nervousness in each emirate which was reflected in plans to ensure economic 
self-sufficiency by constructing essential infrastructure. 
The development of Port Zayed, Abu Dhabi (see Figure 5.17) reflects a change In 
response as the 1970's proceeded. Prior to federation in 1971, the government of Abu Dhabi 
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took the decision to build a deep-water harbour in response to congested conditions in its 
open roadstead which had precipitated shipping conferences into imposing surcharges. 
Imports Into Abu Dhabi (over 90% of which arrive by sea) had risen from 8135 dwt discharged 
in 1965 to 198,041 in 1971. By 1971, a proportion of the emirates imports were arriving 
through the U.A.E. 's principal port of Dubai. The rapid development of the emirates 
(expressed in terms of urban development, and the construction of industrial and infrastructure 
projects) would appear to justify the opening of the 6 berth port in 1972# and its subseque nt 
expansion to 18 berths by 1980, though in less politically fragmented circumstances one 
might have expected Dubai to have handled much of the traffic through its port. During 
this phase of construction one Ro-Ro berth (1978) and two container berths were Included 
to cater for the increase in unitized trades that followed the 1975-1977 port congestion 
era. A further response to the build up of trade in the mid 1970's involved the planned 
addition of a 34 berth outer harbour. However, in late 1977 these plans were cancelled 
in the light of the down-turn in trade levels (reflected in berths lying idle at the port -
Smith 1978) and the scale of port development elsewhere in the federation. 
Throughout the rest of the U.A.E . the pattern of port development appears to have 
proceeded through the 1970's regardless of the development of roads across the peninsula, 
and hence regardless of over-lapping hinterlands. By the beginning of the 1980's, Dubai 
had firmly established itself as the maf or seaport of the emirates (chiefly by virtue of its 
sizeable entrepot trade with Iran, India and Pakistan) though its paramountcy had to a 
certain extent been eroded by the development of Abu Dhabi and Sharjah. Given the size 
of the northern emirates region, Dubai ought logically to have functioned as the one major 
seaport of the region, capable of servi cing all its neighbouring emirates to the north. 
However, economic and political rivalry within the federation seems to have over-riden 

























At the lower end of the port hierarchy Ajman and Umm Al Qaiwain have each 
constructed a wharf capable of berthing deep-draught conventional vessels £ iv i l 
Engineering, Oct, 1977). Presumably these wil l be used to accommodate occasional 
direct deliveries of cement or other construction materials. Fujairah commissioned a 
deep-water berth in the Gulf of Oman in 1978, though future plans to extend this project 
by an additional 9 berths during the 1980's seem questionable in the context of its small 
(primarily rural)h inter land and competition from Khor Fakkan and other higher order 
centres on the Gulf coast. Similarly, the new port Saqr (Ras Al Kaimah) which comprises 
4 conventional berths 2 container berths and 1 Ro-Ro berth (Owens, 1978) would appear 
to be a duplication of facilities in Dubai and Sharjah that are capable of servicing the 
emirate. 
Undoubtedly the most critical case of apparent duplication of port facilities is the 
situation with respect to Dubai and Sharjah. Dubai was first off the mark in stabilizing 
its creek and constructing creek wharves over a twenty five year period from the mid 
1950's to 1980 (see Figure 5.18). This investment was to prove the foundation of the 
emirates vigourous entrepot trade. The deep-water harbour of Port Rashid (see Figure 5.19) 
was opened in 1971 with a total of 15 berths - a size which seemed excessive at the time, 
but the growth of trade during the 1970's confirmed its validity. In contrast to Abu Dhabi 
the ruler of Dubai, Shaikh Rashid, stuck to his decision to exterdPort Rashid by an additional 
22 berths (5 of which handled container ships, and 2 for Ro-Ro vessels) by 1980. The basis 
of this decision appears to lie in Shaikh Rashid's determination that Dubai shall remain 
"primus inter pares" among the Gulf emirates (Shipping World and Shipbuilder, Jan, 1976, 



























Source: Dubai Annual Trade Review, 1980, p. 65 
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the general growth of trade in the mid 1970's, coupled with the rapid urban development 
of the emirate, necessitated port expansion beyond the 15 berth mark, though whether 
the size arrived at is appropriate in terms of competition from neighbouring emirates 
remains to be seen. An indication of trend however is reflected in the fact that general 
cargo handled in Port Rashid in 1978 was 25% down on 1977 (M.E.E.D. , Dec . 78). 
The development of Sharjah's two ports at PortKhatrdand Khor Fakkan (on the Gulf of 
Oman) is perhaps the most controversial in the U . A . E . , especially as prior to their 
construction Sharjah was adequately served (along with the other northern emirates) by 
Port Rashid . Some commentators concede that although Sharhah is merely trying to 
maintain its business independence from Dubai, "the duplication of facilities is hard to 
brush aside" (M.E.E.D. Dec 1978). However, although to a certain extent port 
facilities at Sharjah and Dubai have been duplicated, the primary aim of Sharjah is 
certainly not a duplication of function. Port development at Sharjah and Khor Fakkan 
has to be seen as a linked project designed to furnish the emirate with a specialization in 
the rapid handling and onward conveyance of unitized cargoes by offering a ful ly 
integrated service that meshes together facilities for seabourne traffic with those of road 
transport. 
The decision to expand the existing two berth jetty at Sharjah town (see Figure 5.20) 
and the jetty at Khor Fakkan was taken at a period when trade levels (and attendent part 
congestion) were building up in the aftermath of the 1973/74 oil price rises. The 
government of Sharjah took a decision to invest in facilities for handling containerized 
vessels which at that time were just beginning to make a significant penetration on Gulf 
shipping routes. Work began in 1976 on what appeared to be a far-sighted project to 
construct 2 berth container terminal at Khor Fakkan which would be capable of handling 
the largest 'third generation' container vessels (up to 57, 000 dwt) which would then not 
need to enter the Gulf (and would consequently save the operating costs involved in the 
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normal multiple call system). The role of Khor Fakkan is therefore to act as a 
transhipment port for onward conveyance of containers by road or sea to markers in 
the Gulf . 
A second purpose-built container terminal (the first built in the Gulf) was incorporated 
into the re-design of Port Khalid (Sharjah town) and was opened in 1976. The new port 
consisted of a two-berth container terminal, a Ro-Ro berth and four general cargo berths. 
In the first year of trade 1976-77, Port Khalid handled 750,000 tons of cargo (at the 
height of port congestion in the Gul f ) . However, trade fell 10% in the first five months 
of 1978 as the trade recession began to bite causing "a banking crisis which caused something 
of a liquidity crisis accentuating matters into a sharp fall in the volume of cargo being 
imported" (M.E.E.D. Dec, 1978, p. 55). In fact, during 1978, 18% of all imports were 
made up of cement (M.E.E.D. op cit) indicating that the level of trade relates significantly 
to the pace of economic development (particularly in the construction industry) in the 
emirates. The commensurate drop of 25% in Port Rahid's trade level during that year slso 
indicates that the opening of Port Khalid had affected the level of trade through Dubai 
during that year; however, i t is still the case that the largest share of Sharjah's imports 
still arrive through Port Rashid and not Port Khalid. The continued existence of these two 
ports 'side by side' probably depends in the immediate future on each maintaining specialist 
functions ( i . e . entrepot trade in the case of Dubai, container trades in the case of 
Sharjah) which are to a degree mutually exclusive. The decision by the Sharjah government 
in 1977 to cut back on planned 8 berth extension to Port Khalid by 4 berths in response to a 
down-turn in trade must also be viewed in part as a tacit acknowledgement that although 
Sharjah in the 1980's may well develop a successful, integrated container trade, Dubai 
wi l l remain as the region's primary entrepot. 
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5.4.9 FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
At first- glance the extensive port development projects now under way in the Gulf 
would seem to support the view that there wi l l soon be (in the 1980's) considerable over-
capacity for handling conventional cargoes in the region. However, a more considered 
view of the situation, particularly with regard to political aspects, casts doubt on the validity 
of Jumping to this conclusion in so far as It affects some states. 
Whereas it is already apparent that the Gulf states are having difficulty in the short 
term in finding trained and skilled labour to man to the f u l l , the expensive port facilities 
now built, it nonetheless appears the case that some, i f not a l l , of the Gulf states are 
deliberately building in over-capacity and duplication. At the root lies the general political 
instability of the region. The narrow sea lanes passing through the Straits of Hormuz are 
not only the so-called jugular vein of the "Western Economies" but are also key access 
routes for vital raw materials and products involved in the drive for industrial diversification 
in the Gulf. Three narrow waterways - the Shatt Al Arab, the Straits of Hormuz and the Bab 
Al Mandab (at the entrance to the Red Sea) - are each bordered by states with a recent 
history of military conflict. Blockage at any one of these three has serious implications on the 
level of traffic passing through the other two. In this regard expensive port development in 
Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran seems less as an expensive waste of money leading to over-capacity 
and duplication, but more as a form of political insurance. 
CHAPTER 6 
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"To many it must seem that we live in an age of moronic 
decision-making." 
(C. West Churchman, 1968) 
"It has been said.that philosophers create systems because 
it gives them a nice warm comfortable feeling inside." 
(M. Eliot Hurst, 1973) 
"Development means the development of people. Road, 
buildings, the increase in crop output . . . . are not 
development: they are only the tools of development." 
(President Dr . J . Nyerere, 1968) 
6.1 RE-EXAM I NAT I ON OF HYPOTHESIS 
The specific hypothesis under examination is : 
"That since 1865, the intrusion of non-indigenous transport technology has 
resulted in the spatial dismemberment of a former maritime trading system based on 
dhow transport and the formation of two systems, one traditional and one modern, 
that are structurally and behaviourolly discrete." 
Reduced to its basic intention, this hypothesis implies that there is a clear, measurable 
relationship between the process of modernization and the creation of both constructive 
and desfnictive forces within a traditional social framework. 'Modernization' is here 
defined, "as the process of change toward those types of social, economic and political 
systems that have developed in Western Europe and North America from the seventeenth 
century to the nineteenth and then have spread to other European countries and in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries to the South America, Asia and Africa continents." 
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(Eisenstadt, S .N. 1966, p . l ) . Put another way, the social impact of modernization, in 
the case of transport facilities, unlike the economic impact (Gauthier, 1970; Wilson, 
1966) cannot be viewed as having a 'neutral' effect; rather it is either good or bad, positive 
or negative, creative or distinctive, depending on community perspective. Modernization 
implies a dicotomy between the traditional and the modern, the latter being superimposed 
on, and displacing the other. 
The veracity of this hypothesis is best examined in two stages: Firstly, did the intrusion 
of 'modern' transport and communication facilities dismember a former pattern of life? 
Secondly, i f the former assertion is correct, has i t contributed towards the creation of two 
structurally and behaviourally discrete socio-economic systems - one traditional and one 
modern? 
1. Did the intrusion of modern transport and communication facilities 
dismember a former pattern of l ife based on trading in dhows? 
The evidence clearly indicates that the forces of modernization brought about by 
European contact since 1507 have contributed to both a decline in the volume and 
importance of dhow traffic in the Gulf , and, a spatial reorientation of the network of routes. 
It appears that the effects on this contract were felt post 1862, rather than in the earlier 
era of Portuguese dominance in the Gulf . In the period 1507-1650, the Portuguese 
certainly disrupted certain trade routes, and ultimately influenced the redesign of the 
basic structure in sailing craft in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf , but the overall 
spatial pattern of economic life linking the Gulf , India and East Africa remained Intact 
until the mid-nineteenth century. Data appears to indicate that the intrusion of superior, 
'revolutionary' transport technology into the Gulf post 1862 was the most influential process 
of change rather than the presence of extra-regional political interference. In short, the 
311 
steamer provided competition for dhow transport, particularly on the long haul India-Gulf 
and East Africa-Gulf routes. Landen (1967) has used the oversimplified term 'destructive' 
to label the competitive effect of steamer transport on sail-powered dhows in the post 
1862 era. The evidence, although patchy, is that dhow transport was not destroyed by the 
process of competition from the steamship, i t has merely contracted spatially back to the second 
of its two original functions: namely the traditional long distance, dhow based, exchange 
trade between the Gulf and the Arabian, West Indian and East Africa coasts has almost 
completely ceased; whereas, its secondary role of redistributing commodities imported into 
the major Gulf entrepots and re-exported to other parts of the Gulf l i t toral , and the Indian 
and Pakistani coast, continues. In this regard, Dubai, Kuwait and Bahrain are the three 
ports maintaining this entrepot function. Operationally therefore, the Gulf's motorized 
dhow trading system is now confined to the waters of the Persian Gulf , Gulf of Oman, and 
Indian and Pakistani coasts; its links with East Africa and South Arabia having all but 
ceased. Loss of the African connections confirms spatial dismemberment but not total 
destruction. However, the present contracted system is itself under threat from the 'second 
wave' of modernization in transport, namely competition from new technology in shipping 
and from road and air transport services within the Gulf. 
2. Has the dismemberment contributed towards the creation of two 
structurally and behaviourally discrete socio-economic systems, 
one traditional and one modern? 
(A) STRUCTURE 
The nature of the process of modernization that has accompanied the intrusion of new 
transport technology and the development and export of petroleum resources beginning In 
Iran (1908) and spreading to Bahrain (1934)*, Saudi Arabia (1938)*, Kuwait (1964)*, 
Qatar (1949)*, United Arab Emirates (1962)* and Oman (1967)* (* dates refer to first 
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exports of crude) has been to integrate the economies of each of the Gulf states into the 
wider 'world trading system'. The Persian Gulf states are now inexorably linked by 
virtue of their oil resources to interdependent world development processes. However, 
despite state economic integration into world affairs, a social dualism exists in the 
Gulf which mirrors the extent to which development programmes have really changed 
the lives of most of the inhabitants. 
Traditional Society 
Dhow transport can be regarded as the symbolic and real embodiment of what 
survives of the traditional spatial structure of Gulf society, consisting of a network of 
dhow routes connecting large ports and coastal villages together in a system for the 
exchange of local commodities, information and people. Section 3.3 illustrates that 
'traditional' society is in structural contraction, increasingly being limited to parts of the 
Gulf which have yet to experience many of the physical manifestations of development 
in the 'petroleum exporting era'. This means, in practice, that dhows perform a social 
and economic function in supplying peripheral regions (small coastal village communities) 
with those items which are not easily procurable by virtue of the inability of development 
programmes to spread out from the economic 'core' areas of states (Hirschman, 1958). In 
short, dhows perform a social, structural role in linking Gulf developmental 'cores' with 
neglected 'peripheries'. 
Modern Society 
In terms of trade interconnection, the Gul fs deep-water ports (and oil terminals) 
have become the foci i linking the Gulf to the World economic trading partners. As such, 
the pattern of urban and industrial development in the Gulf has concentrated on the port 
cities which have become the centre for the concentration of investment change. 
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(B) BEHAVIOUR 
Traditional and Modern society in the Gulf may be differentiated in terms of the 
degree to which it exercises internal control over the procurement and distribution of 
its resources. In terms of maritime transport, this means that whereas dhow transport 
was essentially controlled internally by local Arab and Persian merchants and seamen, 
modern ocean transport is run, in most cases, by overseas shipping companies and 
shipping conferences, and modern port development is subject to planning and construction 
by overseas contractors. 
Traditional Society 
Chapter * highlights the fact that, although in decline, dhow transport is in 
local hands. As such, dhow transport is able to adopt a policy of adaptation, internally 
controlled, designed to counter the threats posed by competitive transport modes and unhelpful 
governments, by specializing in the carriage of commodities on trade routes which take 
advantage of local economic and political circumstances, of which differential tariff 
systems form the basis. 
Modern Society 
In contrast, modern society, by virtue of its involvement in wider world affairs, is 
responsive to an array of external stimuli. Section 5.1 indicates that port congestion in 
the Gulf , the pattern of which is a function of spatial imbalance in the rate of port 
development, is in fact exacerbated by the phenomenon known as 'overtonnaging', itself 
the product of unco-ordinated shipping services controlled by non-indigenous shipping 
lines. Further, the decisions of World shipping conferences in fixing the levels of 'additionals' 
and'surcharges' on cargoes carried to the Gulf have a key influence on nSe pattern of port 
development in ftSe region. 
Equilibrium and Society 
in the Persian Gulf 







M Indigenous society utilising traditional technology 
A2 Indigenous society adopting modern technology 
8 Influence of the outside world 
i 
F I G U R E 6.1 
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Maritime Transport and Social Equilibrium 
The results of this research project broadly confirm the original hypothesis. The 
traditional dhow trading system has been shown to have been largely displaced by a 
modern system based on steamer transport, isolating a smaller, contracting dhow 
transport system to perform the subsidiary role of redistribution within the Gulf . 
In systems terms, this process of change is represented diagrammatical I y in Figure 
6 .1 . A trajectory of 'system states* is depicted in four eras. The Persian Gulf Maritime 
Trading System behaved morphostatically until 1862. In the period before the arrival 
of the Portuguese in 1507, the system was indigenously controlled in pursuance of the 
local goal of acquiring and redistributing resources. Despite disruption by the Portuguese, 
and to a limited extent by the British, the homeostatic process maintained the system 
in its original form in the period 1507 - 1862. In this period traditional social and 
economic values (Al - see Fig. 6.1) remained essentially separate from the values of 
exogamous political elite present in the Gulf . Post 1862, the system's behaviour has 
been essentially 'morphogenetic*. Post 1862, the influence of the outside world (B) has 
been felt through its introduction of the steamship, and its later economic interest in the 
Gulf's oil resources, which clashed with the original commercial and social goals of the 
system. Subsequently, 'traditional' society in the Gulf has split into a growing proportion 
of the local community who have adopted the use of modern technology, (A2), and a 
declining proportion who utilise traditional technology, including dhow transport ( A l ) . 
6 .2 . PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
This research has a pioneering function as no comparable study of port development and 
local shipping in the Persian Gulf has been previously attempted. As such, the simple 
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collection of hitherto unassembled arrays of data is perhaps its major contribution 
to further studies. The practical conclusions drawn below must be necessarily 
limited to those aspects analysed: the nature of this thesis is that it asks as many 
questions as it answers, and these may form the basis for future research in the 
field. 
1. The Survival of Dhow Transport 
Research indicates that the following four dhow routes are likely to survive 
into the foreseeable future by virtue of their commercial viability and lack of 
competition from road transport, although each may be subject to competition from 
unitized feeder shipping systems. 
1. Dubai - Towns and villages on Iranian coast 
2 . Kuwait - ditto 
3. Muscat - ditto 
4. Dubai - Indian subcontinent 
It is urged that future research monitors trade patterns on the above routes, together 
with the following six routes which are judge to be under threat of curtailment by virtue 
of competition deriving from the pattern of road development within Arabia. 
1. Kuwait Basra 
2 . Al Khobar - Doha 
3. Abu Dhabi - Muscat 
4 . Abu Dhabi - Dubai 
5 . Muscat Dubai 
6. Bahrain (Manama) - Saudi Arabia (Al Khobar) 
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2. Port Development 
The two decades 1960 - 1980 have seen an era of comprehensive development and 
expansion and port facilities throughout all of the Gulf states. Fears that the pattern 
of port development is too extensive, representing in some cases a waste of scarce national 
resources are possibly unjustified. It is, as yet, too early to judge. Certainly each state 
requires, in the absence of regional co-operation, the strategic and economic security 
afforded by adequate seaport facilities. Port expansion schemes at Khorramshahr, Kuwait, 
Bandar Shahpour and Bandar Abbas and Dammam appear justified in relation to the rate 
of growth of throughput, particularly of imports, though Chapter 5 indicates that present 
problems of congestion may be due in part to an over-proliferation of shipping services on 
certain routes, Dubai's expansion scheme at Port Rashid seems justified given the nature 
of the port and its significance in its na**onal economy, together with the promising trend 
(see Section 3.4.2) in terms of the growth of trade. Port development at Doha, Abu Dhabi, 
Matrah and Bandar Abbas was justified in relation to the previous non-existence of deep-
water ports exacerbated by the high 'outsort' additional and surcharges formerly levied by 
shipping conferences. 
Research indicates that future research projects should focus on the following potentially 
significant developments :-
1. The threat posed, if any, by the port of Dammam's expa nsion and the causeway 
linking Bahrain with the Saudi mainland with reference to the Bahraini-Saud? 
entrepot trade, and its implications for a possible expansion of trie port of Mina 
Sulman. 
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2. A possible over-provision of deep-water harbours in the United Arab 
Emirates. In particular, the expansion of the ports of Mina Zayed 
(Abu Dhabi> Part Khalid ,(Sharjak), Ras Al Khaimah and Fujairah 
would seem questionable in relation to Dubai's pre-existing trading 
expertise. 
3 . The threat posed by the construction of a deep-water harbour at Muscat 
(Matrah) to the pattern of trade presently conducted between the 
Unitsd Arab Emirates and Oman. 
4 . The relatively insignificant role played by Bushire in the Iranian 
system of seaports. 
5 . The significance of port, and industrial development at Bandar Abbas 
in the context of developing the underdeveloped and peripheral 
south-eastern region of Iran. 
6. The general expansion of containerization (in all its forms) in the 
Gulf . 
3. Shipping Development , 
Research has focused on the role shipping lines have in the development of the 
state in both early and later stages. One principle conclusion may be drawn in the 
context of the Gulf . Firstly, that a lack of rationalization among shipping lines, 
particularly on routes from India, Pakistan, and the eastern seaboard of the United 
States, appears from an analysis of those ports studied, to be a contributory factor to 
the problem of port congestion. 
Future research might usefully be conducted in the following areas :-
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1. The role of Gulf shipping lines (e .g . the United Arab Shipping Company) 
in the economic development of the Gulf . 
2 . The role of dry dock and ship repair yards in economic development. 
3. The feasibility of establishing a central routeing agency for the direction 
of ships to unoccupied berths within the Gulf cul-de-sac, thereby 
minimizing delay time. 
4 . The future of containerized 'feeder' vessels in the Gulf . 
6 .3 . THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
"He denied for instance that the world was round, and he had no conception 
of the geography away from the seas he knew". 
(Villiers, 1940, p.222) 
The theoretical implications which derive from this research are grouped under 
two headings: firstly, the specific nature of the role of seaports in the sphere of 
development; and secondly, the general impact of investment in transport facilities 
upon society. 
1. Seaports and Development 
Hoyl e and Hilling (1970) conclude that seaports are well placed to act either as 
a growth pole or obstructive influence upon development. Both oases are true in 
respect of Persian Gulf situation. The location of deep-water ports along the shores 
of the Gulf in fact represents the spatial pattern of urban and industrial growth in the 
region. With the exception of Iran, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, state economic development 
projects have concentrated in the port cities and port environs. Similarly, the 
obstructive influence of inadequate port facilities (in terms of shipping surcharges, 
delays, high costs of indirect imports) have been recognised by all Gulf states in their 
decisions to build deep- water harbours to balance earlier development of oil-exporting 
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terminals. 
However, Hoyle and Hilling's bald statement, although verifiable, perhaps 
misses a key point: Seaports are themselves inert. It is the dynamism, or lack of 
it, among decision-makers concerned with port development and operation that 
ultimately renders a port as a growth point, or obstructive influence upon growth. 
How a port is controlled, or reacts to control, is ultimately the differentiating 
factor. Accordingly, the spatial aspects of decision-making by parties concerned 
with the use of ports have the ultimate bearing on port success. 
Undoubtedly, the success of some of the ports of the Persian Gulf is attributable 
to the skill of local planners, merchants and industrialists in developing and 
utilizing port facilities so as to make the best use of specific local and regional 
circumstances. Dubai is probably the clearest example of a port deriving its success 
through the skilful decision-making of local entrepreneurs, foremost of which is its 
present Ruler. In each of the Gulf Shdikhdoms studied in depth - Kuwait, Bahrain 
and Dubai - the business acumen of their merchants is a major contributing factor 
in the relative success of their ports. 
However, in his study of the port of Hong Kong, T . N . Chiu concluded that, 
"the development of a port is not a function of local circumstances alone. Economic 
and social progress in the area it serves, the rise and fall of rivals, and the development 
of world shipping are all important factors to which a port readily responds" (ix, 1973). 
These processes are at least as significant in the Persian Gulf , where the major conclusion 
from the research carried out is that external factors affecting port development are of 
paramount consequence. 
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External factors may be sub-divided into two topics - the significance of port 
forelands and the role of external decision-making in international shipping 
organisation, and the functional association of seaports within the Gul f . 
Hoyle (1970) and Rimmer (1967) have commented that, with a few exceptions 
(e.g Boxer's 1961 study of Hong Kong), the analysis of seaports has been characterized 
by its neglect of the study of port forelands. Given its physical shape, this 
research has demonstrated the significance of foreland relationships in the (dhow 
based) entrepot trade of the Gulf Shaikhdoms of Kuwait, Bahrain and Dubai. 
Particularly in the case of Bahrain and Dubai, the nature of a cross-Gulf, short-sea, 
foreland linkages, rather than hinterland relationships, are a primary contributor to 
the commercial viability of their seaports. Further, with regard to international 
trade, this research has demonstrated the sensitive role played by shipping lines and 
shipping conferences in influencing the nature of port development problems with 
regard to port congestion and shipping surcharges. 
A final conclusion to be drawn from the data analysis is that the ports of the 
Persian Gulf are best viewed as a port complex rather than as individual units. This 
conclusion fits in with the work of Ogundana (1970), in Nigeria, where he recognfced 
that seaports should be assessed in a relative sense rather than an absolute sense, thereby 
allowing the character of a single port to be appreciated by its comparative functional 
relationship to other ports, especially neighbouring ports. This analysis of Gulf ports 
has revealed a high level of Interdependence. Broadly, the major seaports of the 
Arabian coast have a complementary relationship with the ports and coastal villages of 
the Iranian coast; whereas relations between the Arabian ports are both complementary 
in the sense of re-export trade, and competitive, by virtue of their relative sizes, 
levels of port congestion and rates of handling. 
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2 . The Socio! Impact of Transport Investment 
Taken as a whole, the net effect of change in the post 1862 era has been to draw 
the economies of each Gulf state, to a greater or lesser degree, into a wider, 
Interdependent world trading system in which the major seaports function as the 
central nodes linking the Gulf to all the major world economic heartlands. This 
process has culminated In a situation described by Mesarovic and Pestel (1975) as one 
in which, "the world cannot be described any more as a collection of some 1 0 0 - 1 5 0 
odd nations and an assortment of political blocks. Rather, the world must be viewed 
as consisting of nations and regions which form a world system, through an assortment 
of interdependencies" (p. 19). The Gulf is tied to the rest of the world through the principal 
interdependency of petroleum, rendering it a distinctive sub-system of the 'world economy*. 
Overal l , the result of concentrating investment patterns around the major points of 
linkage with the world economy, namely the larger port cities, the oil terminals and the 
seaports, has been to polarise economic development at specific points along the Gul f . 
The nature of investment in port facilities has therefore been to exacerbate spatially 
unbalanced growth within the Gulf . 
Whereas this pattern of investment has undoubtedly led to economic gains for many, if 
not all Gulf .states, it should be set against the social costs. It is necessary to pause and 
ask precisely what is the purpose of development? According to Boudeville's criteria (1966, 
pp .168 - 169) it is apparent that within the Gulf , 'growth' ( a set of increases in 
quantities produced) has been achieved, as has 'development' (growth, plus a favourable 
change in production techniques and In consumer behaviour). But has 'progress' (development 
plus a diminuation of social tensions between groups within a society) been achieved? 
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In a situation where investment has been concentrated in the major urban centres 
(many of which are seaports) the significance of the link between 'progress' and 
transport investment becomes cri t ical . Put simply, those regions lying outside 
the immediate environs of major urban centres are put at a disadvantage in development 
terms unless connected to centres of innovation and change by adequate transport 
facilities which allow the carriage of paraphernalia of progress. 
In many parts of the 'Third World' road transport development is seen as playing a 
major role in facilitating the spread of resources from core to periphery (Taaffe, Morrill 
and Gould, 1963). However, within the Gulf , coastal craft (dhows) play a vital role in 
performing the same function, linking remote villages to major centres of change. As 
such, the present declining picture of dhow transport activity is depressing. Unfortunately, 
a situation has arisen in the Gulf where governments, although making laudable efforts to improv< 
dhow berthing facilities (particularly Dubai) are loath to support local shipping financially, 
perhaps in spite of the fact that these craft are earners of overseas currency and provide 
a vital social service. Private enterprise is similarly uninterested. Couper (1973, p.193) 
makes observation, valid in the Gul f , that "this attitude arises from the mistaken view of 
local shipping as a single entity, rather than as part of a chain of transport which serves 
the export industry, and which may act as a stimulant to the social and econimic development 
of the country". Inadequate coastal shipping services in an environment like the Gulf or 
South Pacific means two things: firstly, the value of first rate international ocean-going 
shipping services will be diminished by poor local distribution; and secondly, outlying 
communities will suffer economic and social disadvantages. Couper's conclusion (p. 194) 
that, "the role of domestic shipping is thus basically to help overcome the dicotomy of 
incomes and opportunities between urban growth points and rural areas", applies equally to 
the Persian Gulf as it did to his work in the South Pacific, suggesting that investment in 
coastal shipping should be considered by governments and private enterprise, as a social, 
if not economic, necessity. \ 
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The dhow transport system of the Persian Gulf is now a peripheral transport 
system. This secondariness is a function of its diminished role in the transport of goods, 
passenger and information within the total world system. It no longer appears important 
in the pattern of linkages between nations, except in a local sense. As such, development, 
in the sense of development funds, has passed it by. In short, development in dhow 
transport is 'unplanned*. It is, in an interdependent world system where, "change in 
the operation of one part will have significant repercussions throughout the system" 
(Eliot Hurst, 1973), in a reflexive position, a stance of adjustment and adaptation to 
unhelpful changes generated in its external environment. Dhow transport, as a former 
institutional way of life is mistakenly in danger of being committed to the scrap heap of 
obsolescent technology. 
Foster (1962) has commented that, "investments that involve the least change in 
institutions . . . have the greatest likelihood of success" (p. 145), a point echoed by 
Kohn (1951, p. 51) who argues that modest projects which employ relatively little 
capital . . . and attempt . . . a minimum of disruption of settled habits of thinking and 
living are most likely to succeed than those which involve a mass frontal assault on 
non-western patterns of culture". In reality the Gulf has witnessed such a frontal 
assault by modern technology. Beaumont et a l , (1976, p. 327) conclude that, "it is an 
open question just how long traditional socio-economic patterns can be maintained . . . in 
the face of rapid and deliberate economic development". If G . W . Wilson (1966, p.223) 
is correct in assessing that, "what is required is something intermediate between a 
massive assault on culture and those investments which leave all else completely unchanged," 
then unless some investment, perhaps on a limited scale, to improve harbours, and craft 
operating in the coastal waters of the Persian Gulf , takes place to balance the enormous 
investment in deep-water harbours and ocean shipping, then the prophetic words of H. 
Brookfield (1973) will be given added meaning: 
"Development is the modern dynamic. Development of 
the poor nations of the world may even make their 
people poorer; but it is still development." p(xi). 
STATISTICAL APPENDIX 
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: Foreign Trade Matrix for the Persian Gulf States (Imports) 1971 ( I P millions of Kuwaiti Dinars) 
Origan 
DESTINATION 
Kuwait Bahrain Dubai Abu 
Dhabi 
Oman Qatar Saudi 
Arabia 
Iran Iraq 
1 1.56 o.ol* 0.07 0.09 _ 0.07 1.72 6.72 
2 6.72 0.50 0.05 0.15 0.06 0.03 0.89 1.02 -
3 3.25 O.Oli 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.25 3.23 0.13 1.33 
L - 3.11* 0.91 0.19 0.L0 1.07 7.36 5.99 3.29 
5 0.00 0.00 - 0.00 - - - 0.08 0.00 6 0.13 0.01 0.00 - - 0.00 - 0.00 0.13 
7 0.9h 1.1*3 1.71 0.18 0.H1 - 3.73 0.51 0.03 
8 7.36 11.10 0.1*1* 1.72 0.00 3.73 - 1.L7 0.B9 
9 0.58 0.00 - - - 0.00 2.67 0.05 0.21 
10 2.01 0.01* 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.19 0 .L8 0.10 3.63 
11 0.01 0.00 - - - - - 0.21 0.01 12 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 - 0.00 0 .L6 0.00 0.05 
13 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 - - 0.01 0.15 
11* 1.21 0.55 0.21 - 0.55 o.5L 1.72 0.17 0.15 
15 0 .L0 0.3P 1.35 0.55 - 0.1L 0.00 2.62 0.06 
16 1.13 - 1.36 0.L8 0.23 1.03 6.25 1.61 0.50 
17 0.25 0.00 - - - - - 1.91 0.02 
18 O.U 0.06 0.02 0.00 - 0.01 0.05 0.00 
19 0.12 0.22 0.00 - - - 3.28 - O.QL 20 6.55 2.26 6.30 o.65 0.69 1.22 1.1*7 - 0.50 
21 1.55 - 0.00 0.01 - - - 1.78 3-07 22 0.00 0.00 - - - 0.00 - 0.02 
23 0.08 - - - - - - 0.00 
2L 0.00 0.00 - - - - 0.03 0.00 
25 0.00 0.00 0.00 - 0.03 - - - 0.00 26 0.68 0.20 0.53* 0.07 O.H* 0.09 - O.Ll 0.35 
27 0.00 - - - 0.10 - - _ 28 0.1*3 0.00 0.06 - - - - - 0.00 
29 0.15 0.00 0.00 - 0.00 - - 0.1*1* 0.55 
30 0.06 0.00 0.00 - 0.05 - 0.03 0.00 
31 0.00 - - - - - - 0.02 
32 o.lo 0.09 0.01 0.00 - 0.06 8.33 0.12 0.08 
33 - 0.35 0.26 0.08 0.13 0.17 5.1*3 o.oL 
3L 0.92 0.11 0.11* 0.06 0.02 O.oL ~ 0.L3 
35 0.02 0.00 - - - 0.00 - l . L l 0.05 
36 0.10 0.03 0.00 - 0.09 - - 0.35 0.09 
37 0.57 0.01 0.22 0.05 0.00 0.02 1.12 L.86 2.03 
38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 - 0.00 _ 0.63 0.63 
39 0.10 0.00 - - - - - 0.23 0.01 
Lo 314.76 9.61* 9.55 8.03 0.12 3.77 L8.82 106.53 8.06 
hi 9.09 2* .1*0 2.51* 0.06 0.12 0.59 - 3.39 9.62 
h2 3.90 2.10 2.67 0.02 0.07 0.26 2.00 1.05 0.02 
13 6.014 2.29 3.53 0.35 0.96 1.10 5.LL 11.58 6.61 
hh O.OL 0.01 0.00 - - - - - 0.00 
L5 33.31 9.89 13.63 1.92 0.73 L.06 32 87 98.61 5.67 
I16 14.76 1.83 1.90 0.L7 0.52 0.99 3.81 2.21 2.L5 
hi 0.06 COO 0.06 0.00 - - - O.Ll 0.00 
hB 0.80 0.20 0.1*0 0.00 0.02 0.00 2.29 1.9L L.26 
h9 2.07 0.87 0.1*0 - 0.00 0.01 - L.67 0.12 
SO 1.57 0.18 O.LO - 0.10 0.05 L.00 2.50 0.38 
51 0.21 O.2I4 0.60 - 0.9L - _ - 0.39 
52 1.13 0.31 0.52 0.13 O.OL 0.3L - 6.99 2 .L3 
53 3.62 0.1*0 0.5L 0.36 o.oL 0.L9 7.19 16.09 9.28 
51 3.02 0.90 0.7L 0.1*2 0.07 0.16 - 5.70 3.68 
55 11*. 07 0.93 1.23 0.81 0.05 0 93 6.2L 33.62 10.85 
56 17.95 3. Hi 2.72 1.60 0.30 1.76 22.9L H16.LI 6.62 
57 29.36 214.35 13.98 10.92 2.32 Hi. 1*9 26.01 79.33 22.30 
58 0.80 0.03 C.01 0.01 O.OO 0.01 - 0.67 0.91 
59 5.68 lj .26 2.L0 1.35 0.L3 0.91 ! 13.1*1. 17.13 L.05 
60 0.17 0.02 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.02 _ - 0.09 
61 9.86 2.1*0 1.56 0.90 0.05 1.36 12.78 33.83 5.50 
62 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.03 - 1.1L 0.07 
63 O.2/4 0.11 P. 18 0.02 0.00 0.02 1.6L 0.5L 
6L 0.00 0.02 0.1c 0.00 0.00 0.00 - - 0.93 
65 2.03 0.96 0.18 0.06 0.17 0.03 0.32 6.78 1.52 
66 1.93 0.25 0.L6 0.21* 0.01 0.12 1.90 7.75 7.LL 
67 3.1*6 1.03 7.03 0.19 O.OB 0.33 L.10 12.69 2.88 
6e 0-75 O.Ol* 0.03 0.C1 0.00 0.00 - 1.L5 3-9L 
69 1.71 0.23 0.63 0.05 0.02 0.08 - 11*. U L.92 
70 1.03 0.02 0.1L 0.03 0.00 0.03 . - 0.06 3.22 
71 1.90 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.06 I - 7.1*' 2.26 
72 1.11 0.11 0.12 0.07 0.00 0.01* 1 - 3.L6 5.13 
73 2.01 0 06 0.11 0.00 CO'' 16.35 0.6? 
714 2.66 0.08 0.32 0.13 0.13 0.08 - 69.06 21.29 
75 O.80 0.06 0.03 C O : - c o n ; 0 37 L.68 1.30 1 
76 6.1*9 1.91* 1.35 0 80 0.83 0.76 - icv 2.63 i 
77 0.12 0.00 0.03 0.00 o.co 0.00 - 0 h; O.OL j 
1 
/ C o i . ' - <<1. . . 
TABLE C 329 
(Cont'd.) 
DESTINATION 
Origin Kuwait Bahrain Dubai Abu Oman Qatar Saudi Iran Iraq 
Dhabi Arabia 
70 13.01 0.99 0.72 0.76 0.11 3.27 37.65 Jj.21 7.80 
79 0.10 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 - - 0.91 
80 0.U3 0.12 0.37 0.3k 0.00 0.00 6.70 1.20 6.77 
81 1.2U 1.60 - 3.6a 0.8*4 1.38 1.7*4 I 4 . O J 4 0.06 
82 0.65 0.08 0.05 0.00 - 0.01 - 1.66 0.13 
83 0.9b 0.80 1.09 0.12 0.15 0.15 - 1.33 0.9li 81 0.05 0.00 - ~ - - 0.06 
Source : Published Off ic ia l Government Foreign Trade Statistics, 1971, for the States of Kuwait, 
Bahrain, United Arab Emirates (Dubai and Abu Dhabi), Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Iran 
and Iraq, converted into Kuwaiti Dinars at rates specified in Section 3.5.1 of the text. 
KEY TO TABLE F 
1. Egypt 35. Argentina 69. Czechoslovakia 
2. Iraq 36. Brazi l 70. E . Germany 
3- Jordan 37. Canada 71. Hungary 
k. Kuwait 38. Cuba 72. Poland 
5. Libya 39. Mexico 73. Rumania 
6. Morocco ko. U.S.A. 71. U.S.S.R. 
7. Qatar k l . China 75. Yugoslavia 
8. Saudi Arabia k2. Hong Kong 76. Australia 
9. Sudan k3. India 77. New Zealand 
10. Syria kk. Indonesia 76. Lebanon 
11. Tunisia ltS- Japan 79. Finland 
12. Yemen 16. Pakistan 60. Malaysia 
13. Dem. Yemen ii7. Philippines 81. Dubai 
Ik. Abu DhaDi ue. S n Lanka 62. S. Korea 
15. Oman 1*9. Taiwan 83. Singapore 
16. Bahrain 50. Thailand 8I1. Mauritius 
17. Af gnanistan 51. Burma 
16. Cyprus 52. Austria 
19. Ethiopia 53. Belgium 
20. Iran su. Denmark - = No trade 21. Turkey 55. France 0.00 = Trade of less 
22. Angola 56. West Germany 
23. Cameroon 57. U.K. 
21. Ghana 58. Greece 
25- Ivory Coast 59. Holland 
26. Kenya 60. Ireland 
27. Liberia 61. I taly 
26. Malagasy 62. Luxembourg 
29. Mozambique 63. Norway 
30. Nigeria 6I1. Portugal 
31. Senegal 65. Spain 
32. Somalia 66. Sweden 
33. South Africa 67. Switzerland 
3k. Tanzania 68. Bulgaria 
TABLE D 
Dn-v. flows - 1971 
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1 
! ( l ) Incoming Dlio>rS - Destination 
(2) Outpomr D ' I - U - - Origin 
r K U H 11 ~ Kihr 1 • Dui-ai Doha Ab'„ "1.' a-i Pest] n_ ,: or B_hru.li Doha Dubai 
1 Abja.i-. 3066 9 21 _ 36 21 19 
' 'it,u Dhabi 60 67 103 102 - 80 99 73 j Aden _ 3 40 * - - - - 3 1 As,alo - - - - - 15 2 1 A,, j arn at 21 - - - 24 33 -i B-u r"_r Abe as 7 828 - - 7 6 593 1 Eacidu - - 24 - - - - 9 
1 Bust-no _ 11 - - - - - 75 | Eurijl _ _ 28 - - - - 10 | 3 . M'uallrc - - 46 - - - - 17 ] Bushire 294 457 9 - - 375 228 37 ' Basrah 6 2 45 7 - - 6 59 
\ Bahrain 162 - 271 205 80 - 159 175 
Berbera - 2 - - - - - -| E'ShahDOdr 24 - 11 - - 2 - -1 Eu lkha ir 12 4 - - - 47 3 24 [ Eahmasrir 1188 - - - - - - -! Chalat - - 53 - - 1 3 1 ! Chahtiahar - - 66 - - - - 27 
j Charah 6 1 * 53 - - 3 9 18 ' Chivu - - - - - - 3 2 Dulab _ - 3 - - - 3 29 
Deyrestar - - 20 - - - - 5 Dijibouti - - 2 - - - - -Dona 24 92 274 - 99 78 - 233 
I Dae 18 13 1 - - 34 9 3 
! Dubai 132 170 ~ 332 73 147 255 -
, Lankan - 14 - - 235 6 5 Darfwan 30 1 11 - - 8 - 50 
1 Daj;yer - 45 - - - I1 30 29 
Dili»_ 30 52 - - - 82 3 -
L? v\ i am J02 - - - - 6 3 1 
Dibca - - — — - - - 5 
Fasahandar - - - - - - - 56 Fac 750 - - - - - - 1 Gosoar 2790 - 12 - - - - 3 
' Garaveh 132 10 2 - - 20 3 8 
1 G*adar - - 3 - - _ 39 herja/n - - 29 - 7 
< Vzrmuz - - 27 -
_ 20 
! hendijan 264 - - - _ _ - -
^ ' I r a n ' - - - 350 118 -
_ 
-
; ' I n d i a ' 12 23 1153 24 - 6 99 
Jash - 91 - - - 45 
i Juba i l - - - - - 13 - 1 
' Jebe, D'-_rLna - - - - - 1 -| Knoeab - - 3 - 1 - 50 
} rorra ic ia 'ar 600 27 47 - - 26 21 
1A. 
Konc-a-' _ _ 63 - - - - 8 
Karear - - 76 - - - 70 
: hung - 290 - i 1 12 103 
| Khamir - 80 - 1 - - 192 K_rri-b_ra.-. - - 13 - - - - 5 
Kutch - - 10 - - _ 25 
' Kuhestak - - 8 - - 2 
! K U W £ . l t - 81 151 49 - 130 113 
1 Al hroDar 18 1129 124 27 1629 27 99 
hhor Faiucar 6 11 50 - - 1 1 2 : 84 
Karachi - 1 1 - - ; 1 95 
Kargoci - 21 - ' 44 18 1 
'Chaffi 6 1 _ - 1 5 : Kharg 12 - - - I 1 -Xnor Marked - - _ - i " 1 1 ~ 
YYCILTC, ab-ic 1308 4 - - > - i 5 
Lm^eh - - 60 - 1 - * 87 
; Lavan - - - - ! " i 1 21 15 
' Larak - - 9 - 1 
1 ~ 1 
- - 4 
, Laft - - 16 - i - i 1 _ 35 
! Lo^ar - 13 - - ; - 1 48 3 7 
. Menab - - 72 • i ' i - - 38 
Mr nv - - 17 - ! - ! 8 32 
M.ccat 30 17 267 | - I i 37 36 207 
- - ! i 1 
V,, - - 4 - , 1 3 7 
I _ , i t , i . a _ _ 1 - • -
- 2 - 1 1 ; 3 3 6 
> h.iUcind - - - ; i ~* 3 1 ' P e K l t t » n ' - - i 1 - -
Puhul - - - 1 - 6 427 
Qtckm - 5 ! 26 - 1 _ 1 ! - 111 - - ; 10 - - 1 - 49 
Rat M Khaimah 1? 8 4 - 3 3 55 
/Cci I ' d . 
TABLE D 
I Dhow Flows - 1971 (Cont'd.) 
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O r i / i r , 
( l ) Incominp D h o w s - Destination 
bcz X1 n \ - . 1 0 
(2) Outgoing Lhows - Origin 
k\.i»a: t P a h r a i r D v . i 11 L o r n A L u J i l n n r JiriJ '1 l A i b n i 
Rig 30 6 _ _ 11 1 
Has Tanura - 13 - , - - 105 _ a Salakh - - 1 - - - 13 Sauduni 2310 - 2 - - 1 3 2 Suza - - 43 - - - - 50 Sharjah 12 7 40 4 - 4 - 29 Sinq - - 26 - - - - 19 Sur - 23 - - - - 102 Sahout - 5 1 - - - - 4 Salala - - - - 1 - 80 Somalia - - - - - - - 5 Secrutia - - - - - - - 3 Seeb - - - - - - - 12 Sohar - 10 - - - 6 - 3 Taheeri - 1 - - - 4 18 -Tiban - - - - - - 1? -Totnbok - 1 - - - 2 3 -Tiab - _ - - - - - 17 Tang - - - - - - - 6 Tunazeb - 1 - - - - - 1 Vam Said - - - - - 1 -Qatif - 46 - - - 122 - -Kalba - - - - 3 - -Sultan - - - - - - - 25 'Africa' - - - - - - - 1 Kunji - - - - - - 12 Sri Lanka - - 124 - - - - 360 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Al K h o b a r 
•Iraq* 60 
• Co an* 89 
'Iran' 198 
(9) 
Sources s ( l ) - Figures obi-i'ned from Port and Customs Department, Kuwait 
(2) and (6) - " " " Manama 
(3) and (8) - " " . . . . . . . . - j y , ^ 
(4) and (7) - Figures supplied by Ministry of Comrtuncations and Transport, Ports Department, Doha. 
(5) - Foreign Trade Stat is t ical Report, Ministry of Finance, Customs Departmert, Abu Dhabi, 1971, p43 
(9) - Stat i s t ica l Yearbook, 1971, Ministry of Finance ana national Ecocontf, Central Dept. of 
Statist ics , South Arabia, p260. 
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TABLE E . Population of Iranian Towns and Villages 
on Persian Gulf Coast, 1 9 6 6 . 
Abadan 2 7 2 , 9 6 2 Kargan khl 
Asalo 1 , 0 9 1 Rung i | , 2 8 5 
Ayyarnat - Khamir 1 , 7 6 8 
Bandar Abbas 3 2 , 6 2 8 Kumubarak 1 8 2 
Basidu U 9 1 ! Runes tak 6 8 2 
Bustano 1 , 0 1 0 Rangoon 3 , 3 7 0 
Bunji 2 8 3 s ' Kharg 5 , 2 6 2 
B. M'uallm 5 0 1 Khosrowabad 3 5 3 
Bushire 2 3 , 5 2 7 Lingeh 7 , 2 1 8 
B. Shahpour 6,013 ' Lavan 
Bulkhair 5 8 0 Larak 1*16 
Bahmashir 2 , 1 7 9 Laft 1 , 3 3 5 
Chalat 1 1 5 Lowor 3 1 h 
Chahbahar _ Me nab 5 ,310 
Charak 5 1 8 • Mraw 9 6 7 
Chivu 5 0 2 Mogan 9h2 
Dulab 7 0 3 Naband 16 
Deyrestan 5 0 7 ' Puhul 1 , 2 2 6 
Dargwan 2 , 0 2 U Qeshm i | , 7 0 3 
Dayyer hhh Qais 5 7 3 
Dilwa (Delvaz) 8 9 2 I Rig 2 , 5 3 7 






Gosbar 1 , 2 6 3 : Suza 
) 
2 ,098 
Ganaveh h,09k [ S i r iq 189 : 
Henjam 1*18 i Taheen 199 ' 
Hormuz 2 , 1 * 1 0 ! Tiban 6 3 , 
Hendijan 3 , 7 5 7 • Tonibok 1,21*2 
Jask 1 , 2 6 8 ' Tiab 8 5 7 
Khorrams ha.hr 8 8 , 5 3 6 1 Tang 1 2 1 ; 
Konor ak 
Source : Government of Iran, Second National Census, 1 9 6 6 . 
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TABLE F 
Geographical Distances betweer the Portt, of Kuwait, Eahraan, Doha and Dubai, 
ard Porte on the Soutnerri Iranian Coast. 
Distances (Uni t s ) 
Kuwait Bahrain Doha Dubai 
Abadan 93 333 435 594 
Bushire 189 202 277 418 
Bandar Shahpoiir 121 337 - 582 Bulkhair 212 176 246 380 
Bahmashir 70 - - -Charak 469 24fl 208 127 
Dargwan . 597 410 - -Dllwa 216 I69 239 -Day lam 150 285 367 507 
Qosbar 70 - - 570 Ganaveh 169 244 323 462 
Hendi jan 130 - -Khorraroshahr 107 347 449 
Kharg I s land 154 220 
Khosrowabad 80 320 
Big 170 240 - 460 
Sauduni 65 305 407 567 
Ayyarnat - 149 185 -Bandar Abbas - 411 366 158 Bost aru - 273 - 100 Chalat - 221 190 Dayyer - 146 188 295 Kung - 297 253 102 Kangan - 15C 189 162 Lavan I s land - 192 170 172 Laf t - 355 - 140 Lowar - 156 220 -
Mr aw - 263 220 -Mogan - 205 178 180 Qeshm - 393 - 142 Taheeri - 154 182 -Tombok - 150 185 -Tunazeh - 243 - -Asalu - - 177 254 Chi vu - - 183 149 
Dulab - - 283 114 Lingeh - - 247 101 Nab and - - 168 240 
Puhul - - 288 121 Tib an - - 167 Bandar M'uallm - - - 103 Basidu - - - 100 ! Khamir - - - 139 Henyam - - - 110 Salakh - - - 110 Deyrestan - - - 115 Susa - - - 126 Hormuz - - - 157 Larak - - - 142 Tiab - - - 173 Menab - - - 185 Kuhestak - - - 161 S i n q - - 163 Bunji - - - 182 Kumubarak - - 190 Jask - - 228 Kuch - - - 353 Tang - - - 37? Konorak - - - 418 Chahbahar - - 422 Qai6 - - - 132 Fasabandar _ 482 
TABLE G : Merchant Questionnaire - Firms Interviewed 
Kuwait 
Badr Al-Salem (B) 
Khalid Al-Ghanaim (B) 
Abdullah Al-Qatarai (B 
Mustafa Sultan (B ,F 
Al Sagar Company (B) 
Central Market Establishment ( f ) 
W.J. Towell ( F ) 
Shuaib Company ( f ) 
Braz i l i a Company ( f ) 
Al-Raad Company ( f ) 
Sulaiman Abdul Karim ( F ) 
C. Purchottam Company ( F ) 
Marafie Company ( F ; 
Jassim Wassan ( F ) 
Mustafa and Majid ( F ) 
International Malls Company ( f ) 
Al Ghanim Company (c) 
Y.M. Behbani (c) 
Technical Appliances Company (c) 
Electr ica l Applicances Company (c) 
Contemporary Lights Company (c) 
Dubai 
Royal Traders 





United Rice Company 
Youssef Akbar All Reza 
Jinda Tea Sales 




Damodar Das Lukhumal Gajria 
Id Mahmoud Modica 
Zayani Company 
Arab Building Materials Company 
Cicon Company 
Rashid Al-Majid 
Mohammed and Ahmed Haji 
Youssef Rahmani 




Youssef Akbar Al l Reza 
Shukralla Company 
Mohammed All Zanal 





(F) Akund Awazi 
(F) Al Nafa Company 
(F) H.E. Muftah 
(F) Mohammed Al-Kazi 
(F) Kewalram 
(F) Ahmed Kazim 








Key Major commodity type traded 
(c) = Consumer goods 
(F) = Foodstuffs 
(B) = Building materials 
335 
TAJ3LE E : Merchant Interviews - Questionnaire 
Name of Firm: 
1. What commodities are traded "by the firm? 
2. Do you import directly, or indirectly, from the sources of supply? 
3. What i s the country of origin of each type of commodity imported? 
4- What i s the estimated proportion of your stock that i s : 
(a) consumed internally 
(b) re-exported 
(c) held m stock 
5 . Which are the most important re-export markets for each commodity 
traded? 
6. What i s the rationale behind the firm's abil i ty to re-export 
commodities to other States bordering the Persian Gulf, and/or to 
Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the Indian subcontinent? 
7 . What mode of transport i s used to convey re-exported comniodities 
to external markets? 
8. To what degree are re-export commodity trades subject to seasonal 
or other fluctuations m demand? 
336 
TABLE I 
Compdrative Co-Terence 'Base Freighl 
foi Selected Commodities, 1971• 


























































































































































































































































Index = 102 
29.00 43.75 37.25 37.64* I8O.34 
24.00 69.30 ! 59-00 37.84* 214.14 
34.00 63.45 54.00 41.79* 220.24 
37.00 75-20 118.50 35-79* 303.99 
55.00 74.00 63.00 42.34* 279-84 
55.00 86.35 75-50 57-99* 331-34 
34.00 62.55 53-25 44-59* 228.89 




i Index = 101 
29.00 46.12* ; 37.25 38.39* 185.26 
24.00 76.23* 59.OO 38.39* 224-62 
34.00 69.79* 54.OO 42.34* 227.13 
37-00 82.72* I I 8 . 5 0 36.34* 312.06 
55.00 81.40* 63.OO 42.89* 287-79 
55-00 94.98* 75-50 58.54* 340.52 
34.00 68.80* 53-25 45-14* 235.69 
63.00 95.64* 74.00 58.54* 355-18 
EE 2168.25 
Index = 104 
29.00 48.12* ' 37-?5 36.38* 183-25 
24.00 76.23* 59.00 36.38* 222.61 
34.00 69.79* 54.00 4 C 5 3 * 225.32 
37.00 82.72* 118.50 34.23* 309.95 
55.00 81.40* 1 63.00 41.10* 286.00 
55.00 94.9"* 75-50 57-54* 339-52 
34.00 6S.8O* 53-25 43.47* 234.02 




Index = 104 
29.00 43-75 37 • ?5 41.04* + 183.54 
24.00 69.3C 59.00 41.04* + 220.34 
34-00 63.4: , 54 00 1 44.99** 2?3.44 
37.00 7 ' . 20 I18.SO 36.99* + 307.19 
5: .00 74-00 t ,. 5C •54"H 282. L4 
r-5.00 8 6 . ; ' b 30 61 .]o* , 334-54 
34.00 v.. C ' I . - J 4 1. "'9* + 232.09 
6 3. CO h i . ' / , C 1 . i9» + 349-14 
h2 1 ,].b, 
TABLE I 337 











































































































































































































































































































Index = 114 
Rice j 37.40+ 3^.00+ 51.95+ 1 44.25+ 37.85+ I 205.45 
Cement 1 31.90+ 26.50+ 77.50+ 66.00+ 37.85+ 239-75 
Stee l Bar ' 31.90+ 39.OO+ 71.65+ 60.00+ 41-80+ I 244.35 
Timber ! 42.40+ 42.00+ 83.40+ ; 125.50+ 35-80+ I 329-10 
A/C \ 50.40+ 60.00+ 82.20 + 70.00+ 42-35 + ; 304-95 
Household Cooas 61.40+ 60.00+ 94.55+ : 82.50+ 58.00+ \ 356.45 
Cars 39-40+ 39.00+ 70.75+ ! 60.25+ 44.60+ ' 254.OO 
Clothing ' 68.90- 68.00+ 95.15+ ! 81.00- 58.00+ 371.05 
! ! 
1 EE 2305.10 
Ras Al-Khaunah ! 1 Index = 111 | 
Rice | 37.40+ 34.CO+ 51-95+ '; 44.25+ 37-55+ 1 205.45 
Cement 1 31.90+ c'6.50 + 7/.50+ ! 66.00+ 37-85+ 1 239-75 
Steel Bar 31 • 90+ 39.00+ 71.65+ 60.00+ 41.80+ 1 244-35 
Timber 1 4.' . 40 + 42.00+ 63.40+ 125.50+ 3>S0+ 329.10 
A / C 50.40+ 60.00+ 8.'. 20 + 70.00+ 42.35 + 304.95 
Household Goods , 61.4U+ 60 00 T 54 55+ 82.50+ -,8.00 + 156-45 
Cars 35-40+ 39.00+ /U.75+ 1 00. , ' j + 41.60+ 254 - 00 
01 othmr 6? . 00+ c.8.l\> ";.15+ r,i 00. 5 U no,. 371.05 
j EE ^305 10 
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